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STRIDING OUT OF BABEL: ORIGINALISM, ITS CRITICS, AND
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André LeDuc*
This Article pursues a therapeutic approach to end the debate over constitutional
originalism. For almost fifty years that debate has wrestled with the question whether
constitutional interpretations and decisions should look to the original intentions,
expectations, and understandings with respect to the constitutional text, and if not,
what. Building on a series of prior articles exploring the jurisprudential foundations
of the debate, this Article characterizes the debate over originalism as pathological.
The Article begins by describing what a constitutional therapy is.
The debate about originalism has been and remains sterile and unproductive, and
the lack of progress argues powerfully for the conclusion that a successful resolution
of the debate is not likely to be achieved by any of the protagonists. Instead, the debate
should be abandoned.
At a conceptual level, there are a variety of sources for the pathology of the de-
bate, but a series of tacit ontological and other jurisprudential assumptions play a
central role. The Article explains why neither side in the debate over constitutional
originalism can hope to prevail. Any hope to revive or reconstruct the debate seems
at once implausible and unlikely to deliver any significant doctrinal or methodologi-
cal payoff to our American constitutional law. If we articulate the tacit premises of the
debate, we can recognize why the debate over originalism reflects more confusion
than substantive disagreements. As we do so, we begin to see the way forward beyond
the debate. Making the source of the debate’s disagreements appear confused rather
than important also provides ample motivation to move on. This Article concludes by
arguing that such a postdebate constitutional discourse and practice is indeed pos-
sible, as well as desirable.
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INTRODUCTION: WHY THERAPY?
The second most interesting and important question with respect to the decades-
long debate over originalism is why it is still going on. After all, who doesn’t want
it to be over? The most important and interesting question is whether we can end the
debate. Two questions, rarely asked and never before answered.1
This Article answers both questions: we may end the unhappy debate over origi-
nalism and move beyond it by employing a therapeutic approach. That therapeutic
approach recognizes that simply continuing to develop the arguments that have been
made in the debate within the framework that informs the protagonists’ stances is
a dead end.
The debate over originalism has dominated and haunted American jurispru-
dence for half a century.2 Other celebrated jurisprudential controversies—like the
1 Dworkin and Marmor, in their proclamations of the end of originalism, tacitly or directly
express surprise that the debate continues. See ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND
LEGAL THEORY 155 (rev. 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter MARMOR, INTERPRETATION] (“The wide-
spread attraction of ‘originalism’ is one of the main puzzles about theories of constitutional
interpretation.”); Ronald Dworkin, Bork’s Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 659, 674
(1990) (book review) [hereinafter Dworkin, Bork] (arguing that Bork’s purported defense of
originalism in The Tempting of America, which Dworkin characterizes as “generally regarded
as confused and unhelpful,” in fact highlighted the shortcomings, concluding that “Bork’s
defense of the original understanding thesis is a complete failure”). A decade later, Marmor
was more cautious in his dismissal of originalism. See generally ANDREI MARMOR, THE LAN-
GUAGE OF LAW 132–36, 152–55 (2014) [hereinafter MARMOR, LANGUAGE OF LAW]. In assert-
ing that the question has never been answered, I am excluding answers from both sides of the
debate that proclaim victory, as those claims have repeatedly proven unfounded or premature.
2 One of the most insightful accounts of the debate comes from a contemporary intel-
lectual historian. See DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 232–42 (2011). Professor
Rodgers’s reading of the current state of the debate is different from mine, but his account
of the key elements—including the anachronicity of originalism and its origin in response
to the Warren Court—is largely congruent with the analysis here. The voluminousness of the
debate has been often remarked. See, e.g., GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 15 (1992) [hereinafter BASSHAM, PHILOSOPHICAL
STUDY] (“extraordinary outpouring of literature” since 1977); DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 13 (2005) [hereinafter
GOLDFORD, DEBATE] (citing Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of
Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669, 673 (1991)) (“the truly voluminous
literature”); James A. Gardner, The Positivist Foundations of Originalism: An Account and
Critique, 71 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1991). As early as 1989, the voluminous nature of the debate
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Hart-Dworkin debate over legal positivism3—have been far less important as a
practical matter by comparison. Moreover, the debate has not been confined to the
academy, but has been at least as important in the judicial sphere.4 How one thinks
about constitutional interpretation shapes the ways in which one thinks that constitu-
tional cases should be argued and decided. It also shapes the desired qualifications
for appointments to the Supreme Court. The practical importance of this debate en-
tails its philosophical importance.5 But the debate over originalism is at a dead end.
Originalism asserts that the United States Constitution should be interpreted, con-
strued, and applied according to its original understanding or intent.6 Implicitly or
had already drawn comment. See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1086 (1989) [hereinafter Farber, Perplexed].
3 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 15–45 (1977); H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 88, 91 (1961). But see Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Berman, Originalism] (arguing that originalism shares the fea-
ture of inconsistent, competing versions for which the originalists criticize non-originalists).
4 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS
ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 23 (2005) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, RADICALS] (quoting and crit-
icizing both principal 2004 presidential candidates’ statements on the proper canons of con-
stitutional interpretation); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54
TEX. L. REV. 693, 706 (1976) [hereinafter Rehnquist, Living] (“[T]he living Constitution is
genuinely corrosive of the fundamental values of our democratic society.”); Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 851–54 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia,
Lesser Evil] (acknowledging potential objections by leading academic constitutional com-
mentators to originalism on the basis of Rawlsian political philosophy and the “values that
are fundamental to our society” but concluding that, on balance, originalism offers the
strongest theoretical foundation for constitutional interpretation and, by implication, decision
(quoting Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 227 (1980))); GOLDFORD, DEBATE, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that Senator Orrin
Hatch has publicly articulated an originalist position).
5 For classical statements of this pragmatist perspective, see WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM
18 (Thomas Cross & Philip Smith eds., Dover Publications 1995) (1907) (“The pragmatic
method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be
interminable. . . . If no practical difference what[so]ever can be traced, then the alternatives
mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we
ought to be able to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or the
other’s being right.”); see also JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY vii–xli (Beacon
Press 1948) (1920). For a contemporary pragmatist statement of this emphasis upon practical
consequences, see Robert B. Brandom, A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination:
The Normative Fine Structure of the Judges’ Chain Novel, in PRAGMATISM, LAW, AND
LANGUAGE 19, 19–20 (Graham Hubbs & Douglas Lind eds., 2014) [hereinafter Brandom,
Legal Concept Determination] (describing the implications for a theory of law of skepticism
regarding our ability to determine the meaning of authoritative legal texts).
6 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 23–25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia,
INTERPRETATION]; MARMOR, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 155.
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explicitly, that commitment is contrasted with contrary commitments—to interpret
and construe the Constitution prudentially or as we would understand it today, for
example.7 Originalism’s critics deny that originalism was intended or understood by
the Founders to be the right approach to the Constitution.8 They variously deny that
originalism is possible, that it is coherent, and that it is prudent.9
Originalism distinguishes itself from strict construction on the basis that origi-
nalism admits interpretations that encompass the full meaning of the constitutional
text.10 Originalism is also to be distinguished from textualism because it is focused
on the original historical understandings of the text, not the text itself.11 Moreover,
in the case of those forms of originalism that privilege historical expectations or in-
tentions with respect to the text, originalism is twice removed from the text itself.
New Originalism distinguishes itself from traditional or original forms of origi-
nalism in two ways. It privileges the historical public understanding of the meaning
of the constitutional text;12 the private understandings or intentions with respect to
that text are irrelevant.13 It also recognizes that the constitutional text may not appear
to readily answer our contemporary constitutional questions.14 In those cases, New
7 Critics of originalism have not suggested that the text or the original understanding of
that text is irrelevant. But they have generally denied exclusive, privileged, or final authority
to the text’s original understanding or intentions. No attempt will be made to catalogue the
critics of originalism. Some originalists, like Judge Bork, believe that the varieties of criticism—
and their general inconsistency with each other—themselves generate an argument against
such criticism and in favor of originalism. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 254 (1990) [hereinafter BORK, TEMPTING];
Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 44–45. But see Berman, Originalism, supra note
3 (arguing that originalism equally presents multiple, inconsistent variations).
8 See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 885 (1985) (asserting that there was no original understanding that the Constitution
would be interpreted according to its original understanding).
9 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 65–78.
10 See Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 37–38 (conceding that “[originalist in-
terpretation] is not strict construction, but it is reasonable construction”).
11 Id. at 38.
12 Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620
(1999) [hereinafter Barnett, Originalism].
13 BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 144 (asserting that public understandings, not pri-
vate understandings, are dispositive and giving the hypothetical example of a letter from
George Washington to his wife articulating and endorsing an idiosyncratic understanding of
the constitutional text that should be given no weight).
14 See Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 45–46 (“Sometimes (though not very
often) there will be disagreement regarding the original meaning; and sometimes there will
be disagreement as to how the original meaning applies . . . .”); Lawrence B. Solum, Origi-
nalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 471 (2013) [hereinafter
Solum, Constitutional Construction] (“Irreducible ambiguity, vagueness, contradictions, and
gaps create constitutional questions that cannot be resolved simply by giving direct effect to 
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Originalists call for constitutional construction to resolve such remaining constitu-
tional controversies.15 Constitutional construction’s general notion is that some con-
stitutional texts may be interpreted according to their original understanding;16 other
constitutional texts are more indeterminate.17 The more indeterminate texts require
more than interpretation for their application to the constitutional controversies
presented by constitutional cases.18
The debate has been sustained and voluminous, and it shows no sign of subsid-
ing.19 Moreover, the debate has been marked (marred) by extravagant claims and in-
temperate, shrill rhetoric.20 As early as 1971 a leading originalist, Robert Bork, noted
that the debate about constitutional adjudication theory had become “lengthy and often
acrimonious.”21 An important critic, Laurence Tribe, has also noted the unhappy
tone of the debate.22 Indeed, Amy Gutmann’s sensible and provocative strategy of
assembling Justice Scalia, Dworkin, and Tribe (among others) for an exchange on
the rule of constitutional law that directly corresponds to the communicative content of the
constitutional text. Such cases are underdetermined by the meaning of the text . . . .”).
15 Solum, Constitutional Construction, supra note 14, at 469 (calling for construction
“when the meaning of the constitutional text is unclear, or the implications of that meaning
are contested”). See generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Dis-
tinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 95 (2010) [hereinafter Solum, Interpretation-Construction
Distinction] (“I shall argue that the distinction [between interpretation and construction] is
both real and fundamental—that it marks a deep difference in two different stages (or moments)
in the way that legal and political actors process legal texts.”).
16 Solum, Constitutional Construction, supra note 14, at 458.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 469.
19 See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM (2013) (arguing that
originalism has not demonstrated a meaningful constraint on judicial decision); William
Baude, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) [here-
inafter Baude, Originalism as a Constraint] (describing the originalist movement away from
the questionable claim that originalism provides an external constraint to the more limited
claim that originalism constrains in the space of reasons and Baude’s positivist claims and
the semantic and linguistic claims of the New Originalism more generally); William Baude
& Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079 (2017) [hereinafter
Baude & Sachs, Law of Interpretation]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal
“Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
1235 (2015) [hereinafter Fallon, Meaning].
20 See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 54 (characterizing Judge Douglas
Ginsburg’s characterization of critics of originalism: “He writes as if those who reject
originalism reject the Constitution itself. They’re lawless.”); Robert H. Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (1971) [hereinafter Bork,
Neutral Principles].
21 Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 20, at 1. Others have echoed that assessment. See
Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 72 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Tribe, INTERPRETATION].
22 Tribe, INTERPRETATION, supra note 21, at 72.
106 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:101
originalism ultimately fell flat.23 Not even the quiet splendor of Princeton University
could catalyze a respectful and constructive exchange.
The debate has been declared over many times.24 Nearly two decades ago, writ-
ing in the University of Chicago Law Review, Ronald Dworkin proclaimed the end
of originalism as a plausible, mainstream theory of constitutional interpretation:
“[Bork’s] arguments are so weak, and Bork’s apparent concessions to his critics so
comprehensive, that his book might mark the end of the original understanding thesis
as a serious constitutional philosophy.”25 More recently, Andrei Marmor, one of the
leading legal philosophers of his generation, was equally dismissive of originalism.26
Justice Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings deepen our unease with the terms on
which the debate is carried out and, more importantly, our concerns with our con-
stitutional discourse more generally. Those hearings confirmed the urgency of the
remedial therapeutic task. In those hearings, Justice Sotomayor characterized her
decisional stance simply as one of fidelity to law.27 Those hearings reflect the
23 A Matter of Interpretation prints the papers presented at a Princeton University
conference at which Justice Scalia presented the principal paper on which Laurence Tribe
and Ronald Dworkin, among others, commented. When I assert that the exchange falls flat,
I should note that the volume publishing Justice Scalia’s remarks, the comments thereon, and
Justice Scalia’s replies have been very frequently cited and provide a more precise statement
of certain views of the protagonists. Nevertheless, absent from the exchange is any real sense
of intellectual engagement or enthusiasm for dialogue.
24 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980) [hereinafter ELY, DEMOCRACY]; Dworkin, Bork, supra note 1, at 674 (“[W]e
are entitled, on the evidence of [The Tempting of America], to store the theory [of original-
ism] away with phlogistonism and the bogeyman.”).
25 Dworkin, Bork, supra note 1, at 661. Other critics were equally dismissive. See
Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1369 (1990) [hereinafter
Posner, Bork] (“Bork’s militance and dogmatism will buck up his followers and sweep along
some doubters but will not persuade the rational intellect.”); see also ELY, DEMOCRACY,
supra note 24, at 11–42; John Hart Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impos-
sibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 412 (1978) [hereinafter Ely, Allure and Impossibility] (categorically
rejecting an interpretivist theory limited to the language of particular clauses of the con-
stitutional text).
26 MARMOR, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 155–56 (“[I]t is quite a mystery why
originalism still has the scholarly (and judicial) support it does.”). Similarly, Sunstein asked,
in 2005, “Is Fundamentalism Self-Defeating?” and “Is Fundamentalism Coherent?” before
concluding “Why Fundamentalism Is Indefensible.” SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at
65–73. Randy Barnett remarks on the resilience of originalism with his customary humor:
“Originalism was thought to be buried in the 1980s with critiques such as those by Paul Brest
and Jeff Powell. . . . Yet an originalist approach to interpretations has—like a phoenix from
the ashes or Dracula from his grave, depending on your point of view—[thrived] . . . .”
Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds,
22 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (2005) [hereinafter Barnett, Trumping] (citations omitted).
27 See Judge Sonia Sotomayor, Testimony at United States Senate Judiciary Committee
(July 13, 2009) (transcript available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/soto
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continuing sterility of the discourse about constitutional interpretation and decision,
as the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee vainly try to have the nominee
articulate her substantive constitutional commitments, and the nominee responds
with platitudes and the promise to be an impartial arbiter of constitutional disputes.28
The debate and, more generally, our public discourse about constitutional adjudica-
tion, exhibit the symptoms of pathology.
The debate also shapes the argument of constitutional cases in the courts, but the
judicial participants in the originalism debate adopt more complex arguments in
their opinions than their theoretical claims might suggest.29 United States v. Jones30
provides an instructive example of the role that the originalism debate sometimes
plays to contextualize the arguments and decisions of contemporary constitutional
cases.31 In that case, the Court confronted the question of whether the warrant re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment applied to the attachment of a global position-
ing satellite (GPS) device to a criminal defendant’s automobile.32 It unanimously
held the requirement to apply.33
The opinions in Jones reflected the constraints imposed by the perspectives of
the protagonists in the debate and the metrics that the debate employs.34 Although
each member of the Court would have held that the warrant requirement applied, the
reasoning invoked to reach that result varied widely.35 Thus, for example, Justice
mayor_testimony_07_13_09.pdf) [https://perma.cc/LA5F-J7FH] (“[My judicial philosophy]
is simple: fidelity to the law.”). It is hard to give much content to this anodyne assertion; it is
hard to imagine a nominee proclaiming a judicial philosophy of infidelity to law. See Ronald
Dworkin, Justice Sotomayor: The Unjust Hearings, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Sept. 24, 2009), http://
www.nybooks.com/articles/2009/09/24/justice-sotomayor-the-unjust-hearings/ [https://perma
.cc/2YXC-G76F] [hereinafter Dworkin, Unjust Hearings]; see also Confirmation Hearing
on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts,
Jr., characterizing the role of a judge as like that of an umpire, consistent with the originalist
aspiration to decide cases simply by applying the historical linguistic understandings of the
constitutional text).
28 See Dworkin, Unjust Hearings, supra note 27.
29 See infra notes 30–40 and accompanying text.
30 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
31 See André LeDuc, Beyond Babel: Achieving the Promise of Our American Constitution,
64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 185, 197–204 (2016) [hereinafter LeDuc, Beyond Babel].
32 Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–05.
33 Id. at 404; id. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 431 (Alito, J., concurring).
34 565 U.S. 400. See generally LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 31, at 197–204 (dis-
cussing the implications of the originalism debate on the opinions in Jones).
35 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–13; id. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing
the potentially significant implications of developments in surveillance technology for the scope
of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment without much concern for eighteenth
century linguistic understandings); id. at 418–31 (Alito, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court’s
efforts to ground its decision with respect to the government’s use of GPS trackers on eigh-
teenth century understandings).
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Scalia was at pains to ground the Court’s holding that the warrant requirement
applied in the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment, rather than in the
Court’s later doctrine interpreting that requirement based upon defendants’ reason-
able expectation of privacy.36 Justice Alito mocked Justice Scalia’s efforts to ground
the Court’s decision in the original eighteenth century understanding.37
That case could have been decided more persuasively if the opinions and deci-
sion had not been pawns in the ongoing debate.38 The Justices’ opinions are attuned
to that debate and are shaped by it. For example, without the debate, it would be hard
to imagine the silly exchange between Justices Scalia and Alito over the eighteenth
century analog of a twenty-first century GPS tracker.39 Just as important, the stakes
imposed on the choice between prudential and doctrinal arguments on the one hand,
and textual and historical arguments on the other, distract from the exercise of judgment
in Jones but add no informative direction to the required exercise of judgment.40
The debate continues for two principal reasons. First, it is based upon flawed
premises and on distinctions and concepts that are confused or, at least, unhelpful.41
Both sides assume an ontologically independent Constitution, thinking that they
disagree only about the nature of that Constitution and the nature of the language
that expresses that Constitution.42 I have previously traced the genealogy of the
debate and the source of its unfruitfulness in the protagonists’ shared tacit premises
about the ontology of the Constitution and the nature of propositions of constitu-
tional law.43 The assumption that there is an ontologically independent Constitution
distinct from our practice of constitutional law is erroneous.44
Second, originalists and their critics remain committed to their respective
positions because the competing constitutional theories play important, if misguided,
roles in their respective constitutional arguments and jurisprudence.45 Both sides of
36 See id. at 404–06 (majority opinion).
37 Id. at 420 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring).
38 See LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 31, at 201–04 (arguing that stripping away the
conceptual framework of the originalism debate would have permitted a more direct engage-
ment by the justices of the opposing arguments).
39 Jones, 565 U.S. at 420 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring).
40 LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 31, at 201–02 (emphasizing the importance of the
kinds of issues raised by Justice Sotomayor for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
41 See André LeDuc, The Ontological Foundations of the Debate over Originalism, 7
WASH. U. JUR. REV. 263, 335–36 (2015) [hereinafter LeDuc, Ontological Foundations].
42 See id. at 334–36.
43 See id.; André LeDuc, The Anti-Foundational Challenge to the Philosophical Premises
of the Debate over Originalism, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 131 (2014) [hereinafter LeDuc, Anti-
Foundational Challenge]; see also André LeDuc, The Relationship of Constitutional Law
to Philosophy: Five Lessons from the Originalism Debate, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99
(2014) [hereinafter LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation].
44 See LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43, at 187–89.
45 See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 41, at 297–305.
2017] STRIDING OUT OF BABEL 109
the debate believe that their theoretical stances discredit the kinds of constitutional
arguments made by the opposing protagonists.46
The competing theories and accounts of constitutional law and the decisions that
comprise the debate do not give us a better understanding of the Constitution or of
our constitutional practice. Debating originalism does not revivify our constitutional
decisional practice or galvanize the constitutional arguments we already make;
instead, debating originalism constrains and distracts that constitutional practice.
The debate distracts us because it invites or requires us to contextualize those con-
troversies within the false parameters of the debate. Moreover, the debate offers no
promise of resolution.47 There is no argument yet to be discovered that will bring the
debate to a triumphant conclusion for the originalists or for any of their myriad critics.
Yet the debate can be brought to a conclusion, not with the triumph of either posi-
tion in the debate, but with a therapeutic deflationary approach that leads both sides
to recognize that the debate is at a dead end. The entire debate and its associated theo-
retical constructs are best abandoned rather than pursued or defended, respectively.
Progress calls for the debate to be transcended in favor of more fruitful and insight-
ful constitutional theory and practice.48
Progress requires not a brilliant new argument from one side or the other to win
the debate, but instead a therapeutic strategy that will enable the protagonists to
transcend how the debate has been conducted and the terms in which it has been
couched, and to recognize the debate as fruitless and unhelpful.49 A companion
piece, Beyond Babel, completes the project by describing what our constitutional
practice would look like without the brooding omnipresence of the debate.50
The nature and history of the unhappy debate suggest a therapeutic solution to
the problem. Originalism fails to win over its critics, and its critics fail to win over
the originalists.51 We are not well-served by continuing the debate.
46 See, e.g., id. I have offered an argument against the effectiveness of that strategy. See
LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 43.
47 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 132 (2005) [hereinafter BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY]; Mark Tushnet, Heller
and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 623 (2008) [hereinafter Tushnet, New
Originalism]; BASSHAM, PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 15.
48 See infra Parts I, II, III, and IV.
49 See infra Part I.
50 See LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 31.
51 Even seemingly fundamental questions appear immune to resolution. For example, the
question of whether originalism is consistent with Brown v. Board of Education appears
unresolved. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1955) [hereinafter Bickel, Original Understanding];
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947,
957–62 (1995) (making a valiant but ultimately unsuccessful effort to rebut Bickel’s claim
that the drafters and adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment did not understand it to prohibit
racially segregated schools and thus to save the original understanding of the Fourteenth
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This Article will apply a therapeutic approach to the debate over originalism.
Therapy is required for the debate and, properly done, is more effective than argument
alone.52 Moving beyond the debate requires both a recognition and a richer account
of its pathology than is generally presented—or admitted—by the protagonists,53 as
well as a path beyond the debate. The pathology has gone unrecognized by the pro-
tagonists because their conceptual commitments blind them to the unfruitfulness of
their stance and because they are caught up in the arguments of the debate. What is
required is careful attention to the debate’s shared premises and respective errors.
Argument on the contested terms of the debate alone has proven insufficient.
Amendment from the charge of a fundamental underlying racism consistent with racially
segregated public schools); see also Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitu-
tional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1884 (1995) (rebutting
McConnell’s historical claims); Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation
Decision, 99 VA. L. REV. 493, 495 (2013) [hereinafter Williams, Other Decision] (citing
recent claims by new originalists that Brown is consistent with the original understanding of
the Fourteenth Amendment). If readers were perplexed when Daniel Farber attempted to
summarize the debate over originalism, twenty-five years later they are likely downright
flummoxed. See Farber, Perplexed, supra note 2, at 1086. While Farber did a fine job
twenty-five years ago, in the intervening years the debate has grown more complex and
dramatically more voluminous. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3–20 (2011)
[hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM]; ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM,
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE (2011) [hereinafter BENNETT & SOLUM, ORIGINAL-
ISM]; Brian A. Lichter & David P. Baltmanis, Foreword: Original Ideas on Originalism, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 491 (2009); Williams, Other Decision, supra. The protagonists seem increas-
ingly cognizant that they no longer can reasonably hope to persuade the other side. See, e.g.,
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 47, at 132 (“I hope that those strongly committed to
textualist or literalist views—those whom I am almost bound not to convince—are fairly
small in number.”). Justice Breyer never explains why he doubts the efficacy of his argument,
but his caution is instructive as to the nature of the debate. At the least, it confirms the pathol-
ogy described below. See infra Part I. Tushnet has expressed similar pessimism. See Tushnet,
New Originalism, supra note 47, at 623 (discounting the rhetorical power of his argument).
52 For two classical statements of therapeutic strategies, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE
THERAPY OF DESIRE: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN HELLENISTIC ETHICS 13–40 (1994)
[hereinafter NUSSBAUM, THERAPY] and RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF
NATURE 6–7 (1979) [hereinafter RORTY, MIRROR] (describing a classic goal of innovative
conceptual thinking as setting aside prior problems in favor of a new vision); see also infra
Part III (exploring what more is required for therapy).
53 The methodology of the protagonists in the debate has gone largely unnoticed and
unanalyzed. But see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION xix–xx (1991)
[hereinafter BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION]; DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 129, 149–50
(1996) [hereinafter PATTERSON, TRUTH] (endorsing Bobbitt’s claim that the debate over the
legitimacy of judicial review is grounded on a shared philosophical error); BRIAN LEITER, Why
Quine Is Not a Postmodernist, in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 137, 139 (2007) [hereinafter LEITER,
Quine] (denying that the debate over the legitimacy of judicial review is driven by a mistaken
theory of truth or that propositions of constitutional law are statements about the world).
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The traditional role of therapy is to bring subjects or patients to a potentially
painful and resisted understanding.54 In the context of constitutional theory and
jurisprudence, therapy seeks to reconstruct the conceptual pathologies55 that result
in empty debates and unproductive analytical practices.56 In Jonathan Lear’s felici-
tous phrase, we must reconstruct the ideopolises of the protagonists in the debate.57
But the therapeutic project is also a social project; part of the pathology of the
originalism debate relates particularly to the way that constitutional theorists and
Supreme Court justices relate to other theorists and justices who hold different
constitutional views.58 Therapy here must be a group therapy as well as an individual
therapy. And it is not clear whether therapy is even possible for the apparently un-
willing and unreceptive participants in the originalism debate.
The task is thus to discover how to transcend this debate. To do this, I will
reconstruct the positions of originalism and its critics, and allow those positions, as
safe and as appealing as they may feel to the protagonists, to reveal their inherent
confusions or, at least, their fruitlessness for our constitutional theory and practice.
This task is therapeutic.59
54 See generally HEINZ KOHUT, HOW DOES ANALYSIS CURE? (Arnold Goldberg & Paul
Stepansky eds., 1984) (offering a complex account of the therapeutic process under psycho-
analytic theory); JONATHAN LEAR, THERAPEUTIC ACTION: AN EARNEST PLEA FOR IRONY
(2003) [hereinafter LEAR, THERAPEUTIC ACTION].
55 Therapy needs to proceed within and without the framework of a pathological be-
havior. As the therapy starts, the therapist must acknowledge and work within the patient’s
pathological feelings and beliefs as she begins to build the trust and common ground from
which the patients can be led to stronger ground. In the case of an intellectual debate like that
over originalism, therapy requires understanding what is compelling about each side of the
debate, how the two sides are failing to engage, and what the respective sides seek from their
conflicting positions.
56 See RORTY, MIRROR, supra note 52, at 6–7 (arguing that anti-Cartesian arguments
undermine contemporary philosophical projects to construct theories of reference).
57 See generally Jonathan Lear, An Interpretation of Transference, 74 INT’L J. PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS 739 (1993), reprinted in OPEN MINDED: WORKING OUT THE LOGIC OF THE SOUL
56, 69–73 (1998) [hereinafter Lear, Transference] (exploring how successful therapy requires
the therapist to establish a connection with the patient by acknowledging the claims and
commitments that bind the patient).
58 See LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 31, at 197–220; see also SUNSTEIN, RADICALS,
supra note 4, at 54 (noting that some originalists treat their opponents as if they were lawless).
59 The strategy of moving beyond mere argument in legal theory is not novel. Duncan
Kennedy characterized his account of the history of American classical legal theory as an
“intervention.” DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT ix
(2006) (characterizing his work as an intervention without explaining what that would mean
or entail in the context of legal history). Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry sound a theme
of irrationality in their criticism of grand theory, but never adopt a therapeutic strategy like
that pursued here. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CER-
TAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 1, 168 (2002) [herein-
after FARBER & SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING].
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Therapy is needed for the originalism debate for many of the same reasons we
resort to therapy in other contexts: to cure a pathology. The debate over originalism
is pathological, not healthy and robust. This is an important distinction because there
is certainly a sense of stalemate in the current discourse, despite its increasing inten-
sity and stridency60—or, in the case of Dworkin, increasingly icy irony61—and without
apparent significant advances in the debate.62 Healthy debates either persuade one
side or prompt responsive counter-arguments;63 the originalism debate does neither.
Moreover, to the outside observer, there is an even more fundamental sense that
the alternatives that the two sides describe are incomplete. On the originalist side, the
claim to privilege original understandings, intentions, or expectations is manifestly
inaccurate as a description of constitutional argument.64 Original understandings,
intentions, and expectations may sometimes play a privileged role in constitutional
argument and decision, but they are sometimes less important than prudential, struc-
tural, doctrinal or other arguments.65
On the critics’ side, the failure to recognize how often such original understand-
ings and expectations are, as a matter of our constitutional decisional practice,
60 See, e.g., Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 44–47; see also Berman, Origi-
nalism, supra note 3, at 8 (characterizing strong originalism as mistaken and arguing that
the inability of originalism’s critics to agree on an alternative theory is not a decisive defense
of either weak or strong originalism).
61 Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 115 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, INTERPRETATION] (beginning
his response to Justice Scalia: “Justice Scalia has managed to give two lectures about
meaning with no reference to Derrida or Gadamer or even the hermeneutic circle . . . . These
are considerable achievements.”).
62 The development of what has been termed “new originalism” might appear to be an
exception, but it is not. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRE-
TATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999) [hereinafter
WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION]; see also KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
STRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1–2 (1999) [hereinafter
WHITTINGTON, CONSTRUCTION] (introducing and defending a political concept of constitu-
tional construction to supplement originalist constitutional interpretation). For criticisms of
the significance of new originalism, see Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in
Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1025 (2010); see also Richard S. Kay,
Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 703 (2009) [hereinafter Kay, Constitutional Interpretation]; Tushnet, New Originalism,
supra note 47, at 612 (remarking that substantially all of the same evidence adduced by the
“old” originalism is also relevant to the “new” originalism).
63 Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 616–17 (1982).
64 See generally BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 51; PHILIP BOBBITT, CON-
STITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, FATE]
(describing the six canonical modes of constitutional argument).
65 See LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 31, at 197–220 (describing the historical, tex-
tual, doctrinal, structural, prudential, and ethical arguments made in three recent Supreme
Court decisions).
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compelling and controlling leads to a similarly constricted and implausible descrip-
tion of our constitutional decisional practice.66 The prudential arguments made by
Richard Posner or the philosophical arguments made by Ronald Dworkin leave no
place for the historical and textual arguments of originalism to be dispositive of a
constitutional case.67 The battle over originalism is thus joined over two incomplete
and misleading accounts of constitutional practice and over a question of privilege
for particular modes of argument that sometimes appears forced and artificial. It
appears forced and artificial because the framework of the debate does not always
provide alternative opposing arguments that offer a fruitful way to conceptualize the
arguments in a constitutional case. United States v. Jones is a good example of the
limits of the debate’s constitutional metrics.68
Both the debate and our public discourse about constitutional adjudication
exhibit the symptoms of pathology. I am suggesting not simply that the tone of the
debate is acrimonious and counterproductive; this criticism could be met with the
introduction of merely a modest dose of collegiality and humility. Rather, the debate
about originalism is stalemated, and the protagonists are unable or unwilling to
engage meaningfully with their opponents.69 Moreover, the stalemate has infected
and corrupted the discussion of important constitutional questions in the public
sphere.70 With therapy, and a more direct engagement by the protagonists, we may
suggest lines of inquiry to re-engage the debate’s participants, and even provide ways
to resolve or transcend the debate.71 If we reconstruct the respective ideopolises of
the originalists and their critics, we may yet find a path forward.72
66 See infra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. Dworkin and Sunstein are two of the most
critical theorists with respect to the force of originalist arguments. See RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE 373 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, EMPIRE] (characterizing Bork’s argument
from moral skepticism (or, more properly relativism) as “singularly inept”); SUNSTEIN,
RADICALS, supra note 4, at 15–19.
67 See LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 31, at 204–20 (discussing the prudential con-
siderations and doctrinal arguments made in the Court’s opinions). See generally BOBBITT,
FATE, supra note 64.
68 565 U.S. 400 (2012). For other examples, see LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 31,
at 204–20.
69 The recent book by Robert Bennett and Larry Solum does not stand as a counter-
example to this claim. See generally BENNETT & SOLUM, ORIGINALISM, supra note 51. Each
author is largely working out the implications of his own position. The result is a debate in
name only.
70 See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 186–91 (2007) (criticizing the current confirmation process and
suggesting reforms); Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
919 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS (1994)) (urging nom-
inees to explain their substantive constitutional positions in a more forthcoming manner); see
also Dworkin, Unjust Hearings, supra note 27.
71 See infra Part IV.
72 See generally Lear, Transference, supra note 57, at 69–73.
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At the same time, any therapeutic stance must expect and anticipate a transfer-
ence response from both sides of the debate. Transference, in a context like this, is
the projection onto the therapist of beliefs from the patients’ pathological ideopo-
lises.73 In the case of the originalism debate, this will generally include efforts to
assimilate my therapeutic stance into the framework of the debate itself. Part of the
therapeutic claim here is that such an assimilation, by either side of the debate, is
fruitless or impossible.
An ideopolis is an array of concepts and commitments within which, and pur-
suant to which, constitutional jurists and theorists articulate their decisions and their
theories.74 The extent to which those positions are concepts or conceptions, legal,
moral, political, or philosophical, consistent or inconsistent, complete or incomplete,
need not concern us. What is common to all the participants is a set of conceptual
pathologies or confusions that ground—and fuel—the debate.75
The originalists find two primary benefits in the ideopolis they have constructed.
First is the ability to refute and reject the excesses of the Warren Court.76 Second,
and more important, is that their ideopolis purports to construct constraints on con-
stitutional interpretation, and with those constraints, to create certainty in interpre-
tation.77 For its proponents, originalism offers both methodological and substantive
benefits as an account of the Constitution.78
The anti-originalists, too, find two primary benefits in their own ideopolis: first
is the prospect of progress and perhaps even perfection, transcending our imperfect
contemporary constitutional world.79 Second, to the extent that our constitutional ar-
gument and law includes structural, prudential, and doctrinal arguments, originalism’s
critics argue that their account of the Constitution is more descriptively accurate
than that defended by the originalists.80
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 See André LeDuc, Making the Premises about Constitutional Meaning Express: The
New Originalism and Its Critics, 31 BYU J. PUB. L. 111, 119–20 (2017) [hereinafter LeDuc,
Constitutional Meaning]; LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43.
76 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 407–18 (1977) [hereinafter BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDI-
CIARY]; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 262–63; Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 149 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
[hereinafter Scalia, Response].
77 See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 251–59.
78 See, e.g., id.; Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 45–46.
79 See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981)
(finding that identifying and criticizing such anomalies is not enough; otherwise, the origi-
nalism debate would have been over long ago).
80 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64; SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 15–19
(describing where originalism would take constitutional doctrine).
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Resistance in therapy is a familiar concept,81 and it also operates here.82 In this
context, my strategy is to reconstruct the central arguments that have been at the
core of the decades-long debate.83 In so doing, I have explored the foundations,
philosophical and otherwise, that support the debate. Neither the originalists nor
their critics hold a tenable stance with respect to the debate’s core issues. Most
fundamentally, the debate cannot be over something that both originalists and their
critics assume, nor can the truth (or falsity) of propositions of constitutional law be
something that both sides assume.84 When the debate and its erroneous assumptions
are properly understood, we can see that neither side can establish a position with
important practical or theoretical consequences for our constitutional law.
A therapeutic strategy will not resolve the debate on the terms on which the
debate has been carried out. Instead, therapy will permit the protagonists and the rest
of us to move beyond the debate to more fruitful and productive tasks and argu-
ments in our constitutional practice. Transcending the debate will not usher in a
period of constitutional peace. The substantive disagreements about the Constitution
will not be dissolved. They will remain as deep and intense as before; but the dis-
agreements and the arguments invoked in support of one decision or another will be
stripped of their place in the debate.
The most we can hope for on the Court and in the academy is that by recogniz-
ing the legitimacy of the disparate modes of canonical constitutional argument, both
sides in the debate will come to recognize the need to engage the arguments ad-
vanced in the substantive disagreements more directly and more fully. We cannot
hope that everybody will “just get along” because the sources of constitutional con-
troversy are too numerous and too rooted in our fundamental political, moral, and
ideological differences. But we can hope that the disagreements will be acknowl-
edged and articulated, not in the vocabulary of the originalism debate, but in the
accepted modes of constitutional decisional argument. Given the contemporary tone
of the conflicting opinions from the members of the Court,85 that change would be
no small improvement in our constitutional law and practice.
81 See, e.g., ANNA FREUD, THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENCE 8–9 (Cecil Baines
trans., rev. ed. 1966) (locus classicus description of resistance and transference as psycho-
logical defenses encountered in psychoanalysis by the analysand to block the dismantling of
the pathological psychological structures).
82 We see resistance in the originalism debate from both sides. With respect to many of
the critics of originalism, there is a refusal to recognize the pull of originalism and in some
cases, a refusal to recognize the coherence of originalism.
83 See, e.g., LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43; LeDuc, Ontological
Foundations, supra note 41; André LeDuc, Competing Accounts of Interpretation and
Practical Reasoning in the Debate over Originalism, U.N.H. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
[hereinafter LeDuc, Practical Reasoning].
84 See generally Ronald Reagan, U.S. President, The Investiture of Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Associate Justice Antonin Scalia at the White House (Sept. 26, 1986), reprinted
in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 95 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007).
85 See LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 31, at 197–220.
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The balance of this Article pursues the therapeutic strategy sketched above.
Space precludes a recounting86 of how originalism arose as a reaction to the consti-
tutional jurisprudence of the Warren Court, and why originalism’s critics are com-
mitted to rejecting originalism and its assault on that jurisprudence.
Part I of this Article summarizes an assessment of the debate that I have offered
in prior articles.87 I argue that the debate is stalemated and the blossoming complex-
ity and sophistication of the arguments advanced by the protagonists merely ob-
scures the sterility of the exchanges. I briefly recapitulate my argument that the
originalists and their critics are tacitly committed to certain philosophical premises
that support their claims and make the debate possible.88 Moreover, an alternative,
anti-representational, anti-foundational account of constitutional discourse and prac-
tice rejects those premises and saps the foundations that make the debate possible.89
My alternative account of our constitutional law is anti-foundational because it
treats our constitutional law as being without conceptual or theoretical premises that
are needed to support or legitimize it. Such support is neither necessary nor possible.
My account is also anti-representational, an even more controversial claim, because
its account of constitutional language denies that the terms of constitutional lan-
guage represent the world, and that propositions of constitutional law are made true
by facts about the Constitution-in-the-world.90 I have articulated that position and
defended my claims in a companion article.91 I also summarize my meta-philosophi-
cal claim that we need not build our postdebate constitutional life on express or
implied controversial philosophical premises.92 Without that claim, it may appear
86 For representative classic genealogies of originalism that look to the reactions to the
Warren Court, see BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 69–100 (describing the Warren Court
as embracing a manifestly political role in its constitutional jurisprudence, rather than apply-
ing the Constitution according to its original understanding); Keith E. Whittington, The New
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599–600 (2004) [hereinafter Whittington, New
Originalism] (distinguishing modern forms of originalism from the reactionary, early
originalism); see also BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 3; Edwin Meese III, Toward a
Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 10 (1988).
87 See LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43; LeDuc, Ontological Foun-
dations, supra note 41; see also infra Part I.
88 See infra Section II.B.
89 See generally BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64 (arguing that six modes of argument
comprise our constitutional law practice); BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 53, at
xix–xx; LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43 (articulating and defending an
anti-foundational account of our constitutional law and practice in the context of the debate
over originalism). But see LEITER, Quine, supra note 53, at 139 (denying that the debate over
the legitimacy of judicial review is driven by a mistaken theory of truth or the claim that
propositions of constitutional law are statements about the world).
90 See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43.
91 See generally id.
92 See infra Section II.B. For a more complete presentation of that argument, see generally
LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 43. This meta-philosophical
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that my constitutional theory is no more certain than the controversial contemporary
philosophy of language, epistemology, and ontology.93 That uncertainty would appear
troubling, because it would appear to compromise the mission of the Constitution.94
Part I of this Article continues by describing the pathological symptoms of the
debate. I articulate those symptoms in a charitable manner that the protagonists in
the debate, from both sides, may acknowledge. This is no small task.
Part II of this Article describes the elements of a therapeutic approach more pre-
cisely, and proceeds to apply them to the originalism debate.
Part III addresses the resistance and transference that my therapeutic project
may trigger. It rebuts the objections that proponents of the debate may offer—that
the debate cannot be abandoned, but that it can be rehabilitated even in the face of
my criticism. The very possibility of therapy may be challenged by the protagonists
on the grounds that the debate does not exhibit symptoms of pathology, or that any
pathology is only with respect to the opposing position. I will explain why I think
this defense is neither promising nor productive. What are we saving the originalism
debate for?
Part IV concludes by sketching the promise of a post-debate world.
I. THE PATHOLOGY OF THE ORIGINALISM DEBATE: SYMPTOMS AND SOURCES
A. The History of the Debate: Sterility and Stalemate
The first step in the therapeutic strategy is to recapitulate the history of the
debate, and to describe the stalemate over the role of the original understandings,
intentions, and expectations. That narrative must also record the failure of the debate
to offer theoretical insight into constitutional questions. The protagonists on both
claim is a claim about the nature of our constitutional law and about the nature of philosophy.
It denies philosophy a claim to be the ultimate arbiter of the claims of reason. In an analo-
gous context, Bernard Williams has famously defended a challenge to the power and scope
of philosophical argument in the context of ethical reasoning and practice. See generally
BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985).
93 The ongoing philosophical controversy is reflected in several sources. E.g., 3 RICHARD
RORTY, Antiskeptical Weapons: Michael Williams versus Donald Davidson, in TRUTH AND
PROGRESS: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 153–63 (1998) (arguing that Michael Williams’s argu-
ment against skepticism commits him to epistemological projects that should be abandoned);
BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS: AN ESSAY IN GENEALOGY 58–59, 128–31
(2002); RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 40 (2006) [hereinafter DWORKIN, ROBES]
(asserting that Rorty’s position is an incoherent anti-realist position); Bernard Williams,
Auto-da-Fé, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Apr. 28, 1983) (reviewing RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES
OF PRAGMATISM (ESSAYS 1972–1980) (1982)); see LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge,
supra note 43, at 180–86.
94 See Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 45 (dismissing the notion that philo-
sophical theories must ground constitutional interpretation).
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sides of the debate have sometimes remarked on the absence of theoretical engage-
ment with the opposing positions and often demonstrated disdain and disregard for
those positions.95 The implications of that failure to engage have been either ignored
or misunderstood.96
The originalism debate has reached a stalemate.97 That stalemate is one of the
most important markers or symptoms of the debate’s pathology. There are two
aspects of the stalemate. First, the arguments made by the protagonists on both sides
of the debate have convinced very few opponents.98 Second, the arguments have not
evolved in a way that makes them more powerful, as opposed to simply more
sophisticated—or arcane. To be sure, both sides of the debate have made new argu-
ments.99 But those arguments, for all their sophistication and cleverness, will not
persuade the opposing side.100 Nearly half a century of history provides the proof of
that claim. If that were going to happen, it would have happened long ago. The
debate over originalism is, in the vernacular, scholastic.
The protagonists might argue that I fail to adequately acknowledge the progress
that has been made in the controversy and the increasing sophistication of the
debate.101 Originalists would likely cite two principal developments. The first, and
95 See, e.g., Dworkin, INTERPRETATION, supra note 61, at 117 (describing originalism’s
lack of attention to the important relevant work in contemporary analytic philosophy of
language); Barnett, Originalism, supra note 12, at 613; Dworkin, Bork, supra note 1, at
659, 674; Posner, Bork, supra note 25, at 1368 (announcing the imminent demise of origi-
nalism in light of Bork’s defense).
96 See infra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
97 See infra notes 97–100 and accompanying text. I characterize the debate as having
reached a stalemate because neither side appears capable of advancing arguments that
persuade its opponents.
98 Jack Balkin may appear to be an important exception to that claim; even if that were
so, one convert among the scores of participants in the debate over the decades would hardly
be compelling evidence against my claim. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original
Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007) (arguing that the original meaning of the Con-
stitution protects a woman’s right to an abortion). But even Balkin is a strange convert to
originalism because he argues that an originalism committed to the original semantic or
linguistic understanding of the constitutional text is compatible with living constitutionalism.
See id. at 292–93 (tempering his commitment to the original linguistic understanding of the
constitutional text with a commitment to the principles inherent in that text).
99 See, e.g., Berman, Originalism, supra note 3 (challenging originalism’s claim to en-
dorse a single or limited number of theories); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of
Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 (2015); Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A
Post-Originalist Theory of Legal Interpretation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 597 (2013) [herein-
after Soames, Deferentialism] (arguing that originalism must incorporate sources of linguistic
meaning beyond the semantic); Tushnet, New Originalism, supra note 47.
100 See André LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism and Pragmatism in the Debate about Orig-
inalism, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 613, 644 (2016) [hereinafter LeDuc, Paradoxes] (denying that
Baude’s originalism will persuade originalism’s critics).
101 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 62 (emphasizing the role of
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most cited, development would likely be the New Originalist move from an origi-
nalism of original private intentions (to do something or to mean something) to an
originalism of original linguistic understandings.102 The second development, made
by Keith Whittington, is to distinguish between constitutional interpretation and
constitutional construction.103 Many critics of originalism would also cite these two
developments as central to New Originalism.104
The New Originalists claim that the original understandings give originalism a
firmer foundation than the original intentions or expectations.105 This is implausible
for four reasons.
First, it is not clear that originalists who claim to look only to the original linguis-
tic understandings make good on their claim.106 Dworkin made that point forcefully,107
and the subsequent history has only confirmed his claim that originalists like Justice
Scalia look well beyond linguistic understandings. For example, in National Federa-
tion of Independent Business v. Sebelius,108 Justice Scalia’s dissent referenced the
original understanding, but it was not an original understanding of the constitutional
text.109 Rather, it was the original understanding of how the federal government
would work.110 The importance and even the correctness of this change are entirely
questionable.111 The reason that originalists move beyond the original understandings
construction); Baude & Sachs, Law of Interpretation, supra note 19 (defending originalism
on legal positivist arguments); Solum, Constitutional Construction, supra note 14.
102 See generally Barnett, Originalism, supra note 12; Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of
New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 720–24 (2011).
103 See Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGI-
NALISM: A DEBATE 1, 60–61 (2011) [hereinafter Solum, All Originalists Now] (emphasizing
the importance of the interpretation/construction distinction and arguing that originalism’s
critics have not offered a version of their argument that reflects that distinction); see also
WHITTINGTON, CONSTRUCTION, supra note 62 (articulating a non-originalist account of
constitutional construction to permit originalism as an exclusive account of constitutional
interpretation); WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 62, at 5–14 (emphasizing the
importance of the distinction between interpretation and construction); Kay, Constitutional
Interpretation, supra note 62, at 710.
104 See, e.g., Berman, Originalism, supra note 3, at 3–4, 38; Tushnet, New Originalism,
supra note 47, at 612.
105 Colby, supra note 102, at 736–44.
106 Dworkin, INTERPRETATION, supra note 61, at 115–21.
107 Id.
108 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
109 Id. at 649 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Affordable Care Act’s individual
insurance mandate was unconstitutional).
110 Id. at 658 (arguing without citation to any constitutional textual provision that finding
the individual mandate to be within the federal government’s authority under the Commerce
Clause would destroy the “Constitution’s division of governmental powers”).
111 See generally Kay, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 62, at 708 (noting that the
original meaning intended and the original meaning understood must generally be the same
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of the semantic meaning of the text is that semantic meaning is too austere to carry
the necessary meaning for deciding cases.112
Second, as Mark Tushnet has pointed out, the evidence that is ordinarily adduced
in support of an old originalist invocation of original intentions or expectations is
largely the same evidence that is marshaled in support of New Originalism’s argu-
ment from original understandings.113 When the same evidence supports purportedly
different claims, the significance of the distinction must be doubted.114
Third, because the purpose of writing the constitutional text is communication,
what is intended to be communicated and what is understood should be the same.115
Thus, the only difference between an originalism that privileges the original semantic
understandings and an originalism that privileges the original intentions (at least of se-
mantic meaning) would arise in cases of miscommunication.116 In those cases, it is not
clear why the New Originalists privilege the reader’s understanding over the writer’s.117
Fourth and finally, focusing upon semantic meaning is also questionable be-
cause of the performative role of constitutional texts.118 The constitutional text is
principally a doing, not a saying.119 The constitutional text, along with other authori-
tative expressions of constitutional law, create (or recognize) rights, constitute a state,
or limit powers, among other things.120 This role is performative. Approaching the
as a matter of the nature of language and communication: “[W]e know someone’s intended
meaning by examining the typical meaning attached to the words they used.”).
112 See 1 SCOTT SOAMES, Interpreting Legal Texts: What Is, and What Is Not, Special
About the Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: NATURAL LANGUAGE: WHAT IT MEANS AND
HOW WE USE IT 403, 422 (2009) [hereinafter SOAMES, Legal Texts] (arguing that semantic
meaning is too “austere” to carry all of the requisite force of legal texts).
113 See Tushnet, New Originalism, supra note 47, at 612.
114 See id.
115 See Kay, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 62, at 707–08. In characterizing the
constitutional text as communicative, I want to remain agnostic for the purpose of my argu-
ment here on the debate over what Mark Greenberg has styled the “communicative theory.”
See Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of
Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217
(Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011) (arguing that the purpose and role of legislation
is not simply a matter of communication, focusing upon what the legal texts are doing). That
theory asserts that because law is an instance of linguistic use, we should turn to our theories
of linguistic meaning and communication to understand the meaning of law. Id. at 256.
116 Kay, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 62, at 707–08.
117 There is a tacit suggestion that reference to the auditors’ understanding may capture
the public understanding better than the drafters’ understanding.
118 See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43 (arguing that
language does not represent the world and that, without the implicit appeal to an objective
constitution-in-the-world, the originalist pursuit of the original, controlling meaning of the
Constitution is problematic); LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 75, at 150–66 (de-
fending an account of the important performative role of the constitutional text).
119 See LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 75, at 150–66.
120 See generally id.
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constitutional text only as declarative is a mistake. Thus, the proposed shift in the
New Originalism from the historical originalist focus on intentions and expectations
to semantic understandings is not sufficient evidence of the growth and evolution
of originalism articulated in the debate.
The second principal feature of New Originalism cited as evidence for original-
ism’s increasing sophistication and plausibility is the distinction between interpretation
and construction.121 Originalism is thus a doctrine that explains how interpretation
is to be done.122 If there is no controlling interpretation of the constitutional text that
answers a constitutional question, then the New Originalists would hold that consti-
tutional construction is required and the original understanding is not controlling.123
The distinction between constitutional interpretation and constitutional construc-
tion has failed to move the debate forward or convince originalism’s critics. There
are four principal reasons for this failure. First, while seemingly intuitive, the dis-
tinction between constitutional provisions that are to be interpreted and those that
are to be construed erodes under careful examination. Whittington characterizes the
distinction as analytical,124 meaning that interpretation and construction are “two
different ways of elaborating constitutional meaning that have been . . . used.”125 For
Whittington, the fundamental distinction is that constitutional interpretation is a
legalistic process, while constitutional construction is a political process.126 Con-
struction is a political process because the choices to be made require a choice be-
tween competing claims that cannot be made on the basis of principle alone.127
Whittington offers examples of constitutional text that require interpretation or
construction.128 Whittington cites the Fourth Amendment protection against warrant-
less searches and seizures as an example of a provision requiring construction.129
Whittington focuses on the response of the legislative and executive branches to
early judicial decisions about the application of the Fourth Amendment to electronic
surveillance.130 Puzzlingly, Whittington’s history does not appear to include the judi-
cial evolution of constitutional doctrine.131 Whittington does not address the judicial
121 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 62, at 5–14; Kay, Constitutional
Interpretation, supra note 62; Solum, Constitutional Construction, supra note 14.
122 See WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 62, at 2–5.
123 Id. at 5.
124 Id. This term is not used in the classical sense of modern Anglo-American analytic
philosophy. See generally WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in
FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20 (2d ed. rev. 1980).
125 See WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 62, at 5.
126 Id. at 7.
127 Id. at 7–8.
128 Id. at 9–10.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 See id. Whittington’s account stops with Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928) (analyzing the scope of Fourth Amendment protections in terms of the common law
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evolution of our Fourth Amendment law on warrantless searches.132 His failure is con-
sistent with his claim that the executive and legislative branches must articulate the
necessary constitutional protections, thus demonstrating the political character of the
action required.133 But, on their faces, the Court’s decisions in Olmstead v. United
States, Katz v. United States, and, more recently, Jones, appear to be based upon legal,
not political, reasoning.134 Whittington assimilates construction to political decision,
but does not explain how to reconcile the Court’s Fourth Amendment, non-originalist
legal reasoning with what we might anticipate in a traditional political process.135
One potential way to distinguish interpreted versus constructed provisions
would be by reference to their specificity: specific provisions are to be interpreted;
general or principled statements, whose meaning and import must be created by
a project that goes beyond simply determining an inherent meaning, are to be
construed.136 Whittington characterizes the text as “brought into being [by the 
concept of trespass), never addressing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (sub-
stituting a conceptualization of Fourth Amendment protections on the basis of the common
law concept of trespass with an account grounded on defendants’ reasonable expectations
of privacy). That evolution proceeded as a matter of doctrine. Without an alternative polit-
ical account of that evolution, Whittington’s implicit claim that the evolution of the Fourth
Amendment law was a matter of political choice remains unproven.
132 See WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 62, at 9–10 (describing the Court’s
refusal to expand the scope of the Fourth Amendment with respect to certain intrusive searches
conducted in the course of a criminal investigation, which was coupled with an invitation to
Congress to consider enacting non-constitutional limitations on those types of searches).
133 Id. While Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), may support Whittington’s
distinction, the evolution from Olmstead to Katz demonstrates the importance of interpre-
tative questions in application of the Fourth Amendment.
134 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–06 (2012) (finding a warrantless search
unconstitutional because the government had trespassed on the defendant’s motor vehicle
when it installed a GPS tracking device, without the need to reach the Katz test of whether
the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the location of a
personal automobile); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (after reviewing the development of the case law
after Olmstead, concluding that “[t]he Government’s activities in electronically listening to
and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied
while using the telephone booth, and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment”); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (concluding, after a careful,
extended review of the prior case law, none of the precedents “[held] the Fourth Amendment
to have been violated as against a defendant unless there [was] an official search and seizure
of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual
physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure”).
135 See WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 62, at 7–10.
136 Such an approach would appear to be inconsistent with Justice Scalia’s claim that all
of the Constitution’s provisions are to be understood as speaking in a practical, rather than
aspirational, voice. See Scalia, Response, supra note 76, at 134–35. Moreover, such a con-
structionist methodology opens up the possibility of judicial discretion that originalism was 
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reader].”137 In some ways this account appears to echo the natural law account of the
determinatio, although Whittington does not himself draw this parallel.138 This
strategy may appear engaging because it is plausible that we can distinguish the
level of generality or specificity of constitutional texts.
Nevertheless, puzzles immediately appear. For example, does the First Amend-
ment apply to a federal law providing that flag burning is a criminal offense? The
text of the First Amendment appears very clear, providing that Congress shall make
no law abridging the freedom of speech.139 The question of whether burning the flag
is speech would appear interpretative because the question presented is the meaning
or force of the term “speech.” That appears to be an interpretive question. Yet
Whittington cites the First Amendment as another example of a constitutional pro-
vision requiring construction, not interpretation.140 Whittington needs to reach this
conclusion because his approved originalist interpretative methods are insufficient
to generate the First Amendment jurisprudence that he wants to preserve. But it
requires Whittington to sort constitutional provisions into interpretative and con-
structional texts in a non-obvious and seemingly implausible way.
The second reason that the interpretation/construction distinction has failed is
that the New Originalists still assert that the original understandings are privileged
and arguments from those original understandings trump all other arguments.141 That
privilege within the sphere of interpreted constitutional provisions is not plausible
to originalism’s critics. For example, that privilege is inconsistent with Sunstein’s
functionalism, which looks to constitutional law only as a social tool to mediate
initially designed to limit. See generally Baude, Originalism as a Constraint, supra note 19
(exploring the shift in emphasis in originalism away from the importance of external constraint
and arguing that originalism is more important as a conceptual, internal constraint); Colby,
supra note 102 (describing the failure of the New Originalism to cabin judicial discretion);
see generally also CROSS, supra note 19 (concluding that originalism has not constrained
constitutional decision).
137 WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 62, at 5. The sense in which Whittington
empowers the reader as interpreter is not the same as that endorsed by Stanley Fish, infra
notes 225–35, because, for Whittington, the creation of the meaning or force of the text is not
simply a matter of a creative, critical choice but must arise within the political constraints of
our democratic Republic.
138 See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 284–90 (1980) (explain-
ing that there are two working parts of law: the central principle of law and the determination
in the application of this basic principle; the first derives from natural law); ROBERT P. GEORGE,
Natural Law and Positive Law, in IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 102, 108–09 (1999).
139 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
140 WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 62, at 10. It may be that some parts of the
First Amendment, like that relating to the free exercise of religion, require construction,
whereas other parts require interpretation. What is not clear is how the different parts or
aspects of the constitutional provision may be distinguished.
141 See id. at 213–15.
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conflict or organize the political process,142 or with his commitment to incompletely
theorized agreements.143 Generally, originalism’s critics are not prepared to privilege
textual or historical arguments over other kinds of arguments that have been made
to expand citizens’ rights or to limit government discretion.144
The third reason that the interpretation/construction distinction has failed is that
the privilege accorded original understandings in the domain of interpretative con-
stitutional texts leaves no room for the exercise of judgment. Charles Fried and those
like him would reject this account, since they emphasize the role of judgment in con-
stitutional decisions.145 For those constitutional provisions that are interpretable, the
exercise of judgment may lead a judge to follow the original semantic understandings
of those provisions.146 If so, the two accounts would appear consistent.
But it does not appear likely that the exercise of judgment with respect to interpret-
able provisions would consistently lead to the application of the original semantic un-
derstandings. It might be that where the text is clear, other arguments merely face a
higher hurdle before they can be deployed. But proponents committed to the exercise
of judgment would appear committed to the view that judgment is always both neces-
sary and proper, regardless of whether a case is easy or hard.147 When judgment is
employed, all of the considerations that figure in the various canonical modes of
constitutional argument naturally come into play. It is not clear why certain factors
or claims that a judge would seek to apply, to the extent consistent with our practice
of constitutional argument and decision, could be excluded. Thus, when we recog-
nize the role of judgment in the process of adjudication, it is difficult to cabin that
judgment within the confines of originalist theory.
The fourth and final reason that the interpretation/construction distinction failed
to convince originalism’s critics remains that New Originalism is committed, in the
realm of interpretation, to the claim that there is always an answer to the constitu-
tional questions we face in the constitutional text, properly interpreted.148 That is an
142 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 71 (describing the idea of judicial
minimalism).
143 See, e.g., id. at 73–74 (claiming that, in the final analysis, the Constitution is treated
as binding because it is good to treat it as binding).
144 See, e.g., id. at 71–75 (concluding that following the original understanding of the
Constitution “would be terrible” because the resulting substantive constitutional law would
be terrible and inconsistent with the democratic choices that the citizens would make).
145 See generally Charles Fried, On Judgment, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1025 (2011) [here-
inafter Fried, Judgment] (arguing that constitutional adjudication requires a judge to exercise
the faculty of judgment and that such decision process cannot be reduced to an algorithm). I am
grateful to Professor Fried for making available to me a pre-publication copy of this article.
146 See generally id.
147 See generally id.
148 See LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 75, at 115; LeDuc, Ontological
Foundations, supra note 41; Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 31, 36–37 (Ill. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Research Papers Series, Paper No. 07-24, 2008) [hereinafter Solum,
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ontological claim that others and I have challenged.149 If that challenge to the New
Originalism’s tacit ontology is correct, then the New Originalism has no better pros-
pect of convincing or defeating originalism’s critics than the old originalism does.
The critics demonstrate no greater progress in their efforts to discredit or rebut
the originalists’ arguments. If we take Dworkin, Sunstein, and Tribe as represen-
tative among the leading critics of originalism, there is no apparent progress in the
evolution of their criticism of originalism.150 While the arguments proffered by
the critics have changed, they reflect no more meaningful engagement with the
originalists.151
Dworkin began his critique of originalism with the claim that originalism cannot
do what it purports to do.152 Dworkin has moved on to other arguments against
originalism as his own jurisprudence has evolved.153 Nevertheless, he would appear
to continue to embrace his impossibility claim.154 Dworkin’s new arguments are
equally dismissive of textual and historical arguments, because Dworkin is commit-
ted to an integrated reading of the Constitution grounded in moral and political
philosophy.155 Although Dworkin would agree that a law’s integrity requires some
deference to precedent,156 he is always prepared to jettison that precedent when the
holistic theory, grounded in moral and political theory, is articulated.157
Sunstein’s current line of criticism derives from his endorsement of judicial
minimalism and his commitment to a functional account of constitutional law.158
Semantic Originalism] (asserting that there is a fact of the matter about the meaning of texts
and utterances).
149 See generally PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 53, at 126–27; LeDuc, Anti-Founda-
tional Challenge, supra note 43, at 142–51.
150 See infra notes 153–88 and accompanying text.
151 See infra notes 153–88 and accompanying text.
152 See Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 482–500 (1981)
[hereinafter Dworkin, Forum] (arguing that the originalist appeal to the original intentions
with respect to the constitutional text is more complex and problematic than the originalists
acknowledge, calling into question whether it is possible).
153 See, e.g., Dworkin, INTERPRETATION, supra note 61, at 126–27 (arguing that a careful
analysis of Justice Scalia’s originalism reveals an overriding moral reading of the Con-
stitution, albeit a moral reading very different from Dworkin’s own).
154 See id. at 127 (arguing that Justice Scalia tacitly invokes his philosophical reservations
about majoritarianism in his defense of originalism, thus relying on extratextual contempo-
rary values in his defense of originalism).
155 Id. at 122–23. See generally DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 66.
156 See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 66, at 240–50 (acknowledging that fairness in
adjudication requires that precedent be respected in many cases even if justice would support
a different outcome).
157 See id. at 245–47 (arguing that the originalists’ invocation of the concept of collective
intentions masks conceptual problems that may compromise the very concept).
158 See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at xiv–xv (rejecting the originalist project to
restore the Lost Constitution on minimalist arguments).
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According to Sunstein, constitutional decisions should be minimalist.159 Cases
should be narrowly decided and opinions should articulate the reasons for a decision
in a narrow (if not the narrowest) way.160 Thus, Sunstein objects to the originalists
because of their rejection of judicial minimalism, and their commitment to far-
reaching, principled decision.161 He also objects to originalism because it is not a
functional account of our constitutional law.162 Originalists are unconcerned that a
constitutional interpretation or decision might lead to a result that would be rejected
as a prudential matter.163 Yet, it is not clear what arguments Sunstein could offer that
would persuade originalists to adopt a functional account of constitutional law
allowing prudential arguments to trump arguments from a provision’s original
semantic understanding. At the least, despite Sunstein’s repeated criticisms of orig-
inalism on this point,164 it is not clear that he has any new argument to make. He
wants to reject originalism for its general theoretical arguments, but he never really
explains whether he admits originalist arguments in his jurisprudence.
Part of the uncertainty may arise from an unacknowledged evolution in
Sunstein’s own views. Twenty years ago, Sunstein expressly endorsed what he
termed “soft originalism” in contradistinction to “hard originalism.”165 It is not
159 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 59–61 (1996)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING].
160 SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 27–30 (defending judicial minimalism). But see
Larry Alexander, Incomplete Theorizing: A Review Essay of Cass R. Sunstein’s Legal Reason-
ing and Political Conflict, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 531 (1997) (book review) (criticizing
Sunstein’s rejection of highly theorized judicial decision).
161 SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 25–27.
162 See id. at 73. See generally LeDuc, Paradoxes, supra note 100.
163 See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 258–59 (strongly criticizing the reasoning
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), while conceding the substantive policy
objections to the Connecticut law struck down in that case); Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra
note 6, at 47 (citing the adoption of a constitutional amendment requiring the extension of
the franchise to women as evidence of the limits of constitutional interpretation and
application).
164 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 209–43 (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE]; SUNSTEIN, RADICALS,
supra note 4.
165 Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 313
(1995) [hereinafter Sunstein, Five Theses] (very briefly—and somewhat cryptically—
asserting that soft originalism, which doesn’t seek answers to particular contemporary consti-
tutional cases but is generally attentive to the original understandings and expectations, is a
stronger constitutional theory than hard originalism, the Warren Court’s jurisprudence, or
other leading alternatives). Hard originalism, in Sunstein’s lexicon, seeks to decide particular
constitutional controversies on the basis of the original understandings in a process Sunstein
characterizes as “trying to do something like go back in a time machine.” Id. at 312.
Sunstein’s soft originalism, to the extent that it encompasses structural arguments, may not
even qualify as a traditional originalism.
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entirely clear what Sunstein means by these terms.166 Leaving aside that important
definitional issue, the initial substantive question Sunstein’s description raises is
whether his soft originalism is really a form of originalism at all.167 Sunstein would
permit arguments from the historical understandings and expectations but caveats
his endorsement of those arguments by noting that for the soft originalist “it matters
very much what history shows.”168 It matters because the historical understanding
of the Constitution is a good but not dispositive reason to interpret and apply the
Constitution consistently with that understanding.169 But he goes on to note that the
soft originalist tempers historical reference with a judgment as to the level of gen-
erality at which to interpret historical positions.170 As a result, much like Balkin’s
introduction of constitutional principles into his Living Originalism as authoritative
sources of constitutional law, Sunstein admits non-originalist authority to support
his non-originalist substantive constitutional jurisprudence.171 Sunstein concludes
that soft originalism is an incomplete theory of constitutional interpretation.172
Sunstein would complete that theory with his functional approach.173 It is not clear
what is left of originalism, other than the name.
Moreover, Sunstein disregards some of the far-reaching, principled decisions
that history has judged most favorably. For example, Sunstein’s minimalism would
appear to have doomed the Court’s approach in Brown v. Board of Education.174 It
also would have blocked the series of democracy-enhancing decisions of the Warren
Court like Baker v. Carr175 and Reynolds v. Sims.176 Sunstein, like the originalists he
criticizes, is committed to a methodological position that would foreclose certain of
Bobbitt’s modes of argument.177 Like the originalists, and despite his efforts to
166 Id. at 312.
167 Id. at 313–15.





173 Id. at 313–14.
174 347 U.S. 483, 493–95 (1954) (striking down state segregation in public education as
violating the Equal Protection Clause without inquiry into whether any such segregated
schools were equal by any other measure).
175 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (repudiating the prior law that electoral districting was non-
justiciable as a political question).
176 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (requiring roughly equal population in state electoral districts
under the republican government clause).
177 It is not clear that Bobbitt’s ethical argument, even understood in his limiting way,
could be made on a narrow or unprincipled way, for example, under the incompletely theo-
rized, minimalist methods that Sunstein endorses. What could a minimalist ethical argument
from the essential, inherent American ethos be? Other modes of argument may be hard to
constrain within Sunstein’s minimalist methodology in particular contexts, as in Brown.
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distance himself from some of the unattractive implications of hard originalism,
Sunstein’s own theory appears subject to some of the same normative objections.178
With Tribe, as with Sunstein, it is not entirely clear what stance he takes or
which propositions he would endorse with respect to the originalist claims and their
alternatives.179 For example, while it is clear that Tribe rejects the claims of classical
originalism, we do not know exactly what alternative account of the truth of propo-
sitions of constitutional law he would endorse.180 Tribe rejects the originalist account
as facing an insurmountable technical objection in the problem of generality181 and
for failing to give an adequate account of the richness of the constitutional text.182
Tribe’s first argument, based on the problem of generality, appears wrong.183
There is no general problem of generality.184 Tribe next argues that the questions pre-
sented in the constitutional decision and by the constitutional text are not captured ade-
quately by the originalist account.185 But Tribe’s account of the constitutional text
and, in particular, his most recent account of the Invisible Constitution,186 is not likely
to persuade originalists. It will fail because it appears to devalue originalists’ textual
and historical arguments. Originalism’s critics have not come to terms with what
178 Sunstein’s position, like that of most protagonists in the debate, would delegitimize
some of the accepted forms of constitutional argument. Moreover, his claim that broader
judicial holdings are always inappropriate appears implausible—as the cases of Brown and
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), demonstrate.
179 See generally LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 41, at 320–22 (arguing that
Tribe is committed to the existence of an ontologically independent Constitution despite his
emphasis on practice and his skepticism about systematic theories of interpretation like those
defended by Justice Scalia and Ronald Dworkin).
180 See id.
181 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 73–80
(1991) [hereinafter TRIBE & DORF, READING] (arguing that constitutional interpretation re-
quires determining from extraconstitutional sources the level of generality at which a con-
stitutional provision is to be understood and applied). But see Brandom, Legal Concept
Determination, supra note 5 (denying that there is a problem of regress because a rule does
not always need an interpretation to be followed or applied).
182 See generally Tribe, INTERPRETATION, supra note 21, at 65–75. Thus, Tribe does not
appear to make a place for historical and textual arguments. For a catalog of the modes of
argument, see BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 7–8.
183 See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 41, at 320–22.
184 Id. (arguing that Tribe’s infinite regress argument would apply equally to application
of any rule, so that, paradoxically, no rule can be followed). Robert Brandom has defended
a similar Wittgensteinian, Carrollinian rejection of the problem of infinite regress. Brandom,
Legal Concept Determination, supra note 5, at 21–22 (expressly invoking Lewis Carroll’s
logic fable of Achilles and the Tortoise to deny that a legal rule needs an interpretation before
it can be applied).
185 Tribe, INTERPRETATION, supra note 21, at 68–72.
186 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 10 (2008) [hereinafter TRIBE, IN-
VISIBLE] (introducing the concept of the “invisible” Constitution, consisting of an array of
fundamental unstated assumptions that are, as Tribe puts it, within the Constitution).
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makes originalism so attractive, nor with the continuing vitality of historical and
textual arguments in our constitutional practice.187 Without doing so, originalism’s
critics cannot hope to move beyond originalism’s claims.
It is important to understand how the debate over originalism has failed to
resolve the dispute over the role of value and scope of judicial discretion in constitu-
tional decision. Originalism is intended to cabin judicial discretion and block the
injection of personal values into judicial decision.188 Originalists believe that privileg-
ing the original understandings and intentions of the constitutional text will do
that.189 But the critics deny those originalist claims.190 They generally assert that the
original intentions and understandings cannot provide the guidance necessary to
resolve constitutional disputes.191 To the extent the New Originalism creates a place
for constitutional construction,192 the goal of cabining judicial discretion is compro-
mised. If the critics are right, then New Originalism has failed to perform its mission
to provide constraint in constitutional decision.193
The final development that warrants attention relates to how the protagonists
on both sides have systematically introduced modern linguistic philosophy into
the debate.194 I have explored those arguments in some detail in a companion
187 Thus, for example, in his review of Bork’s The Tempting of America, Dworkin was
scathing and dismissive. See Dworkin, Bork, supra note 1, at 659, 674 (characterizing Bork’s
argument as “generally regarded as confused and unhelpful” and asserting that The Tempting
of America in fact highlighted [originalism’s] shortcomings, concluding that “Bork’s defense
of the original understanding thesis is a complete failure”). Tax scholar and originalism critic
Boris Bittker perhaps came closest to giving originalism its due. See Boris I. Bittker,
Interpreting the Constitution: Is the Intent of the Framers Controlling? If Not, What Is?, 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9, 54 (1995) (concluding that “[a]ll in all, the best bet is that our
judges will continue to invoke ‘the American scheme of justice,’ ‘ordered liberty,’ ‘commu-
nity standards,’ and other noninterpretivist ideals, values and aspirations, but will not take
these concepts anywhere near their logical extremes”); see also CROSS, supra note 19, at
1–22 (acknowledging the appeal of originalism); Boris I. Bittker, The Bicentennial of the
Jurisprudence of Original Intent: The Recent Past, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 235 (1989).
188 See Reva B. Siegel, Heller and Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice,
56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1400–01 (2009).
189 See generally BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7; Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6.
190 See, e.g., TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 181, at 73–80; Dworkin, INTERPRETA-
TION, supra note 61, at 117.
191 See, e.g., TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 181, at 73–80; Dworkin, INTERPRETA-
TION, supra note 61, at 117.
192 See, e.g., Solum, Constitutional Construction, supra note 14; Tushnet, New Originalism,
supra note 47.
193 I am not endorsing the critics’ claims, merely pointing out that if they are right, then
New Originalism has failed its mission. See generally Colby, supra note 102.
194 See generally MARMOR, LANGUAGE OF LAW, supra note 1 (criticizing originalism);
Fallon, Meaning, supra note 19 (criticizing originalism); Soames, Deferentialism, supra note
99 (criticizing originalism in part and defending originalism in part on the basis of an approach
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article,195 concluding that increased philosophical sophistication has yielded scant
progress toward resolving the debate.196
One reply to my critical characterization of the debate over originalism might
be to argue that I have set the bar to measure progress unreasonably high. For
example, the reply might go, compare the debate over originalism to many ongoing
philosophical debates. How does the state of the debate over originalism appear less
fruitful or with less progress than the disputes over the nature of truth or the nature
of moral obligation? I am simply asking too much of the debate over originalism.
Instead of criticizing the debate, I should recognize the New Originalism as the
jurisprudential equivalent of the causal theory of reference.
I think not. Leaving aside the obvious question of the relative significance of
these two theoretical contributions, the difference between the mission of analytic
philosophy and the mission of constitutional theory precludes the reply to my
criticism. The different missions reflect the difference between practical and pure
or theoretical reasoning. In constitutional theory, as in constitutional adjudication,
questions must be answered and decisions made. In philosophy, the goal of both
systematic and therapeutic projects is understanding. Discovering that we do not
understand something we thought we understood counts as progress, not failure. In
constitutional theory and adjudication, on the other hand, an argument or account
can be refuted only by another theory or account, as Justice Scalia was fond of
remarking in the context of the originalism debate.197 Flawed theories do not win by
default in the philosophical space of reasons.
In sum, the debate over originalism has made no significant progress over the
past half century. Neither the originalists nor their critics have produced compelling
new responses to the arguments made for the opposing positions, nor have they
made compelling new arguments for their own positions. Even the protagonists have
begun to express doubts about their ability to convince the other side.198 The failure
of either side to convince their opponents is simply evidence of the stalemated,
that privileges the semantic and pragmatic meaning of the constitutional text but concedes
that such meaning leaves many constitutional controversies without a determinative textual
answer); Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 148 (defending originalism but endorsing
a role for constitutional construction that goes beyond interpretation of linguistic meaning).
195 See generally LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 75. For examples of those
arguments, see Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 99 (arguing that legal interpretation must
incorporate all of the linguistic meaning of the relevant text, not merely the semantic meaning),
and Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 148 (arguing that originalism must incorporate
the non-semantic sources of linguistic content from texts’ pragmatics).
196 See LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 75.
197 See, e.g., Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 4, at 855.
198 BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 47, at 132 (acknowledging that some original-
ists will remain unpersuaded by his arguments); Tushnet, New Originalism, supra note 47,
at 623.
2017] STRIDING OUT OF BABEL 131
pathological dimension of the debate. The purported progress in the debate, despite
the protagonists’ enthusiasm, collapses on careful examination.
B. Foundations of the Pathology: The Flawed Ontology of the Debate
After acknowledging that the originalism debate is at a dead end, the next step
in my therapeutic approach plumbs the foundations that make the debate possible.
The path out of the ideopolises of the debate’s protagonists requires that we first
understand the foundations on which those ideopolises have been built. The orig-
inalists and most of their critics take for granted that there is an objective Constitu-
tion that is to be interpreted and serve as the touchstone for deciding constitutional
cases.199 They assume that statements of constitutional law have non-trivial truth
conditions that are determined by the correspondence of such statements to an
objective Constitution.200 I have defended these attributions in some depth in The
Ontological Foundations of the Debate over Originalism201 and The Anti-Founda-
tional Challenge to the Philosophical Premises of the Debate over Originalism,202
and will only summarize that argument here. As Bobbitt has argued,203 there are a
variety of modes of constitutional analysis and argument, all of them legitimate, none
of them exclusive, and none of them privileged in relation to the other modes.204
More importantly, Bobbitt explains how the foundational confusions arise.205
The dominant foundational picture of our constitutional law misunderstands the
ontological character of that law. In Bobbitt’s words: “Law is something we do, not
something we have as a consequence of something we do.”206 This slogan is important
199 See generally LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 41.
200 See id. at 274–79, 310–12.
201 Id.
202 LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43.
203 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 7–8; BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 53,
at 11–22.
204 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 6–8.
205 BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 53, at 24.
206 Id. Bobbitt appears to mean that there is nothing independent of the human activity of
law that, as an ontological matter, can be meaningfully extracted from that activity as inde-
pendent of it. The same could be said, of course, about many human activities—quantum
physics, the archaeology of Minoan Crete, urban planning, and the theater of the absurd. I
do not understand Bobbitt to be distinguishing law from these activities as a matter of on-
tology. Instead, he would appear to be emphasizing that the context and meaning of all these
activities is drawn from their practice.
It is instructive to consider Bobbitt’s stance in relation to Brian Leiter’s recent defense
of an artifact theory of law. See Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism About the Artifact Law: A Retro-
spective Assessment, in LAW AS AN ARTIFACT (L. Burazin, K. Himma, & C. Roversi eds.,
forthcoming 2017), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2870877. Leiter is focused on de-
feating an account of law as a natural kind, but he appears to assert the artifact claim in a way
that gives law an ontological status independent of its constitutive social practices. See id.
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in Bobbitt’s theory. In place of the foundationalist, representationalist models that
assert that propositions of constitutional law have truth conditions based upon the
Constitution,207 Bobbitt would substitute a description of practice, finding legitimacy
in those practices, not in the words.208 On this account, originalists object that the
structuralism of Justice Black or the prudentialism of Justice Frankfurter or Alexander
Bickel do not hew closely enough to the constitutional text as understood by the
original drafters.209 Bobbitt would reply that the originalists misunderstand how the
Constitution works and what constitutional law is.210 He would say that the human
social activity of making constitutional arguments and deciding constitutional cases
comprise our constitutional law.211 For Bobbitt, constitutional law is an activity, not
an abstract thing.212 That is, there is no constitutional law independent of the human
social activities—principally arguing constitutional cases and deciding those cases—
to which we can appeal in talking about what our constitutional law is.213
The originalists want and need constitutional law to be a thing to which interpre-
tative conclusions can be compared.214 Bobbitt believes that originalism’s critics
make the same ontological mistake.215 The constitutional law of the critics is equally
reified. There is an ontologically independent Constitution that makes our claims about
constitutional law true or false.216 But for the critics, that constitutional law is at
once richer, less static, and potentially less certain.217 Originalism’s critics believe
that the claims of originalism are false, a belief supported by their assumption that
207 See, e.g., MARMOR, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 9–25 (offering a philosophically
sophisticated explanation of meaning, truth, and interpretation); THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 5
(Ronald Dworkin ed., 1977) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHY OF LAW].
208 BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 5–8.
209 See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1869,
1916–17 (1994) [hereinafter Bobbitt, Reflections].
210 Id. at 1873–76.
211 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 5–8.
212 Id.
213 See id.
214 See generally LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 41; Scalia, INTERPRETA-
TION, supra note 6.
215 BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 7–8 (describing the coequal modes of constitutional
argument).
216 See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 41, at 305–23.
217 See, e.g., DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 66, at 355–99 (asserting that law as integrity
can provide unique right answers even in constitutional cases); Powell, supra note 8 (asserting
that the Founders had no original understanding that the Constitution would be interpreted
according to their original understanding or original intentions). See generally LeDuc, Anti-
Foundational Challenge, supra note 43. There is a sense in which the anti-originalists are
more deferential toward the Founders than the originalists, because the anti-originalists credit
the Founders with having created a constitutional machine that can provide answers through
time to all constitutional controversies that may arise. See generally André LeDuc, Original-
ism’s Claims and Their Implications, ARK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter LeDuc,
Originalism’s Claims] (describing the problem that constitutional flux poses for originalism).
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the Constitution has an ontological status independent of our constitutional practices,
and that the truth of propositions of constitutional law are true or false by virtue of
their correspondence with the objective facts about the Constitution.218
If, following Bobbitt, we dispense with the notion of constitutional law as an
objective thing independent of our practice, then the originalist, interpretative claim
may be reconstructed as an endorsement of Bobbitt’s first two modes of argument—
the historical and the textual219—and the anti-originalist claim may be reconstructed
as an endorsement of the remaining four modes—doctrinal, structural, prudential,
and ethical.220
But that restatement loses a critical element of the claims made and a critical
element of the entire debate. In Bobbitt’s theory, depending upon the context, the
claims of an originalist interpretation may be dispositive, but they will not be in-
variably so.221 The modes of argument endorsed by originalism’s critics, too, will
only sometimes be dispositive; in other cases they will be trumped by the modes of
argument endorsed by the originalists.222 Central to Bobbitt’s account of constitu-
tional law is that none of the modes of constitutional argument is dispositive of all
questions (although each will sometimes prove persuasive—and thus dispositive)
and that no meta-mode exists to resolve potential conflicts among the different
modes.223 The debate about originalism cannot survive this re-description because
the debate is based on claims of a systematic privileging of a particular mode or modes
of argument—claims we now reject. While that modal account of our constitutional
practice may appear to describe only a chaotic, uncertain practice, Bobbitt and I
have explained the constraints that govern that sophisticated social practice.224
This modulated pluralist claim may be contrasted to the more radical skeptical
claims made by Stanley Fish and the Critical Legal Studies proponents.225 Fish
218 See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 41 (providing a more complete defense
of the claims attributed to originalism’s critics); Ronald Dworkin, Introduction, in THE PHILOS-
OPHY OF LAW 1, 5 (Ronald Dworkin ed., 1977); Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d
Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87, 95–96 (1996) [hereinafter Dworkin, Objectivity].
219 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 9–38 (describing historical and textual modes of
argument).
220 Id. at 39–119 (describing doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethical modes of argument).
221 See id. at 246–47 (“Constitutional argument is the method by which the competition
for legitimate decision is carried on.”).
222 See id.
223 See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 53, at xii–xv.
224 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64; LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43.
225 See STANLEY FISH, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature,
in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY
IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 87 (1989) [hereinafter FISH, Working on the Chain Gang];
STANLEY FISH, Wrong Again, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC
AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 105 (1989); ROBERTO
MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986) (arguing that law
is without integrity, merely serving, and reducible to, the structures of power); see, e.g.,
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criticizes Dworkin for attributing far too restrictive conditions to later writers in his
chain novel analogy to the interpretation of law.226 The Critical Legal Studies theorists
often deny that there is any objective truth in law.227 They instead assert that law
may be reduced to an expression of economic and political power and explained and
understood by understanding those underlying power relationships.228 Patterson
characterizes Fish very accurately as such an anti-realist.229 Fish’s position may
seem very similar to Bobbitt’s deflationary account of the truth of propositions of
law.230 Both deny that constitutional law is independent of how we talk about and
act with respect to it.231 Patterson highlights an important difference, however, Fish
goes further in his reduction.232 Patterson makes an anti-realist commitment to the
primacy of interpretation.233 For Fish, the practice of constitutional interpretation is
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, Sophistry about Conventions, in LOVE’S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS
ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 220 (1992) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, Sophistry] (invoking
notions of truth and objectivity in criticizing Fish’s commitment to subjectivity and denial
of the claims of rationality); PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 53, at 97–127; Brandom, Legal
Concept Determination, supra note 5, at 21–22.
226 FISH, Working on the Chain Gang, supra note 225, at 88–91 (arguing that Dworkin’s
chain novel metaphor—which analogizes the formation of legal doctrine by the courts to mul-
tiple authors who undertake to write a novel with each author writing a chapter after another
has made her contribution—for the cumulative, precedential feature of law is fundamentally
mistaken, because in such a chain novel the later authors are no more or less free than the
first author in their writing). Many have rejected Fish’s strong claim of legal indeterminacy.
See, e.g., PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 53, at 97–127 (criticizing Fish not for his subjectiv-
ism but for his construction of an interpretive community to ground claims about the truth
of legal propositions); Brandom, Legal Concept Determination, supra note 5, at 21–22,
33–38 (rejecting the radically indeterminate realist account Brandom attributes to Fish as a
misconception of the inferential content of legal precedents because of its failure to recognize
the obligation a judge assumes in interpreting and applying legal precedent (or other legal
authority)); NUSSBAUM, Sophistry, supra note 225 (arguing that Fish’s subjectivism should
be despised and rejected); RONALD DWORKIN, On Interpretation and Objectivity, in A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 167, 175–77 (1985) (characterizing Fish’s stance as invoking radical
external skepticism and rejecting that position as incoherent). See generally also Dworkin,
Objectivity, supra note 218 (making further arguments against external skepticism); Jeremy
Waldron, Did Dworkin Ever Answer the Crits?, in EXPLORING LAW’S EMPIRE: THE JURIS-
PRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 155 (Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006).
227 See generally UNGER, supra note 225, at 5–8 (beginning the heroic epic of Critical
Legal Studies with its repudiation of objectivism).
228 See id.
229 PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 53, at 126–27 (“Dworkin and Fish agree with Nietzsche
that humans are ‘interpretation all the way down.’ . . . Dworkin and Fish are both committed
to a picture of legal justification where each appeals to ‘something’ which makes propo-
sitions of law true.” (citation omitted)).
230 Id.; BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 53, at xix–xx.
231  BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 53, at xix–xx; PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note
53, at 126–27.
232 FISH, Working on the Chain Gang, supra note 225.
233 See PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 53, at 126, 179.
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not a social practice with the social patterns and constraints that Bobbitt and
Patterson describe.234 Patterson wants to salvage the primacy of the argumentative
community without Fish’s anti-realist commitments and without Fish’s commitment
to the priority of interpretation in constitutional decision.235
Bobbitt’s characterization of constitutional law, and his denial of foundations
therefor, may seem to commit him to the same claims made by the skeptics.236 Bobbitt
and Patterson are at pains to distinguish their positions from that taken by Fish.237
They do not argue that the absence of factual support from the world for legal propo-
sitions leaves those propositions uncertain, as the skeptics appear to do.238 Rather,
they argue that there cannot be any move to legitimize legal claims, and that the
consensus of the relevant legal or constitutional community or, in the absence of
consensus, authoritative resolution of such claims, is as good as it gets.239 As I ex-
plored in The Anti-Foundational Challenge, this distinction resonates with the
philosophical debate between realists, anti-realists, and anti-foundationalist critics.240
Moreover, Bobbitt and Patterson hold themselves out as members of that commu-
nity, at least implicitly—they share the internal point of view with respect to the
community’s rules.241
Indeed, Hart’s concept of the internal point of view may capture the most im-
portant difference between Bobbitt’s anti-foundational position and the positions of
234 FISH, Working on the Chain Gang, supra note 225.
235 PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 53, at 126–27 (defending an analysis of the truth of
legal propositions derived from community practice, but denying that the relevant practices
are only those of interpretation).
236 See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 53, at xix–xx (asserting that his account is
neither realist nor anti-realist).
237 See id. at xix; PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 53, at 99–127 (offering a comprehensive
account of, and argument against, Fish’s theory).
238 Critical Legal Studies theorists endeavor to reduce constitutional propositions to
expressions of power or structures of power. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies
and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623, 646–47 (1984)
(expressly invoking Marx in an analysis of contemporary constitutional jurisprudence). See
generally MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW (1988) (endorsing communitarian ideals in assessing federalism and other
fundamental constitutional questions).
239 PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 53, at 126–27, 169–79; see BOBBITT, FATE, supra
note 64, at 4–7.
240 LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43.
241 See HART, supra note 3, at 88, 91 (“One of the difficulties facing any legal theory
anxious to do justice to the complexity of the facts is to remember the presence of both these
[internal and external] points of view and not to define one of them out of existence.”). The
internal point of view with respect to a law for a member of the subject legal community is
the perspective that the legal obligation is not simply a consequence of the coercive power
available to the sovereign to compel compliance with the obligation (with the obligation
viewed from the external point of view), but is also a consequence arising from the fact that
membership in the community creates a duty to comply with the community’s laws.
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Fish and the Critical Legal Studies theorists.242 Yet Bobbitt, despite his radical criti-
cisms of the premises of both sides of the originalist debate, preserves the internal
point of view with respect to constitutional law. That is, although he denies that true
propositions about constitutional law describe the world, he nevertheless endorses,
accepts, and honors that law.243
Bobbitt defends four theses244:
1. The debate between originalists and non-originalists reflects philosoph-
ical confusion, not disagreement;
2. The first philosophical confusion is ontological, reflecting the belief that
law is an abstract thing—independent of our constitutional practices—
rather than a human, social activity, like our social practices of courtesy
and, in America, passing approaching fellow pedestrians on the right;
3. The second philosophical confusion is epistemological—the failure to
recognize that we come to know law, in general, and constitutional law
in particular, by participating in the social practice of constitutional in-
terpretation, agreeing to understand within that practice certain proposi-
tions of constitutional law; and
4. If we eliminate the philosophical confusion, we are left with a concept
of law in which texts acquire their meaning and force in a complex,
intellectual social practice—and thus neither originalism nor its critics’
position are correct.245
242 See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
243 See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 53, at xii–xiv (implicitly acknowledging
that American constitutional law is legitimate); Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 209, at 1869
(“In my work, I have endeavored to derive legitimacy from the practices themselves . . . .”).
Indeed, according to Bobbitt’s account, it was Bork’s rejection of the legitimacy of certain
decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts that disqualified Bork. See BOBBITT, INTER-
PRETATION, supra note 53, at 83–108. Goldford also appears to endorse such a radical
strategy to resolve the controversy over originalism. GOLDFORD, DEBATE, supra note 2, at
17 (“My goal, therefore, is to engage and advance the literature of the originalism debate not
by simply adding on to it, but, rather, by working through that literature in order to recon-
ceptualize it in a fundamental but hitherto largely unexplored manner.”). He argues, much
like Bobbitt, that the debate over originalism turns on implicit, unarticulated, shared positivist
premises about language, meaning and ontology. Id. at 16 (“[T]he concept of Framers’ intent
cannot function in the way that originalism requires, because it relies on misconceived
assumptions about the nature of language, interpretation, and objectivity . . . .”).
244 See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 53, at xvi–xx.
245 Bobbitt must explain how the practice of constitutional decision is constrained. He
purports to do so by arguing that only certain modes of constitutional argument are privileged
and that, as a matter of constitutional practice, there is a shared acceptance with respect to
which arguments are most compelling in particular cases. See id. He does not establish that
there is a unanimity in that practice—the presence of dissents and concurrences would put
paid to that claim in any case.
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In Bobbitt’s view, it is necessary to reexamine the implicit ontology and episte-
mology underlying the originalism debate to resolve it.246 Bobbitt does not claim that
there is no debate; it is that through mistaken shared premises, the debate is muddle-
headed.247 The silence of the originalists on these questions is striking. It is less a
“just say no” strategy of denial than a strategy of non-engagement, seemingly re-
fusing to acknowledge genuine issues. Originalists owe us—and themselves—an
account of these questions and their implications for originalism itself. This account
presents another reason that the literature of the debate is so unsatisfying.
Before outlining what a therapeutic strategy would be, it is helpful to canvass
simpler and more direct strategies that have been proposed to bring the debate over
originalism to a conclusion. I will briefly describe and then reject some strategies
that seek to dissolve the debate, rather than to resolve it.
First, some suggest that we are now all originalists.248 The core of the originalist
canon appears commonplace: who, after all, would suggest that the original mean-
ings of the constitutional provisions ought not to be consulted in understanding how
to resolve a case presenting a question of constitutional interpretation?249 But that
superficial formulation of originalism neither captures the originalist claim nor
highlights the disagreement with originalism’s critics. If caring about the original
meaning of the Constitution were enough to make us all originalists, then we would
indeed all be originalists.250 But most versions of originalism insist on more than that
principle, privileging an original intention, understanding, or expectation in deroga-
tion of other potential sources of constitutional law or interpretation.251
246 See id. at xvi.
247 Id. at 16. In implicitly characterizing the debate as muddled, Goldford and Bobbitt
allege that the participants are applying a representationalist and foundationalist theory of
constitutional law that does not fit the facts. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 53,
at xix–xx; GOLDFORD, DEBATE, supra note 2, at ix–x (invoking Hegel). On this account,
there are no facts about the Constitution (or about anything else in the world) that make
propositions of constitutional law true. The debate over originalism can be interpreted as
about whether the other side’s constitutional claims are proven true by the Constitution (or
otherwise). That is a debate neither side can win.
248 See Solum, All Originalists Now, supra note 103 (offering an impassioned defense of
the New Originalism). Dworkin also flirts with this position, perhaps ironically. See DWORKIN,
ROBES, supra note 93, at 117–18.
249 See DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 93, at 117–18 (acknowledging that interpretation
begins by understanding what was said). In this respect, the constitutional text would appear
no different from other texts with respect to the nature of its understanding and interpretation.
250 This version of the doctrine might be termed “platitudinous originalism,” in termi-
nology derived from Robert Brandom. See ROBERT B. BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO INFERENTIALISM 23–24 (2000) [hereinafter BRANDOM, INFERENTIAL-
ISM] (referring to “platitudinous empiricism”).
251 See generally André LeDuc, Evolving Originalism: How Are the Original Understand-
ings, Expectations, and Intentions Privileged? 4–5 (Jan. 2, 2013) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the author) [hereinafter LeDuc, Privileged How?] (describing the ways in which
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To the extent that originalism is committed to privileging historical and textual
arguments over other modes of constitutional argument,252 then we are not all original-
ists. As Sunstein argues, many of us would not endorse the radical surgery that original-
ism requires upon our contemporary understanding of the Constitution and the role of
the federal government.253 Similarly, to the extent that originalism would disregard the
consequences of certain decisions—for example, with respect to gun control254—its
critics are not all originalists.255 Many of those critics, like Posner and Sunstein, be-
lieve that the measure of a constitutional theory is its consequences for the decision
of constitutional cases.256 Similarly, to the extent that originalism calls for us to im-
plicitly adopt the moral framework and expectations of eighteenth century or nine-
teenth century racist white Americans, we are not all originalists.257 Finally, as a matter
of substantive constitutional law rather than constitutional theory, to the extent that
uncertainties cause us to abandon entire provisions of the Constitution or to reduce
their protections to their lowest common denominator, we are not all originalists.258
But the disagreement between originalists and their critics goes beyond these
differences. The originalists deny, or limit, the legitimacy of sources of law that
non-originalists accept as authoritative—among them, the precedential, structural,
originalism generally privileges the original understandings, expectations, and intentions in der-
ogation of other arguments or interpretative strategies, and how its critics contest those claims).
252 See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 53, at 83–108 (arguing that Bork’s argu-
ment in his Supreme Court confirmation hearings that the non-originalist decisions of the
Warren Court were illegitimate is the feature of Bork’s jurisprudence that properly dis-
qualified him from confirmation).
253 See generally SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4 (identifying alleged implications of
originalism that would be unpalatable or unacceptable). But see Steven G. Calabresi, Intro-
duction, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 32–40 (2007) (endorsing many
of the constitutional implications of originalism that Sunstein characterizes as unpalatable).
254 See Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 43.
255 See Robert Leider, Our Non-Originalist Right to Bear Arms, 89 IND. L.J. 1587, 1641
(2014).
256 See generally SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 73 (characterizing the prudential
defense of originalism as “an utterly implausible position”); Posner, Bork, supra note 25.
257 Compare Bickel, Original Understanding, supra note 51 (arguing that the drafters and
adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment did not understand it to prohibit racially segregated
schools), with McConnell, supra note 51 (making a valiant—but what is generally viewed
as an ultimately unsuccessful—effort to rebut Bickel’s claim and thus to save the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment from the charge of a fundamental underlying
racism consistent with racially segregated public schools); see also Klarman, supra note 51,
at 1904–05 (rebutting McConnell’s historical claims). See generally LeDuc, Privileged How?,
supra note 251, at 60. But see BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 76 (asserting that Brown
was rightly decided as a matter of the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment).
258 Justice Scalia of course denies looking to expectations rather than understandings. See
Scalia, Response, supra note 76, at 144. But see Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of
Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1256–57 (1997)
[hereinafter Dworkin, Arduous] (arguing that Justice Scalia proclaims himself a semantic
originalist but is, in fact, an expectations originalist).
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prudential, and ethical arguments.259 This disagreement is as profound as the dis-
agreement over particular constitutional interpretations.260
Second, some may question whether there is really a conflict between original-
ism and its critics. It would indeed be ironic if we concluded that the apparent conflict
over originalism is in fact illusory. Nevertheless, that reconciliation may be entertained
for two reasons. The first is trivial. On this argument, originalists and their critics
merely emphasize different, independent but non-exclusive modes of argument.261
From this vantage, certain forms of originalism, such as weak originalism and moderate
(non-exclusive) originalism, do not conflict with other theories of interpretation because
they can coexist. While there is certainly less inconsistency between such forms of
originalism and their critics,262 the conflict nevertheless remains because originalism
asserts a priority to, or primacy for, original intentions, expectations, or understand-
ings that critics deny.263 Thus, such a strategy of reconciliation cannot harmonize even
the weak or non-exclusive types of originalist theory with the critics’ responses.
Finally, it is sometimes argued that the debate is illusory because originalism is
not well-defined264 or is incoherent.265 These are disguised arguments for the anti-
originalist position. The first is an argument for the anti-originalist position because
259 See, e.g., Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 139–40 (attacking the legitimacy
of non-originalist precedent under originalism, but conceding a limited role for such law
under the principle of stare decisis); Barnett, Trumping, supra note 26, at 257–59 (defending
a more radical and systematic attack on the role of non-originalist precedent on the grounds
that the only legitimate source of constitutional law is the constitutional text).
260 Indeed, because the debate over originalism is, fundamentally, a debate over the legiti-
macy of various modes of argument, the stakes are perhaps even higher than with respect to
any particular question that may come before the Court.
261 Dworkin sometimes writes as if this were the case, but this is not his considered view.
See Dworkin, Arduous, supra note 258, at 1250 (“[T]extual interpretation is nevertheless an
essential part of any broader program of constitutional interpretation, because what those
who made the Constitution actually said is always at least an important ingredient in any
genuinely interpretive constitutional argument.”).
262 See id. at 1249–50.
263 Thus, the core of originalism is the claim to privilege arguments from original under-
standings, expectations, and intentions. See generally LeDuc, Originalism’s Claims, supra
note 217, at 1.
264 See Berman, Originalism, supra note 3, at 4–6 (arguing that the various versions of orig-
inalism are inconsistent in ways at least as fundamental as the differences among its critics).
265 Compare Powell, supra note 8 (arguing that the Founders were not committed to a
jurisprudence of original intentions or understanding), with Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the
Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW.
U. L. REV. 226, 273–81 (1988) (acknowledging Powell’s objection and offering a series of
rebuttal arguments to his claim), and Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77 (1988) (“What, Powell asks, was ‘the original
understanding of original intent’? In this article, I unabashedly appropriate Powell’s central
question. My purpose is to offer another reading of major chunks of the evidence that Powell
himself cites . . . .”).
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the originalists have eschewed theoretical precision. They aspire to a commonsensical,
untheoretical approach to the Constitution.266 In the case of the charge of incoher-
ence, even for an often untheoretical theory like originalism, such a characterization
calls into question its merits.
There is a bona fide dispute between originalists and their critics. Originalists
privilege the original understandings, expectations, and intentions in a manner that
their critics deny.267 A therapeutic resolution of the debate must enter into the pro-
tagonists’ respective ideopolises.
When we arrive, despite the intensity of the debate, what is most striking is not
the differences, but the commonalities. Both sides of the debate believe that there
is a fact to the matter as to how a constitutional case controversy ought to be de-
cided.268 They believe that there is a state of affairs—a fact of the matter—relating
to the Constitution that exists in the world that determines how the Constitution
applies and thus how a constitutional case should be decided.269 Originalists and
their critics assume that the appeal to the original understandings or expectations,
for example, is an appeal to the relevant fact of the matter and that such an appeal is
either correct or incorrect.270 For the originalists and their critics, propositions of con-
stitutional law, which are the building blocks of constitutional argument, assert inter-
pretations of the constitutional text, based upon such original understandings.271 Those
interpretations are either true or false.272
On the other hand, in terms of the debate, originalists and their critics really do
disagree about the truth of such propositions.273 Originalism’s critics would also
assert the truth of propositions of constitutional law ungrounded on original inten-
tions, expectations, or understandings.274 Originalists would deny such propositions
a place in constitutional interpretation and decision.275
266 I have elsewhere explained why that approach is flawed. See generally LeDuc, Philos-
ophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 43.
267 See Farber, Perplexed, supra note 2, at 1085–90. See generally LeDuc, Originalism’s
Claims, supra note 217, at 1.
268 See generally LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 41, at 269–74, 306–18.
269 See id. at 304.
270 Id. at 334.
271 See id. at 269–74.
272 See generally id.; LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43.
273 In characterizing the disagreement between originalists and their critics as a disagree-
ment about the truth of their respective claims of constitutional law, I am tacitly adopting
(but not endorsing) the stance of the protagonists in the debate. I am not endorsing the truth
claims each makes.
274 Dworkin is probably the clearest and most articulate defender of his truth claims. See
generally Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 218.
275 See, e.g., Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 43–44. See generally LeDuc, Beyond
Babel, supra note 31, at 197–220 (exploring the originalist and non-originalist arguments in
three important recent cases).
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The rejection of both the alternatives offered by the protagonists sets the stage
to consider a more complex therapeutic strategy to move beyond the debate. The
first step is to sketch out what therapy means in this context, recapitulate why the
debate about originalism appears pathological, and to flesh out how a therapeutic
approach may be employed with respect to the debate.276
II. ADMINISTERING THE CURE
A. Introduction
The therapeutic project is well underway, because I have motivated us (if we
need any further motivation) to want to end the debate over originalism, and I have
explained why the two sides of the debate have such a powerful appeal to the
protagonists in the debate. It is helpful to summarize what I have argued so far.
First, I have outlined how originalism and its critics have failed to describe our
practice of constitutional argument and decision. Second, I have argued in a com-
panion piece against the effectiveness of the strategy of using philosophy to ground
radical reform strategies in our constitutional theory.277 That is a strategy that fig-
ures, tacitly or expressly, in the arguments made by the protagonists in the debate.
Most simply, I have argued that philosophy cannot solve our constitutional puzzles,
whether substantive or theoretical. Nor can philosophy ground our constitutional
arguments or decisions. At most, it can help us work through the confusions that
have put our constitutional thinking—and the originalism debate—in the ditch.
Diagnosing the pathology of the originalism debate does not, however, effect
the cure. A cure requires the protagonists in the debate to abandon the arguments
and claims that carry on the debate. The task of therapy is first to show the protago-
nists how those arguments and claims may be abandoned at an acceptable cost. The
second task is to show the benefits that may be captured with such progress.
B. Four Remaining Major Therapeutic Moves
Four principal therapeutic insights remain to be developed with respect to curing
the protagonists of their need to continue the debate. What is required is teasing out
the therapeutic implications of the claims that I have already made. The therapeutic
task now is to develop an alternative to the express premises and, more importantly,
the tacit assumptions underlying the debate.
276 See supra Sections I.A–B.
277 See LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 43, at 105–32
(arguing that philosophy does not ground and cannot be deployed to radically reform our
constitutional law, despite Dworkin’s claims to the contrary). See generally BOBBITT, FATE,
supra note 64; PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 53.
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First, the protagonists on both sides offer an incomplete and inadequate descrip-
tion of our constitutional practice.278 The descriptions are incomplete because they
do not account for large parts of the constitutional argument authoritatively made
in constitutional decisions. They are inadequate because they describe constitutional
reasoning in formalistic and misleading terms.279 As noted previously and in some
companion articles,280 the participants’ descriptive failures are largely a consequence
of their focus on what constitutional practice ought to be.281
If this indictment is correct, then is there a therapeutic insight that can move the
protagonists toward a more fruitful stance? The protagonists may well remain
steadfast in their commitment to the primacy of prescription. If they do so, they must
explain the failure of either side to make advances in the debate—at least in the
critical sense of convincing the other side. Without arguing against the integrity or
good faith of their opponents, it is hard to understand how the protagonists can
account for a half century of stalemate in the debate. The unfruitfulness of the debate
seems obvious. Abandoning the dualism of the debate would allow the protagonists
to recognize the complexity and richness in our constitutional argument and prac-
tice. Thus, the descriptive failure inherent in the debate provides a good reason to
move beyond the opposition emphasized in the debate.
The originalists may argue that the debate is not at a stalemate. Originalists like
Justice Scalia may argue that the increasing commitments to originalism on the
Court and within the academy show that the originalists are winning the debate.282
This may be true as a matter of political or constitutional history, but my focus is not
on that aspect of the originalism debate. In the space of reasons, there is no evidence
that the originalists are convincing their opponents—or successfully discrediting
them. The New Originalists like Baude and Sachs believe that their new arguments
will win the day.283 I have argued in some depth why those arguments are not likely
to be effective, even if the originalists are prepared to accept the concessions that
accompany those new arguments.284 Moreover, there is no evidence that any origi-
nalist critic has been persuaded by the new arguments. Originalism’s critics may be
278 See infra notes 279–85 and accompanying text.
279 LeDuc, Practical Reasoning, supra note 83, at 12–19.
280 See LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43; LeDuc, Constitutional
Meaning, supra note 75.
281 See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43; LeDuc, Consti-
tutional Meaning, supra note 75.
282 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Foreword, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DE-
BATE 43, 43–44 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007); Scalia, Response, supra note 76, at 149
(predicting “hard times ahead” for nonoriginalists).
283 See, e.g., Baude & Sachs, Law of Interpretation, supra note 19, at 1147 (“Once we
recognize the importance and ubiquity of the law of interpretation, we can be clearer with
ourselves and with each other about what we’re doing in any given case . . . .”).
284 See generally LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 75; LeDuc, Practical
Reasoning, supra note 83.
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equally optimistic, but their optimism is no more firmly grounded. The philosophical
arguments that Dworkin, Marmor, Soames, and others have advanced have, again,
won no originalist converts.285 My claim of stalemate is hard to rebut—or ignore.
The second therapeutic insight is that, in constitutional decisional theory, de-
scription is prior to prescription; any judgments about our constitutional practice
must be made from within that practice.286 There is no Archimedean stance from
which to criticize or reform our constitutional practice from outside that very prac-
tice.287 The protagonists make prescription prior to description in their accounts of
our constitutional law and practice.288 This is a fatal flaw because it assumes that
there is a foundational derivation of our constitutional law. On the strength of that
foundational account, the existing practice of constitutional argument and decision
can be assessed and, as necessary, reformed. But there is no such foundational ac-
count that legitimizes our constitutional practice. That practice is itself foundational,
the bedrock of our constitutional law.289 When the priority of our constitutional
practice is acknowledged, the commitment of the protagonists to a foundational
account of that practice emerges as the fatal flaw it is and another reason to abandon
the argument.
The third therapeutic insight is that the substantive constitutional goals that the
protagonists in the debate have for the theoretical stances that they take can be
achieved without the theoretical commitments of the originalism debate. Originalism
is not necessary for the originalists to have a basis on which to criticize the excesses
of the Warren Court.290 Thus, for example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda
285 DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 66, at 90 (“Jurisprudence is the general part of ad-
judication, silent prologue to any decision at law.”); MARMOR, INTERPRETATION, supra note
1; Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 99. See generally LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning,
supra note 75.
286 See, e.g., LeDuc, Practical Reasoning, supra note 83, at 4 (defending an informal
account of the reasoning in constitutional decision against the competing formal account of
the originalists); see also LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43 (arguing that
there are not foundational discursive premises of our constitutional practice to which appeal
may be made in criticizing or defending constitutional arguments or decisions).
287 That is, I believe, the fundamental import of Justice Jackson’s celebrated aphorism
about the Court: “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only
because we are final.” Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
The Court’s de facto infallibility encompasses not only the outcomes of the Court’s deci-
sions, but also the kinds of arguments it makes.
288 See LeDuc, Practical Reasoning, supra note 83, at 4. The claim that a jurisprudential
or philosophical theory could force the fundamental revision of our constitutional law and
practice reflects a misunderstanding of the nature of that constitutional law and practice—and
of the nature of philosophical theory. See LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, supra note 43, at 113 n.92.
289 See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43; LeDuc, Philosophy
and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 43.
290 See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 82–83, 131.
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v. Arizona291 could be criticized not simply because the Court failed to attend to the
original intent regarding, or linguistic understanding of, the prohibition on self-
incrimination, but on the basis that those original intentions and understanding yield
a more compelling application of the Fifth Amendment or because, as a prudential
matter, requiring the safeguards dictated by Miranda unduly hampers the police
work of the State. Those arguments can be made even while acknowledging the
legitimacy of the ethical and structural arguments advanced by the Court. Nor are
the arguments against the legitimacy and importance of historical and textual argu-
ment necessary for originalism’s critics who make structural, doctrinal, and pruden-
tial arguments.292 Thus, for example, nonoriginalists like John Hart Ely can defend
the voting rights decisions of the Warren Court on the structural arguments he makes,
even while acknowledging that the historical and textual arguments cut against such
decisions.293 In the end, the Court must make a judgment as to which of the compet-
ing modes of argument is most persuasive in the case at hand. Thus, on both sides
of the debate, the protagonists’ claims and theories are unnecessary for the judg-
ments the protagonists defend with respect to the Warren Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence. The goals motivating the protagonists can be achieved, at least in
substantial part, without the sterile theories of the debate. Understanding that ought
to give the protagonists another reason to move on.
The originalists seek a constitutional theory that can provide a foundation from
which to criticize the Warren Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, to cabin judicial
discretion, and to explain the Court’s power of judicial review in our democratic
republic.294 Moreover, by privileging varieties of historical and textual arguments,
the originalists believe that they can generate a constitutional jurisprudence that de-
livers substantive constitutional results that can reverse much established constitutional
doctrine that has allowed the growth of the modern liberal administrative state.295
The originalists are wrong both about what originalism can do and about the
need for originalism to do it. The originalists want their theory to comprehensively
discredit the constitutional jurisprudence of the Warren Court as illegitimate.296 The
critics think that their theoretical commitments generate arguments that refute the
originalist claim to privilege historical and textual arguments. By privileging the
arguments that generate the Living Constitution, the critics believe that they can
defeat the originalist assault on the Warren Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.297
291 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
292 See, e.g., ELY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 24 (structural arguments); Sunstein, Five
Theses, supra note 165 (doctrinal arguments); Posner, Bork, supra note 25, at 1369 (pru-
dential arguments).
293 See ELY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 24.
294 See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 129–32; Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note
6, at 9. But see Baude, Originalism as a Constraint, supra note 19.
295 See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 18–19.
296 See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 82–83, 131.
297 See, e.g., ELY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 24, at ch.2 (criticizing originalism and setting
up the foundation for a structural argument for the Warren Court’s decisions about voting
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The critics are wrong about their ability to protect the constitutional legacy of
the Warren Court against the attacks of the originalists on the basis of the theories
they have built in the debate over originalism. They are wrong about their need for
such theoretical arguments to burnish that legacy. Finally, they are wrong about
their ability to ground the Living Constitution and the other alternatives to original-
ism on the basis of their constitutional theories. The theoretical arguments that the
critics have constructed generally privilege the arguments from structure, prudence,
doctrine, and ethics that support constitutional jurisprudence like that developed by
the Warren Court.298 But the fit is at best only rough: the most problematic elements
of the Warren Court’s constitutional canon were not those decisions and opinions that
clearly invoked canonical structural, doctrinal, prudential, or ethical arguments.299
Rather, they were those decisions and opinions that do not both expressly articulate
any of those modes of argument and resonate with us as a matter of justice.
For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut,300 the conclusion that a constitutional
right of privacy extends to protect the right of a married couple to procure contracep-
tives was not supported by doctrinal, prudential, or structural arguments—and was
supported even less by historical or textual arguments.301 The only argument that
may support the recognition of that right is ethical argument.302 Ethical argument is
not often deployed by the Court.303 Historically, ethical argument has been employed
to strike down overreaching by the state against its citizens.304 The Connecticut statute
prohibiting the sale of contraceptives is not obviously easily assimilated to the
rights); cf. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4 (criticizing originalism and endorsing mini-
malist prudential arguments without defending the entire Warren Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence, but without the theoretical structure offered by Ely); Dworkin, Forum, supra
note 152.
298 See ELY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 24; SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4.
299 Thus, for example, while the voting rights decisions of the Court were undoubtedly
politically controversial, they were not particularly controversial as a matter of constitutional
law because of the strong structural arguments for the results reached.
300 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
301 Id. at 480, 485–86. The rhetorical style of the Court’s opinion, and its casual invocation
of the penumbras of the express rights protected by the Constitution, undoubtedly exacer-
bated the controversialness of the decision.
302 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 103–06 (describing the role of ethical argument
as a tacit appeal to fundamental beliefs about the nature of individuals and their relationship
to our limited government, but not invoking that mode of argument to explain the decision
in Griswold). Ethical argument supports the result in Griswold because that decision protects
the fundamental expectation of privacy within the intimacy of married couples’ bedrooms.
Thus the Court wrote: “Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.” Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86.
303 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 104–05.
304 See id. at 103–06.
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template of the kind of intrusive state action struck down in Rochin v. California.305
In Griswold, while the State had criminalized the use of contraceptives by married
couples, it did not actively enforce that law and never asserted that its enforcement
could bring the State into the marital bedrooms that Justice Douglas invoked in
striking down the statute.306 By contrast, the State in Rochin had, in fact, entered the
defendant’s bedroom and ultimately forced his stomach to be pumped.307
Yet at a more general level, what was troubling in Rochin was also what was
troubling in Griswold: in each case, the state had intruded into the private affairs of
its citizens.308 Indeed, in each case the state had implicitly asserted its right to regu-
late the bodies of those citizens in fundamental and intrusive ways.309 Viewed with
that level of generality, the decision in Griswold was not as much an outlier as it
may initially have appeared.
Perhaps the best way to think about the perceived mistake in the Warren Court’s
constitutional jurisprudence is as a misunderstanding of the proper limits on the
power of the Court. The Court betrayed an unrealistic arrogance in its assessment of
its ability to change American society.310 While the performative nature of constitu-
tional decisional texts made the constitutional law so when pronounced by the Court,311
that performative power has not extended to changing American social mores, moral
beliefs, or much of American social behavior.312 The failure of American political
and social practices to follow the Court’s leadership, while deplorable at a moral
level, is not surprising as a matter of human social psychology and behavior.313 The
failure to anticipate that response may be grounds on which to criticize the Court.
The critics are also wrong that their theoretical stance can discredit the orig-
inalists’ historical and textual arguments. All of the modes of our constitutional
305 See 342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952) (holding that law enforcement officials violated the
Fourteenth Amendment when they obtained evidence for a drug conviction by forcing open
a suspect’s bedroom door, struggling to remove suspected drugs from his mouth, and ulti-
mately forcing him to have his stomach pumped).
306 381 U.S. at 480.
307 342 U.S. at 166.
308 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480; Rochin, 342 U.S. at 165–66.
309 Ironically, these two cases presented the kind of state intrusion that critics of the Af-
fordable Care Act would analogize to a state mandate to eat broccoli—and reject. See LeDuc,
Beyond Babel, supra note 31, at 204–14 (criticizing the Court’s purported distinction
between regulating action and inaction).
310 See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008).
311 See infra note 320 and accompanying text. See generally LeDuc, Constitutional
Meaning, supra note 75, at 150–68 (exploring the performative role of the constitutional text
and constitutional decisions).
312 See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 310, at 70–71 (asserting that the court’s
decisions had “virtually no direct effect” in ending many forms of racial discrimination).
313 See generally id. at 72–106 (describing in some detail the political, social, and his-
torical context for the courts’ decisions regarding racial discrimination after Brown).
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argument comprise integral parts of our constitutional practice and law.314 Historical
arguments have no significance in modern science; but they are nevertheless an
integral part of our constitutional law and practice.315
Perhaps more importantly, the critics are wrong to believe that they need the
elaborate superstructure of their constitutional theory to rebut the originalist assault
on the Warren Court. The structural, doctrinal, prudential, and ethical modes of
argument that the Warren Court invoked to reach its decisions are sufficient to face
the originalist criticisms, except to the extent that, as a matter of our continuing
judgment, the originalist criticisms made on the basis of historical and textual argu-
ments appear persuasive.316 I have previously adduced Ely’s defense of the Warren
Court’s voting rights decisions as one example of the kinds of arguments that can
be made without challenging originalism’s theoretical claims.317 The Warren Court’s
decisions on civil rights—Brown and its progeny—can be defended on the basis of
textual arguments about the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, even if those
arguments face counter-arguments on the basis of precedent and history. As impor-
tantly, originalism’s critics can generally also defend more progressive decisions
protecting individual rights on the basis of canonical constitutional arguments,
again, even if those arguments may admit canonical counter-arguments within that
same constitutional practice.
The fourth therapeutic insight is that the debate is grounded on untenable founda-
tions. Both the originalists and their critics are trapped by models of language and
the world that fit none of the Constitution, its interpretation, or the argumentative
practices of lawyers, courts, or commentators.318 Most fundamentally, the Consti-
tution, and the courts applying the Constitution, do not state propositions of consti-
tutional law that are true or false; instead, the constitutional text and the opinions of
the courts are most fundamentally performative utterances, like the statements made
in entering into marriage, in wagering, and in entering into contracts.319
314 See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43; BOBBITT, FATE,
supra note 64; PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 53.
315 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 9.
316 See, e.g., id. at 9–38.
317 See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
318 This therapeutic insight is more important because it explains why the respective claims
of priority or exclusivity are unfounded. It is more fundamental because it offers a compre-
hensive redescription of the nature of the Constitution and constitutional argument. The
protagonists in the originalism debate do not offer adequate descriptions of our constitutional
practice. Their accounts are inadequate to capture the complexity of our constitutional argument
and decision and generally fail to capture or even acknowledge the role of judgment.
319 See J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 4–5 (1962) (establishing the con-
cept of “performative[s]”: sentences that comprise utterances or texts with little or no truth-
value, but when uttered in the appropriate context, perform an act); see also PAUL GRICE,
STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 14 (1989). The classic Oxford example of a performative
is the utterance “I do” by the bride or groom in the traditional Anglican wedding ceremony,
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These utterances are not true or false in any ordinary sense.320 They do not
express a claim about how things are. Instead, these statements can be felicitous and
effective, or infelicitous and ineffective, in a variety of ways.321 Austin thus uses the
term felicitous in a technical, philosophical sense, indicating that a performative
utterance has worked properly in the social practice in which it is imbedded.322
When we recognize the performative character of the constitutional text and consti-
tutional decision, then we can recognize that we should examine and assess such
expressions not principally for their truth but for their felicity and effectiveness as
performative texts. An example may help show what this performative description
of constitutional texts entails. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual
punishments.323 That prohibition has proved controversial, particularly as it relates
to capital punishment.324 Originalists argue that the historical understanding of this
clause should be understood to determine its meaning today and to control its
application.325 They assume that the meaning of the text corresponds to an historical
linguistic understanding of the text and a state of affairs in the world.
Most of originalism’s critics, who would deny the controlling role of that orig-
inal historical linguistic understanding, would nevertheless look to interpret the text
as if it were an assertion. They seek to identify the meaning with a state of affairs
in the world. In the case of Dworkin’s law as integrity, that correspondence requires
first articulating a moral theory and then a complex theory of law balancing justice
and fairness into which an interpretation of the constitutional text may be fit.326 But
fundamentally, Dworkin believes that there is a fact of the matter as to right inter-
pretation of the constitutional text and that the meaning of the text corresponds with
a state of affairs in the world.327
The shared treatment of the text by the originalists and their critics as if it were
merely an assertion misses the text’s more fundamental performative function. What
can we say about that performative role? The constitutional text is establishing a
constraint, initially on the federal government, since Reconstruction on both the
state and federal governments, with respect to their criminal law. That is what the
text is doing by what it is saying. How do we ascertain what that performative force
as part of the ceremony and playing a key part in the act of marriage. See LeDuc, Constitu-
tional Meaning, supra note 75, at Section I.B: Challenging Classical Originalism’s Semantic
Account. See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43.
320 AUSTIN, supra note 319, at 14 (characterizing the nature of what happens when things
go wrong with such utterances as matters of “Infelicities”).
321 See id. at 14–15.
322 See id.
323 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
324 See, e.g., Dworkin, Arduous, supra note 258; Dworkin, INTERPRETATION, supra note
61, at 120–22; Scalia, Response, supra note 76, at 144–46.
325 Scalia, Response, supra note 76, at 144–46.
326 See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 66, at 176–77.
327 Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 218, at 95–96.
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is? That question is not simply a matter of establishing the semantic meaning of the
text.328 The performative dimension of constitutional authority explains why sub-
stantive due process is not an oxymoron.329 The failure to recognize the importance
of that aspect of authoritative constitutional texts is the shared error of the protago-
nists in the debate with respect to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
The protagonists in the originalism debate and others committed to a purely
representational account of constitutional texts and decisions may challenge this
performative account on the basis that we make arguments for and against readings
and applications of constitutional texts and decisions and those practical inferences
are assessed as to whether they are good. That may sound like a judgment about truth
and what makes such inferences true. Such assessments about practical inference
can instead be better understood in terms of how we make such inferences true.330
Moreover, statements of constitutional law also play an inferential role. They
stand as premises and conclusions in practical reasoning.331 In doing so, those per-
formatives have conceptual content, and the nature of the truth of such conceptual
content may be complex.332 Constitutional case decisions and the opinions that accom-
pany those decisions have inferential content.333 They relate to other cases and other
doctrine. We need a practical conceptual account of how that works. That is the
sense in which constitutional performatives also have conceptual content that must
be accounted for.334
I have explored these foundations in more detail in a series of related articles.335
In those articles I outlined an anti-foundational, anti-representational account of our
constitutional language and our constitutional practice. On that account, the lan-
guage of our constitutional decisional discourse does not represent the Constitution
328 See generally AUSTIN, supra note 319; GRICE, supra note 319.
329 See LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 75, at 170–71.
330 See generally BRANDOM, INFERENTIALISM, supra note 250.
331 LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 75, at 168–74 (sketching an account of the
complex inferential content of constitutional texts and opinions); see BRANDOM, INFEREN-
TIALISM, supra note 250, at 63–69 (endorsing an account of the conceptual content of an
expression as determined by its inferential role and arguing that the meaning of a statement
is determined by how it is used in inferences).
332 See LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43, at 148 n.70; LeDuc, Con-
stitutional Meaning, supra note 75, at 168–74.
333 See generally LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 75, at 168–74 (describing
the nature of constitutional inferential content).
334 See generally id. at 150–78; LeDuc, Practical Reasoning, supra note 83, at 11–12. For
a classic inferentialist account of conceptual content, see generally BRANDOM, INFERENTIAL-
ISM, supra note 250 (offering an inferentialist account of conceptual content in contrast to
a representational account of meaning).
335 See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43; LeDuc, Onto-
logical Foundations, supra note 41; LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation,
supra note 43.
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in the world, and authoritative sentences in such discourse are not true or false in
any material sense.336 Those sentences are performatives, although they do have im-
portant conceptual content.337 Thus, the ontologically independent Constitution to
which the protagonists in the debate over originalism appeal, tacitly, to ground the
truth of their claims about the Constitution, does not exist.338 Moreover, as a meta-
philosophical matter, philosophy does not stand as the ultimate arbiter of the claims
of reason; it does not play a foundational role in grounding those claims.339 In the
context of our constitutional theory and constitutional argument, philosophy can play
at most a therapeutic role, revealing linguistic and perhaps conceptual confusion.340
The result of this alternative account is not an end of argument, but only an
account of that continuing activity, and perhaps, a little refereeing of what to expect
from the arguments available to us. The aspirations of the originalists, the emphasis
of Tribe on finding the new synthesis,341 the claims of Bickel to the intellectually
grounded coherent and consistent law,342 must all be tempered, if not abandoned.
336 See generally BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 53, at xix–xx; LeDuc, Anti-
Foundational Challenge, supra note 43; LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 75.
337 See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43; LeDuc, Consti-
tutional Meaning, supra note 75, at 150–78.
338 See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43; LeDuc, Onto-
logical Foundations, supra note 41.
339 See generally LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 43, at
153–54 (arguing that our constitutional practice does not require or have legitimating
foundations); NUSSBAUM, THERAPY, supra note 52, at 13–40 (describing the stoic model of
philosophical inquiry as therapy intended to cure pathologies of the soul); RORTY, MIRROR,
supra note 52, at 6–7 (describing a classic goal of innovative conceptual thinking as a setting
aside prior problems in favor of a new vision); Richard Rorty, Metaphysical Difficulties
of Linguistic Philosophy, in THE LINGUISTIC TURN: RECENT ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL
METHOD 1–37 (Richard Rorty ed., 1967) (offering an account of philosophical controversy
and the nature of philosophical progress and expressing caution that the linguistic turn in
philosophy will result in a definitive resolution of traditional philosophical puzzles and
problems); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 133 (G. E. M.
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS] (“There is not
a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.”).
340 See LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 43, at 153–54.
341 See Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291, 296 (2005)
[hereinafter Tribe, Treatise Power] (announcing the suspension of his project of preparing
a new edition of American Constitutional Law as the disarray in the evolving constitutional
doctrine precluded the formulation of a new theoretical synthesis); see also LeDuc, Beyond
Babel, supra note 31, at 221–22 (explaining why Tribe’s grounds for suspending preparation
of the revised edition were insufficient).
342 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (proposing to solve the alleged theoretical problem of judicial
review by limiting the role of the Court); see also Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 20
(proposing to solve the problem of judicial review by requiring the Court to act on the basis
of neutral principle). See generally Bickel, Original Understanding, supra note 51.
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When we are all engaged in a common activity, instead of finding or recovering a
text or other object bequeathed to us, the standards under which we act and to which
we aspire must be different. But we would be naïve to expect this fundamental
rejection of both sides of the originalism debate as fruitless, confused, and patholog-
ical to be easily embraced by the protagonists and the mainstream constitutional law
community. The next section anticipates some of the principal arguments that may
be made by the protagonists to preserve the status quo of the debate.
Most of the originalists decline to argue against Brown, for example. The voting
rights decisions defended by Ely343 are also often challenged as to their reasoning
rather than their result.344 The hard question is whether the protagonists in the debate
can join in this assessment and, if they are initially unwilling to do so, if there is any
further therapeutic gambit that may lead to that result. The two sides of the debate
need to be treated separately. In the case of the originalists, knowing that the con-
stitutional jurisprudence can be roundly criticized, and future cases decided, subject
to the governor of stare decisis on the basis of historical and textual arguments,
would appear to respond to much of the concerns behind the rise of originalism.
Admittedly, some of those arguments against the legacy of the Warren Court are
easier to make than others. On the therapeutic argument made here, the originalists
are asked to concede their claim to a clean methodological strike that delegitimizes
the entire Warren Court constitutional jurisprudence. That is a substantial conces-
sion. In the case of the anti-originalists, the account of our constitutional law and
practice acknowledges the ability to invoke structural, prudential, doctrinal, and
ethical arguments to defend the Warren Court’s constitutional legacy. Some of those
arguments are more plausible than others, and some of the cases that comprise the
Warren Court’s constitutional jurisprudence are easier to defend than others. But,
just as the originalists are asked to make peace with structural, prudential, doctrinal,
and ethical arguments, so, too, their critics must acknowledge the continuing place
of historical and textual arguments. It is easy to imagine the protagonists on each
side clinging to the hollow hope that their genius is all that is necessary for their side
in the debate to prevail.
III. RESISTANCE AND TRANSFERENCE IN THE THERAPEUTIC PROCESS
The next stage in my therapeutic strategy takes three principal further steps,
addressing two forms of resistance (one as a gating, threshold response, and one
later, in response to the challenge I offer). It is here that I begin unraveling the com-
mitments of the protagonists’ respective ideopolises. Resistance, perhaps through
a mechanism like transference,345 may play an important role in the continuation of
343 ELY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 24.
344 See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7.
345 See generally Lear, Transference, supra note 57, at 56–62.
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the debate over originalism and the failure of strategies like mine and Bobbitt’s to
move past the debate.346 Jonathan Lear suggests that Socrates’s experience stands
as a poignant and dramatic reminder of the power of transference with respect to
public reason in the public sphere.347
A. Early Resistance: Questioning Whether Therapy Is Possible
The debate over originalism may be immune to therapy if the debate simply
expresses in the constitutional context values or preferences that are themselves
immune to reason or to argument.348 If such an expressivist349 account of the debate
is proper, and if moral relativism is committed to such an emotivist350 or subjectivist351
stance, then a therapeutic strategy or, indeed, any strategy to end the debate, must fail.
I do not think such an emotivist or subjectivist account of the debate is accurate, nor
do I think that values or preferences are indifferent to reason and argument. Accord-
ingly, an argument against therapy fails on two grounds. Moreover, such an emo-
tivist characterization is not endorsed by many participants in the debate over
originalism.352 Indeed, the kinds of reasoned and conceptual arguments that the
originalists and their critics make are largely inconsistent with such a characterization.
The conceptual, inferential content of the claims made by the protagonists in the
debate are not reducible to expressions of emotion. But the failure of the protagonists
346 See generally, e.g., BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64; LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Chal-
lenge, supra note 43; LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 31; LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning,
supra note 75; LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 41.
347 Lear, Transference, supra note 57, at 57 (“Socrates’ mistake, it seems in retrospect,
was to ignore transference.”). I may be making the same mistake.
348 See CHARLES TAYLOR, Explanation and Practical Reason, in PHILOSOPHICAL ARGU-
MENTS 34, 34–35 (1995) [hereinafter TAYLOR, Explanation] (characterizing the nature of
the debate over ethical questions as rarely about fundamental principles, but instead about
particularized (“special”) interpretations or applications of those principles—often at or
beyond the limits of what others would recognize as rational).
349 By expressivism, I mean a description of the debate that interprets the claims of the
participants not as propositions about the world, but as expressions of such participants’
attitudes or dispositions.
350 By emotivist, I mean a theory that accounts for moral or ethical claims as expressing
an emotional endorsement of an outcome or choice. See GILBERT HARMAN, THE NATURE OF
MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 27–40 (1977) [hereinafter HARMAN, MORALITY]
(characterizing emotivism as claiming that ethical or moral propositions express emotional
states rather than cognitive judgments).
351 See, e.g., James Rachels, Subjectivism, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 432, 432–33
(Peter Singer ed., 1993) (noting that subjectivism asserts that moral judgments are only sub-
jective, not objective, and as such, are generally a matter of personal preference or choice).
352 See generally Dworkin, Bork, supra note 1 (rejecting the substantive doctrinal claims
of originalism); Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 4 (making and defending the methodological
and doctrinal claims of originalism).
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to acknowledge this possible characterization is not a sufficient reason to ignore
such an objection in the context of my more expansive therapeutic project.
As we have seen, the argument against therapy begins with the claim that the
positions taken with respect to constitutional decision and constitutional interpreta-
tion merely express fundamental values as to which the originalists and their critics
differ.353 The substantive, as well as the methodological, differences between the two
sides are substantial. A brief summary cannot capture those differences fully. But
originalists would appear to value democratic choice,354 on the one hand, and a
limited federal government355 and limited individual civil liberties,356 on the other
hand. Their critics, by contrast, value individual civil liberties,357 civil rights,358 and
governmental action to achieve minimal levels of equality of opportunity,359 even
353 See Scalia, Response, supra note 76, at 148–49 (recognizing the difference between
the political and moral values shared among the originalists and those generally shared by
their critics). Whether the originalism debate merely expresses those differences is a far
stronger claim that appears implausible because of the substantial conceptual content of
originalism’s claims and the arguments made in the debate.
354 This appears particularly true with respect to democratic choices made to preserve
traditional social values. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586, 590 (2003) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). But see BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 178–85 (criticizing Ely’s classic
defense of the Warren Court’s application of the Constitution to enhance the working of
democratic government and the representation of all citizens).
355 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 558, 574 (2012) (in-
validating mandatory health insurance in national health care legislation as an exercise of the
federal government’s commerce power, but upholding the associated penalty tax under the
exercise of the taxing power); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733–34 (1986) (striking down
fiscal budgetary control legislation that provided for an ongoing administrative role for a
congressional officer on the basis that such a role violated the separation of powers doctrine).
356 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the deci-
sion striking down a Texas statute criminalizing consensual adult homosexual activity). But
see, e.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (striking down a mainstream handgun
ordinance of the City of Chicago); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)
(striking down a District of Columbia firearm law).
357 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498–99 (1966) (holding that statements
obtained from defendants during custodial interrogation, without full and express warning
of constitutional rights, are inadmissible as having been obtained in violation of the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86
(1965) (holding that laws prohibiting the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally intrudes
upon the right to privacy); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961) (holding that evi-
dence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded in state courts as
well as in federal courts under the Fourteenth Amendment).
358 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2, 12 (1967) (striking down a state criminal anti-
miscegenation statute on the basis of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
359 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 393–96 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing to uphold federal law regulating campaign finance to limit the disproportionate
role corporations and affluent individuals may play in the electoral process through campaign
154 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:101
at the expense of democratic majorities’ exercise of their political choice. This is too
simplistic an account.360 But the fundamental notion that there is a political divide
between the originalists and their critics has been widely recognized.361 That differ-
ence in values lends some credibility to the reductionist project to explain constitu-
tional decision in political terms.
An emotivist characterization of the debate appears far less apparent. In general,
the arguments made within the debate presume that reason and argument, not value,
are dispositive.362 Thus, when Powell argues that there is an historical understanding
that the original understanding was not to be controlling in the interpretation and
application of the Constitution, he is arguing that such a historical claim argues
against the originalist position.363 Similarly, when Justice Scalia argues against the
prohibition of capital punishment by the Eighth Amendment, he assumes that the
historical fact of the matter that ought to be determinative.364
Very occasionally, the originalists and their critics suggest that the debate is
about political and moral values. This reflects an ongoing concern about the Court’s
role.365 Bork suggests that the debate over originalism may be reduced to a debate over
contributions); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (upholding a “narrowly tailored”
university admissions policy that took race into account).
360 For example, Justice Scalia has both on the bench and in his commentary strongly
defended a broad right of confrontation in criminal trials under the Sixth Amendment. See,
e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860–61 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
closed circuit televised testimony did not satisfy the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause); Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 43–44.
361 See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 9–14 (tracing the political sources of the
constitutional originalist from the Reagan administration). But see generally CHARLES FRIED,
SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT (2004) [hereinafter
FRIED, SAYING] (describing the place of precedent in articulating the conceptual content of
constitutional law). It would also be possible to develop an account of the originalism debate
that emphasizes the economic and sociological reasons for the continuation of the debate.
The debate, after all, is a major source of tenure in the constitutional law academy. If the
deflationary strategy proposed here were to be adopted in the courts and in the academy, that
route would be narrowed or foreclosed. But while a sociological or economic account would
perhaps be of interest to intellectual historians and advance our understanding of the debate,
that analysis would not advance our legal understanding of the Constitution and the
originalism debate. I am indebted to Graham Burnett for focusing my attention on the im-
portance of this question, even as I decline to explore it further here.
362 See generally BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 161–85 (offering rebuttal arguments
to an array of arguments made against originalism).
363 See Powell, supra note 8, at 948.
364 See Scalia, Response, supra note 76, at 145; supra notes 323–25 and accompanying text.
365 Thus, Justice Jackson wrote in Brown v. Allen:
Rightly or wrongly, the belief is widely held by the practicing pro-
fession that this Court no longer respects impersonal rules of law but
is guided in these matters by personal impressions which from time to
time may be shared by a majority of Justices. Whatever has been in-
tended, this Court also has generated an impression in much of the
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the continuing vitality of values embedded by the Founders in the Constitution.366
Dworkin has suggested that Justice Scalia’s originalist jurisprudence is informed by
his moral judgments, even when those judgments lead him away from originalist
theory.367 From the left, the skeptics who endorse Critical Legal Studies have argued
that all law, and therefore constitutional law, is reducible to politics.368 In general,
however, the protagonists in the debate over originalism conduct the debate as if,369
and sometimes aver370 that, the debate is a matter of principle. Moreover, reducing
the debate over originalism to a matter of value or preference appears a difficult and
unpromising task.371 This is not to deny that subjective preferences may have in-
formed individual Justice’s decisions or opinions or even the decisions or opinions
of the Court.372 The claim is different as a matter of logical quantification: it does
judiciary that regard for precedents and authorities is obsolete, that
words no longer mean what they have always meant to the profession,
that the law knows no fixed principles.
344 U.S. 443, 535 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
366 BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 177–78 (acknowledging Dworkin’s claim that there
is moral content in constitutional law, but asserting that such moral content is inherent in the
constitutional text, not determined by judges).
367 Dworkin, INTERPRETATION, supra note 61, at 127; see also Fried, Judgment, supra
note 145, at 1043–44 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s strongest constitutional opinions have
been those in which he has broken free of the shackles of originalist modes of argument).
368 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory,
94 YALE L.J. 1, 6–10 (1984) (defending the reduction of law to politics, but denying that such re-
duction creates a problem for the realization of our freedom or the exercise of our responsibility).
369 See, e.g., Dworkin, INTERPRETATION, supra note 61, at 120–22 (arguing that Justice
Scalia’s originalism cannot support his rejection of Eighth Amendment challenges to capital
punishment); Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 44–47 (arguing that alternatives to
originalism are impossible to apply because indeterminate); Tribe, INTERPRETATION, supra
note 21, at 76–77 (arguing that originalism leads to an infinite regress). But see LeDuc, Phi-
losophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 43, at 113 n.92; LeDuc, Practical
Reasoning, supra note 83, at 21–22; Brandom, Legal Concept Determination, supra note 5,
at 21–22.
370 See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 143 (arguing that only originalism has le-
gitimacy as a method of constitutional interpretation in our democratic republic); Scalia,
INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 44–45 (identifying the absence of generally accepted
extratextual principles for the interpretation as the second most serious flaw in living con-
stitutionalism). They also do so implicitly by the manner in which they argue against the
claims and arguments of the opposing participants in the debate. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, RADICALS,
supra note 4, at 54 (describing the harsh rhetoric of Judge Douglas Ginsburg in his argument
against non-originalists).
371 See FRIED, SAYING, supra note 361, at 241–44; Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 1233, 1302–12 (1989) (book review) (arguing that such a reduction of law to politics
misunderstands the nature of the modalities of constitutional argument and the ontology of
the Constitution).
372 That there exist such decisions and opinions appears hard to dispute. In the adminis-
trative law context, it seems incontrovertible that Justice Douglas’s personal, subjective
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not deny that decisions on the basis of subjective preference exist; it makes the much
weaker claim that not all constitutional decisions are a matter of the Justices’ sub-
jective preference. Put another way, the claim asserts only that there are factors in
constitutional decision and the arguments of the Court’s opinions that cannot be
reduced to the subjective preferences of the Justices.373
A reductive strategy would need to reduce very complex claims about constitu-
tional law to expressions of subjective preference. Such a reductive approach could,
however, incorporate at least two principal elements. First, it could interpret certain
claims as expressing subjective values.374 Second, certain claims could be character-
ized as consequences of such subjective values.375
But even such a complex reductive approach appears implausible for many ele-
ments in the debate. For example, the originalists’ claims that the written nature of
the Constitution requires fidelity to the Framers’ original understandings and expec-
tations376 appear very difficult to reduce to any subjective preference or set of subjective
preferences. It does not appear very plausible that we have subjective preferences
for particular canons of constitutional interpretation.377 Those views appear rather
to be consequences of theories about the Constitution, constitutional interpretation,
and constitutional adjudication, and possibly even, at the conceptual level of our
beliefs, about political theory or philosophy.378 When critics like Posner and
Sunstein379 challenge originalism’s claims with a defense of a generally pragmatic,
values shaped his decisions in federal income tax cases. See generally BERNARD WOLFMAN,
JONATHAN L.F. SILVER, & MARJORIE A. SILVER, DISSENT WITHOUT OPINION: THE BEHAVIOR
OF JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS IN FEDERAL TAX CASES (1975) (demonstrating that Justice
Douglas consistently voted against the Internal Revenue Service in tax cases, without sub-
stantial argument or explanation).
373 Charles Fried makes the same claim. See FRIED, SAYING, supra note 361, at 241–44.
374 In some contexts, the notion that originalist claims may be so reducible to subjective
values of the participants is not implausible. For example, with respect to the question of
whether the Eighth Amendment bars the imposition of capital punishment, it is not obviously
implausible that the divide between the originalists like Justice Scalia, who argue against
such a prohibition, and his liberal critics, who assert such a prohibition, may be reducible to
a difference in such subjective values. See Dworkin, INTERPRETATION, supra note 61, at
120–22. See generally SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 9–19 (describing potential
doctrinal implications of the originalists’ claims).
375 See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 9–19.
376 See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 9 (2004) [hereinafter BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION] (exploring the role of writing—
and writing requirements—in private law and in public constitutional law); BORK, TEMPTING,
supra note 7, at 251–53.
377 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 185 (noting that we are not born with a prefer-
ence for trial by jury).
378 Id. at 182–89.
379 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 454–69 (1990) [hereinafter
POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE] (announcing a “pragmatist manifesto”); SUNSTEIN, RADICALS,
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utilitarian metric of constitutional interpretation and constitutional decisions, that
too appears resistant to any such reduction.380
Instead, we ought to recognize and respect the debate on its own terms, at least
in part. Originalism recognizes the paramount role of practical reasoning in our
constitutional practice.381 Occasionally, however, originalism adopts a more formal-
istic account of reasoning.382 I have argued elsewhere against this formal account.383
Constitutional argument and reasoning, in the context of constitutional decision,
cannot be reduced to a syllogistic account.384
But originalism often embeds its stance in a more general, tacit account of
practical reasoning.385 On this account, we employ practical reasoning to make
decisions and choices in our practical, all-too-ordinary lives. When confronted with
a cupboard empty of a box of my favorite marshmallow-sweetened breakfast cereal,
I choose an available alternative.386 In the law, our faculty of practical reasoning
permits us to identify the relevant evidence with respect to a question, the relevant
preferences and values, and the relevant rules of law in making legal judgments.387
In Justice Scalia’s view, the common law methodology is different from the
proper method of statutory interpretation in a democratic republic.388 According to
supra note 4, at 72–73 (ultimately grounding his rejection of originalism on the consequences
of that theory).
380 Posner and Sunstein’s pragmatic, utilitarian claims about what results work best, or
maximize wealth or value, appear to be based upon conceptual claims of political or moral
theory, not subjective preferences, and the history of utilitarianism is the history of efforts
defending utilitarian claims against our moral intuitions or subjective feelings. See POSNER,
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 379, at 454–69 (defending a pragmatist theory of law against
formalist rivals, but nevertheless asserting a limited irreducible autonomy to legal practice);
SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 72–73.
381 The tacit recognition that legal and constitutional decision is a matter of practical
reason underlies the originalist rejection of philosophical theory to ground constitutional
argument or interpretation. See Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 45.
382 See generally BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 162 (describing the text of the Con-
stitution as providing a judge “not with a conclusion but with a major premise”). Originalism
thus sometimes suggests that legal reasoning follows the formal rules of logical inference.
383 See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 41, at 285–88 (describing the orig-
inalists’ formal account); LeDuc, Practical Reasoning, supra note 83, at 27–40; see also
PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 53, at 170–79 (offering an alternative, less formal account
of legal reasoning).
384 See LeDuc, Practical Reasoning, supra note 83, at 27–40.
385 See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 262; Scalia, Response, supra note 76, at
138–40.
386 See GILBERT HARMAN, CHANGE IN VIEW: PRINCIPLES OF REASONING 1–2 (1986)
[hereinafter HARMAN, CHANGE IN VIEW] (describing the process of practical reasoning).
387 See id. at 1–2 (distinguishing practical reasoning from theoretical reasoning on the
basis that the former relates to plans and intentions and the latter implicates belief).
388 See Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 9–13 (arguing that common law methods
are inconsistent with democracy).
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Justice Scalia, the judge owes a higher duty of deference to the democratic sovereign
in its law making.389 But both common law reasoning and statutory and constitu-
tional interpretation are examples of practical, rather than theoretical, reasoning.390
By contrast, mathematical reasoning is a classic example of theoretical reasoning;
modern analytic philosophy of language also qualifies.
Even if the debate is couched in emotivist or subjectivist terms, therapeutic
arguments may still be sufficient to end it. In making this argument, I want to again
draw on the work of Martha Nussbaum391 and Charles Taylor.392 Nussbaum has
made a strong case for the cognitive dimension of emotional judgments and Taylor
has made a strong case for the role of reason in shaping our fundamental normative
commitments.393 Nussbaum argues that emotional judgments implicate other, non-
normative cognitive judgments.394 For example, she argues that anger can be righteous
when it is based upon judgments of the wrongness or injustice of the actions taken
by the object of the subject’s anger.395 Indeed, Nussbaum argues, when confronted
with this behavior, not to experience anger may itself appear a questionable reaction.396
Moreover, Nussbaum asserts that these emotions, freighted as they are with cogni-
tive claims, are susceptible to modification through changes in the related beliefs.397
If this account extends to an emotivist or other subjectivist account of constitutional
commitments and judgments, then the kinds of argument made here have the po-
tential to change those evaluations and constitutional commitments.
Taylor argues that moral arguments do not generally proceed from general
principles.398 Instead, he asserts that much, if not most, moral argument is particular-
ized, proceeding almost ad hominem399 against a particular moral position or stance.
389 Id.
390 See generally HARMAN, CHANGE IN VIEW, supra note 386, at 1–2.
391 NUSSBAUM, THERAPY, supra note 52.
392 TAYLOR, Explanation, supra note 348.
393 See NUSSBAUM, THERAPY, supra note 52, at 38 (“[The passions] are . . . intelligent and
discriminating elements of the personality that are very closely linked to beliefs, and are modi-
fied by the modification of belief.”); TAYLOR, Explanation, supra note 348, at 38–40 (describ-
ing the limits of moral nihilism and skepticism).
394 See NUSSBAUM, THERAPY, supra note 52, at 38.
395 Id. at 403 (describing the anger of an officer in the Allied forces upon entering a German
death camp in World War II). Nussbaum’s views on anger have changed over time, leading
her to question whether there is any merit in anger in her later views. See generally MARTHA
C. NUSSBAUM, ANGER AND FORGIVENESS: RESENTMENT, GENEROSITY, JUSTICE (2016).
396 See NUSSBAUM, THERAPY, supra note 52, at 403.
397 Id. at 38. This, of course, is very similar to Lear’s account of how modern psycho-
analytic therapy cures. See LEAR, THERAPEUTIC ACTION, supra note 54, at 69–73 (describing
how the analyst must demonstrate an understanding and commitment to the analysand’s
pathological stance as a prelude to cure).
398 TAYLOR, Explanation, supra note 348, at 36–41.
399 See id. at 36, 39, 59 (emphasizing his argument as actually ad hominem, but without
the pejorative overtones of that term in our ordinary speech). All Taylor means is that his
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Taylor argues that his particularized account of moral reasoning is a better descrip-
tion of our moral discourse and argument.400 While he doesn’t expressly characterize
such strategies as therapeutic, they share important features with the therapeutic
approaches Nussbaum describes, as Nussbaum notes.401 Taylor persuasively asserts
the claim that these modes or styles of argument can be effective in cases of moral
or subjective disagreements.402
If Nussbaum and Taylor are right, then even if the debate over originalism is
properly cast in emotivist terms, it may well be that the kinds of therapeutic strate-
gies offered here and in my related articles403 may prove effective. Even if recast in
emotivist terms, the kinds of claims that are made in the debate would appear strong
candidates to fall within those judgments that carry cognitive claims and, therefore,
may be changed by persuasive arguments or other therapeutic strategies.404 If the pro-
tagonists in the debate recognize its fruitlessness, they ought to be open to endorsing
the anti-foundational, pluralist account of constitutional law defended here, and to
expressing that new preference in their judgments about the Constitution.
Two key features emerge if I place the arguments that have been made in this
account of the debate in the context that Nussbaum and Taylor have developed.
First, my argument has proceeded in a particular, ad hominem in Taylor’s terms,
way against each side in the debate.405 Abandoning the debate gives a better account
of constitutional adjudication first, constitutional discourse second, and constitu-
tional interpretation third.406
Without claiming that my account of the ontology of the Constitution or our
constitutional talk is demonstrably correct, I am claiming to offer a better account than
the protagonists in the debate can provide. That account promises to be far more fruit-
ful than the accounts that have been developed in the debate. As a novel account, it
does not suffer from the same pathologies that I have articulated above.407 First, as
a descriptive matter, this anti-foundational account is better than the originalists’ and
argument proceeds—not unlike the therapy that Nussbaum describes—against the particular
position the opponent or interlocutor endorses, rather than generally from first principles.
400 Id. at 60.
401 NUSSBAUM, THERAPY, supra note 52, at 35.
402 TAYLOR, Explanation, supra note 348, at 53–60.
403 See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43; LeDuc, Onto-
logical Foundations, supra note 41.
404 See TAYLOR, Explanation, supra note 348, at 34–60 (arguing that argument with re-
spect to an array of practical reasoning can proceed on a particularized or ad hominem basis,
and that with that recognition comes the understanding that the range of argument in practical
reason is much greater than foundationalists acknowledge).
405 See generally LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 41.
406 Implicit in my claim is a further claim that accounting for these three elements of our
social practice is ordered in importance in the order that I list them. See generally LeDuc,
Practical Reasoning, supra note 83.
407 See supra Section I.B.
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their critics’ accounts because our constitutional argument and decision includes
several modes of argument, not just those endorsed by the originalists or their
critics.408 Second, there are a variety of unstated premises in the debate that make the
debate possible. Those premises appear questionable.409 The protagonists assume
certain characterizations of legal and constitutional reasoning and the primacy of
interpretation.410 At a philosophical level, they also make assumptions about the
ontology of the Constitution411 and about language, including the nature of truth and
meaning.412 I have explained elsewhere why those assumptions appear mistaken.413
The second objection to a therapeutic solution to the debate argues that the de-
bate between the originalists and their critics reveals a breakdown in the practice of
normal constitutional theory.414 On this account, only revolutionary constitutional
theory can resolve the stalemate.415 Only a constitutional paradigm shift can resolve
the seeming irreconcilable conflicts.416 If this account of the debate is accurate, the
therapeutic strategy proposed here that treats the debate as pathological is inadequate;
408 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 6–8.
409 See generally LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 41 (arguing that the onto-
logical and linguistic assumptions of the debate over originalism make the debate possible);
LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43 (exploring how the debate becomes
impossible when we reject the tacit assumption of the existence of truth conditions for
propositions of constitutional law and the existence of an objective Constitution independent
in the world).
410 See LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43, at 138–89; LeDuc, Ontologi-
cal Foundations, supra note 41, at 267–330.
411 See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 41, at 267–330; LeDuc, Anti-
Foundational Challenge, supra note 43, at 138–89.
412 See LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43, at 138–89; LeDuc, Consti-
tutional Meaning, supra note 75, at 225–32; LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note
41, at 267–330.
413 LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43, at 206–09; LeDuc, Constitutional
Meaning, supra note 75, at 225–32.
414 I am here defending an account of the debate that draws on Kuhn’s classic analysis of
scientific revolutions. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS 43–76 (2d ed. 1970) (1962) [hereinafter KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS]
(arguing that revolutionary scientific theories do not replace their predecessor theories on the
basis of experimental proof, but on the basis of the adoption of what Kuhn termed a “para-
digm shift”). The stalemate of the current debate over originalism on this analogy is compa-
rable, for example, to the state of Ptolemaic astronomical theory on the eve of the Copernican
Revolution. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION: PLANETARY
ASTRONOMY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN THOUGHT (1957). The methods available
within the debate are insufficient to resolve the puzzles and disagreements about constitu-
tional decision.
415 See KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 414. The needed breakthrough is
revolutionary not in the substantive sense that Kuhn describes revolutionary scientific theory
making but in the more limited therapeutic sense that I have described. But both transcend
the constraints of the existing discourse.
416 See id.
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instead, the debate about originalism reflects the healthy, if difficult, path of prog-
ress in our constitutional theory. Resolving the debate requires, on this account,
revolutionary constitutional theory and a paradigm shift in our constitutional theory.
Nevertheless, I doubt that the debate reflects the birth throes of a revolution in
constitutional theory. First, neither originalism nor its critics offer a better or fuller
account of our constitutional practice; each would instead exorcise a portion of that
practice in their respective prescriptions for our constitutional practice.417 Second,
the implications of those respective prescriptions are implausible or unacceptable
to significant communities within our constitutional practice.418 In short, the respec-
tive positions advanced in the debate do not have the profile of revolutionary theory.
The third objection to the possibility of successful therapy questions the appar-
ently meta-theoretic stance of a therapeutic approach. My approach to ending the
debate may appear to replicate, at another level of theory, the originalist and anti-
originalist strategies against the kinds of arguments that the originalists and their
critics offer for substantive constitutional claims. If I am rejecting those kinds of
meta-arguments of the originalist debate, why should the theoretical arguments
against the underlying premises of the debate be more persuasive?
There is a difference. In challenging the premises and arguments of the debate,
I am emphasizing the richness and complexity of our constitutional practice and
discourse. By contrast, the arguments of the debate about originalism, on both sides,
seek to foreclose arguments and discourse.419 My account of constitutional theory,
like that articulated by Bobbitt and Patterson, leaves constitutional practice intact,
except insofar as it has incorporated elements of the originalism debate, which
should be abandoned.420 Its target is constitutional theory, seeking to reject constitu-
tional theories that would reject or devalue established modes of constitutional argu-
ment. This anti-theoretical method preserves our constitutional practice, but leaves
it more self-conscious. It is thus to be distinguished from the participants in the
debate who would generally claim to offer constitutional theories to change our
fundamental constitutional practice, and thus, to change our Constitution itself.
B. Acknowledging the Failure of the Debate
Four elements of the debate ought to give particular concern to protagonists who
may be tempted to reject therapy in favor of continuing a failed debate.421 First,
417 See generally LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 75; LeDuc, Ontological
Foundations, supra note 41.
418 LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 41, at 284–85.
419 Id.; André LeDuc, Political Philosophy and the Fruitless Quest for an Archimedean
Stance in the Debate over Originalism, 85 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2016) (exploring the use of
political philosophical arguments to resolve the originalism debate).
420 See LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43, at 152–54; LeDuc, Beyond
Babel, supra note 31; see also supra text accompanying note 52.
421 See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43; LeDuc, Onto-
logical Foundations, supra note 41.
162 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:101
neither the originalists nor their critics offer a persuasive description of the practice
of constitutional argument in the courts.422 That descriptive failure compromises the
prescriptive theories defended in the debate.423 The protagonists, particularly on the
originalist side, acknowledge that failure.424 They are not troubled by originalism’s
failure to offer an accurate description of the current practice of constitutional
argument.425 They acknowledge that failure.426 Originalism, after all, begins with the
premise that our non-originalist constitutional practice—as epitomized by the Warren
Court—is mistaken, if not illegitimate.427 Originalism’s goal is to repudiate the current
practice and replace it with new, originalist argument and results.428 That is not a
change that can be effected by means of extra-constitutional, theoretical argument.
It can only happen over time—admittedly sometimes discontinuously as precedents
are effectively, if not literally, reversed, as in Brown or reinterpreted, as in Griswold—
within our practice of constitutional law as canonical arguments are made to justify
and expand decisions.
The originalists’ failure to describe current constitutional practice is a conse-
quence of the primacy of prescription in originalism. The failure to describe that
practice and to acknowledge the force of centuries of constitutional argument is a
422 Originalists vary in their dating of the Court’s departure from the original understand-
ing of the Constitution. Bork appears to identify the origins of the departure in Chief Justice
Marshall’s jurisprudence. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 25. But the turn from the
original understandings only became acute much later.
423 The failure of an account of the Constitution to explain the arguments made and the
results obtained from an internal point of view discredits such an account, because there is
no Archimedean stance from which to discredit entire modes of argument as the originalists
(and their critics) would do.
424 See, e.g., BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 376, at 354–57; Soames, Defer-
entialism, supra note 99; Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 148, at 32–40 (acknowl-
edging the need for a more complex and inclusive account of the sources of linguistic
meaning for originalism).
425 See, e.g., BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 376, at 354–57; BORK, TEMPTING,
supra note 7, at 69–100 (criticizing the Warren Court for departing from the original under-
standing of the Constitution); SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4; Scalia, INTERPRETATION,
supra note 6.
426 See, e.g., BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 376, at 354–57; BENNETT &
SOLUM, ORIGINALISM, supra note 51, at 32–40 (acknowledging and endorsing some de-
partures originalism makes from current law and disavowing others).
427 See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 143 (“[O]nly the approach of original understand-
ing meets the criteria that any theory of constitutional adjudication must meet in order to
possess democratic legitimacy.”); Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 20, at 5–8; Whittington,
New Originalism, supra note 86, at 599–600; see also SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4,
at 54.
428 See, e.g., BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 76, at 407–18 (concluding
that the Fourteenth Amendment was not originally intended or understood to extend to the
protection of political rights or to protection from segregation, and that the decisions so in-
terpreting it should be overturned); BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 155–59 (exploring the
extent to which the doctrine of stare decisis limits originalism from reaching correct results).
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fundamental failure in the originalist argument.429 Originalism mistakenly assumes
that there is a stance, outside our current constitutional practice, from which that
practice may be criticized.430 In the case of Robert Bork, that assumption was
coupled with the claim that constitutional decisions were illegitimate if they could
not be legitimized under such a radical, Archimedean criticism.431 As Bobbitt has
argued, the Senate’s rejection of Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court can be
best understood as a rejection of Bork’s originalist claim to delegitimize the non-
originalist corpus of our constitutional law.432 That law cannot be delegitimized by
an originalist assault; for good or for ill, the accepted modes of constitutional argu-
ment constitute our constitutional law.433 As Bobbitt has argued, its legitimacy con-
sists simply of its contextualization within our practice of constitutional argument
and decision.434 The only criticism that may be made of such practice is the same as
that made at the founding of the Articles of Confederation: it is the repudiation of
such practice by action.
There is also no Archimedean stance from which the originalist criticisms of
such decisions can be rejected.435 Nor can the sweeping decisions of the Warren Court
429 The failure to reconcile the claims of originalism that privilege the original under-
standings, expectations, or intentions over other modes of argument in our constitutional
practice reveals the flaw in originalism, because it presumes to have articulated the critical
stance from which a radical critique of our constitutional law may be made. Some originalists
might challenge my claim that their theory is inconsistent with centuries of our constitutional
decisional practice because of their focus on the excesses of the Warren Court. Others, like
Robert Bork, acknowledge that their revolutionary claims challenge our constitutional
practice at least as far back as Chief Justice Marshall. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7,
at 20–28 (deploring Justice Marshall’s judicial activism, first, in holding that the Court had
the power to hold statutes that violate the constitution invalid and second, in looking to extra-
constitutional natural law as a source of constitutional law).
430 See, e.g., BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 53, at 83–108 (criticizing Bork’s
constitutional jurisprudence for its claim to delegitimize non-originalist decisions of the
Warren and Burger Courts).
431 Id.
432 Id. (arguing that the Senate’s rejection of Robert Bork’s nomination to the Supreme
Court was proper and, indeed, required because of Bork’s attack on the legitimacy of the
Court’s decisions).
433 BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 3–8 (describing the accepted modes of argument);
BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 53, at 88–99 (describing Bork’s constitutional theory
and his criticism of the Warren Court’s constitutional jurisprudence); see BORK, TEMPTING,
supra note 7, at 139–41.
434 BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 53, at xii–xv (rejecting the search for the foun-
dations of the legitimacy of constitutional decision). See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational
Challenge, supra note 43.
435 See generally BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 5 (arguing against such an Archi-
medean stance to justify or challenge the legitimacy of constitutional decision); LeDuc, Anti-
Foundational Challenge, supra note 43. But see SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note
159, at 59–61, 176 (offering a global challenge to originalism on the basis of a theory of
judicial minimalism).
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be delegitimized by Sunstein’s minimalism,436 nor the concept of substantive due
process discredited by Ely’s mockery of the concept as an oxymoron.437 Whether or
not dispositive in any particular case, the acceptance of such forms of argument
precludes the rejection of such arguments as a practical matter.
Practice must trump theory in the context of constitutional argument. That is
because our practice of constitutional law is not simply a conceptual or analytical
practice. It is also an exercise in political organization and the deployment of
political power. As such, our constitutional law and its practices of argument and
decision implicate both conceptual commitments and power.
It implicates our conceptual commitments because the propositions of constitu-
tional law that are stated in the text and in precedential opinions have inferential
content.438 Those opinions follow as a matter of practical inference from other
statements of constitutional law and support inferences to other statements of con-
stitutional law.439 Constitutional doctrine is stated in conceptual terms; that doctrine
carries inferential content as the consequence of certain other doctrinal claims and
in its commitments to other doctrines derived from practical inference.440 What
opinions say implicates what the decisions and opinions do. The statement of the
principles or terms on which the Court makes its decision helps to determine the
breadth of the decision and the scope that it is to be given.441
But unstated elements of the decision may also provide an important foundation
for the subsequent understanding of the force and implications of the Court’s
decision. These contextual factors explain the limited force of Bush v. Gore442 and
help explain why that case has never been cited.443 We understand the force of an
opinion and decision only as our ongoing practice of constitutional argument and
decision give them effect.
436 SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 159, at 38–41; SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE, supra
note 164, at xiii–xiv. While Sunstein wants to criticize the sweeping, principled decisions of
the Warren Court, it is less clear that he wants to deny them legitimacy. They appear more
mistaken than lawless. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 159, at 176.
437 ELY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 24, at 18.
438 See generally BRANDOM, INFERENTIALISM, supra note 250, at 11–12.
439 See id.
440 See FRIED, SAYING, supra note 361, at 4–10 (describing the place of precedent in law,
generally, and asserting that precedent and its associated doctrine have a particularly im-
portant role in articulating the conceptual content of constitutional law); SOAMES, Legal
Texts, supra note 112, at 422 (emphasizing that semantic meaning alone is too “austere” to
carry the full meaning and import of legal texts, including constitutional texts).
441 See FRIED, SAYING, supra note 361, at 4–10.
442 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
443 Insensitivity to this dimension led Bruce Ackerman and others (not including Charles
Fried) to breathlessly exaggerate the importance of the decision shortly after the case was
decided. See generally BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman ed.,
2002).
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The performative dimension of constitutional decisions also exercises power,
as rights and obligations are determined in real-life cases. In so doing, constitutional
decisions stand beyond the realm of mere reason. By contrast, constitutional theory
operates exclusively within the realm of reason.444 Thus, the treatise power is
weaker, however important it may be in the space of reason.445 It is weaker because,
in contrast to the interpretations made part of judicial decisions, treatises do not do
anything directly in the constitutional space.446 Judges and Justices, by contrast, cause
things to happen—or not to happen—in the lives of the parties to cases, and to others
through the force of doctrine and precedent.447
The second element that should trouble persistent protagonists is that they
encounter substantial difficulty explaining the role of judgment in the process and
practice of constitutional adjudication.448 The leading originalists describe their de-
cisional algorithm in some detail,449 but gloss over the role of judgment in the decision
of cases quite quickly.450 The originalists sometimes seem to suggest that the role of
judgment is severely circumscribed, and other times seem to suggest that even after
the original understandings are determined, the role to be played by judgment is signif-
icant.451 Their critics generally do no better.452
444 This is different than the claim Posner made in his Holmes lectures. Richard A. Posner,
The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1639–40 (1998)
(denying that academic moral theory can provide valuable insights and answers to important
questions). I am not denying that theories and narratives play causal roles, only that those
roles are mediated through mechanisms like judicial decision. Posner appears to deny even
that indirect causal role.
445 See generally Tribe, Treatise Power, supra note 341 (tacitly assuming that the future
of a revised edition of a leading constitutional treatise was of such import that it should be
announced by the publication of a letter to a sitting Justice).
446 See generally id.
447 See FRIED, SAYING, supra note 361, at 4–10.
448 See generally Fried, Judgment, supra note 145 (describing the nature and place of
judgment in constitutional adjudication and the futility of efforts to articulate theories of
constitutional interpretation, like originalism, that can determine the outcome of constitu-
tional cases). But see BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 158 (acknowledging that “[j]udging
is not mechanical” under originalist theory).
449 See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 149 (explaining that, for most constitutional
provisions, the level of generality at which they are to be applied “is readily apparent”).
450 See Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 45 (“Often—indeed, I dare say usually—
[the original meaning of the constitutional text] is easy to discern and simple to apply.”).
451 See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 149–51; Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra
note 6, at 45.
452 See SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 159, at 49 (mocking Judge Hercules’s
methods as a member of an appellate judicial panel). But see DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note
66, at 379–99 (offering an elaborate, but patently implausible, account of how his model
Judge Hercules makes constitutional decisions).
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Both sides of the debate generally leave the impression (even if it is not asserted
expressly) that the judgment required is rather modest.453 They fail to account for the
nature and role of judgment. That absence has been widely noted.454 Such an
omission is glaring, not only because we call the decision makers “judges,” but,
more fundamentally, because we experience many of the questions presented as
lacking an answer from the authorities, or from the mere application of reason or
analysis.455 This part of Dworkin’s account, before he turns to the defense of his
“right answer” thesis, rings true.456 The decision of such questions and the resolution
of such cases require the exercise of judgment.457
The third element that should trouble persistent protagonists is the confusion
generated by the premise of the originalism debate as to the primacy of interpreta-
tion in constitutional decisions.458 Both the originalists and their critics generally
assume that constitutional decision requires, first, constitutional interpretation.459
453 In the case of the originalists, the tacit derogation of the role of judgment may be
explained by their goal of cabining judicial discretion and repudiating the decisions of the
Warren Court. See generally BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 76; Bork,
Neutral Principles, supra note 20. Mistakenly conflating judgment with discretion, the
originalists exclude any meaningful role for the former as they strive to limit the latter.
454 See generally Fried, Judgment, supra note 145; BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra
note 53, at xvi–xvii (arguing that judgment is the faculty necessary to choose among the in-
commensurable canonical modes of constitutional argument when those arguments support
inconsistent outcomes).
455 See Tribe, INTERPRETATION, supra note 21, at 65, 68–73. See generally TRIBE & DORF,
READING, supra note 181.
456 See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 66, at 43–44; RONALD DWORKIN, Is There Really No
Right Answer in Hard Cases?, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 119 (1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
No Right Answer?] (arguing that there is indeed one right answer, even to hard legal questions).
457 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 234–35 (acknowledging that the nature of the
arguments and judgments employed in constitutional law may appear anomalous to lawyers
familiar with more doctrinal areas of the law, like trusts and estates); Fried, Judgment, supra
note 145, at 1043–46.
458 For a more extended analysis of interpretation and the role of interpretation asserted
by originalism and its critics, see LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 75; LeDuc,
Ontological Foundations, supra note 41, at 264. The nature and place of interpretation in
legal theory and adjudication has long been controversial. Ronald Dworkin is one of the
strongest defenders of the primacy of interpretation in legal theory and in legal decision. See
DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 66, at 225–27. For an extended criticism of theories that
accord primacy to interpretation, see Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern
Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871 (1989). See generally LAW AND
INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) (collection of
a variety of philosophical essays on interpretation in law).
459 See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 143–46; Frank H. Easterbrook, Alternatives to
Originalism?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 479, 486 (1996) (arguing that the primacy of the
theory of meaning embedded in judicial review requires that constitutional adjudication
begin with interpretation on an originalist, textualist basis: “Judicial review came from a
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That claim is not only descriptively mistaken, but more importantly, conceptually
flawed.460 Interpretation is not, and cannot be, prior to decision or prior to following
the constitutional rule.461 If it were, there would be an infinite regress. No interpreta-
tion of a rule is self-interpreting.462 Each interpretation of a rule would need an
interpretation before it could be applied to the preceding rule or interpretation.463
Thus, there would be an infinite regress as each interpretation requires yet another
interpretation before it can be applied in constitutional decision.464
Making a constitutional decision is not primarily interpretation, and interpreting
the relevant constitutional provisions is not, in that sense, logically prior to the
decision.465 Interpretations do not, in our practice of constitutional law, determine
constitutional decisions.466 To the extent originalism and many of its critics are
committed to an account of constitutional decision that assimilates our practice to
that model, that account is implausible. Rather, constitutional argument and decision
is a complex practice of making choices and other judgments within a pattern of
performative and inferential claims.467
theory of meaning that supposed the possibility of right answers—from an originalist theory
rooted in text.”); Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 37.
460 See generally LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 75; LeDuc, Ontological
Foundations, supra note 41, at 279–85; LeDuc, Practical Reasoning, supra note 83.
461 See WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 339, at §§ 201–40 (classical but
controversial account of the nature of following a rule, conventionally understood to deny
that following a rule first requires that there be an interpretation of the rule); SAUL A. KRIPKE,
WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE: AN ELEMENTARY EXPOSITION 7–15
(1982) (interpreting Wittgenstein as expressing, or constructing, a novel, skeptical account
of the problem of following a rule). But see generally G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER,
SCEPTICISM, RULES AND LANGUAGE (1984) [hereinafter BAKER & HACKER, SCEPTICISM]
(rejecting Kripke’s skeptical account).
462 See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 181, at 73–80 (arguing that the determination
of the level of generality at which to interpret a constitutional judgment requires the applica-
tion of extraconstitutional judgment).
463 See Lewis Carroll, What the Tortoise Said to Achilles, 4 MIND 278 (1895) (demon-
strating that even the rules of logical inference cannot be self-applying).
464 See WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 339, at §§ 201–40; see also KRIPKE,
supra note 461, at 7–15. See generally BAKER & HACKER, SCEPTICISM, supra note 461
(rejecting Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein as raising a skeptical challenge to our
commonsense understanding of language and meaning).
465 Constitutional decision is a mixture of following rules and making choices. See
generally BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64; TRIBE, INVISIBLE, supra note 186 (suggesting that
constitutional decision is principally a matter of choice; however, Tribe is inconsistent, often
also asserting that constitutional decision is a matter of discovering the meaning of the
visible or invisible constitutions).
466 Those like Justice Scalia and Ronald Dworkin who are committed to an interpretative
account of our constitutional law endorse just such a determinative role for interpretations,
of course. See generally LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 75.
467 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 4–8; BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 53,
at xi–xvii; PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 53, at 181–82.
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Both the performative and the conceptual elements in constitutional argument
and decision, as well as in the constitutional text itself, are central to the practice that
is constitutional law.468 The performative role of the constitutional text, the past
constitutional decisions, and the doctrine of stare decisis determine how certain
decisions come out—whether it is the way public schools are organized with respect
to the race of their students in Topeka, Kansas,469 or whether the State may take the
lives of convicted criminals.470 But the performatives of our Constitution and our
constitutional law are freighted with conceptual and inferential content.471 The
propositions of constitutional law stand as the consequences of certain propositions
and as the grounds for others.472 Those inferential commitments are an integral part
of our practice of constitutional law.473 Any failure to make and to acknowledge
those commitments would require a substantial departure from that practice.474 In
our practice of judicial decision, it is customary and expected that judges provide
reasons for their decisions.475 That articulation permits the parties to assess the
persuasiveness of lower court decisions, and allows the parties and other non-parties
subject to the legal rule at issue in the decided case to better understand the law.
468 See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43.
469 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (striking down segregated public
schools in Topeka, Kansas, as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment without overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
470 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (upholding a Georgia criminal statute
imposing the death penalty as satisfying the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment); see also Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 46 (deriding the
suggestion that the Eighth Amendment could prohibit capital punishment, since it was
imposed at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted).
471 See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43, at 162–64.
472 For an account of the inferential role of propositions, see BRANDOM, INFERENTIALISM,
supra note 250, at 45–77 (introducing an inferentialist account of language to replace the
more traditional representationalist account).
473 See id.; LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43, at 163–64; LeDuc,
Constitutional Meaning, supra note 75, at 168–74 (sketching how a Brandomian
inferentialist account might be extended to authoritative constitutional language).
474 Such a rejection could take the form of a court turning its back without explanation on
its own relevant precedent, or, in the case of an advocate presenting an argument to a court,
could take the form of ignoring precedent or the force of precedent relevant to the case being
argued. Such recognition would not preclude customary argumentative moves, like an advo-
cate’s urging the narrow interpretation of a precedent or a court’s distinguishing—or even
overruling—a precedent in an express manner.
475 This is one of the principal reasons why Chief Justice Roberts’s celebrated metaphor
of the judge as umpire is fundamentally inadequate and misleading. See Confirmation Hear-
ing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John
G. Roberts, Jr.); see also MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE
ROBERTS COURT 70–72 (2013) (discussing the academic reaction to this testimony).
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Originalism’s critics fare no better in seeking to describe and explain constitu-
tional law. Their failure results from a misunderstanding, shared with the originalists,
of the relationship between constitutional decision and constitutional interpreta-
tion.476 Tribe assumes interpretation is prior to application of a constitutional pro-
vision and decision.477 He invokes the concept of an Invisible Constitution to explain
how interpretation and decision are possible.478 Akhil Reed Amar,479 among others,480
endorses the concept of an Unwritten Constitution. These spectral constitutional
penumbras are called forth because of interpretative puzzles that Tribe, Amar, and
others conjure up.481 As a matter of interpretation, they find themselves unable to
find answers to their puzzles in the text of the Constitution, just as before them
Nelson Goodman purported to be unable to determine whether he saw the color
green or “grue”482 and Kripke questioned whether and how we are able to distin-
guish addition from “quaddition.”483
The introduction of the concepts of the Invisible or Unwritten Constitution is a
wrong turn for three principal reasons. First, the concepts are wrong because they are
grounded on a model of language—including a model of constitutional language—that
476 See LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 75 (arguing that the assumption of the
originalism debate, generally tacit but occasionally express, that appellate adjudication
begins with interpretation, is mistaken); LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 41, at
335 (noting that originalism’s critics have generally not been able to persuade originalists
because both sides take for granted that there are right answers to constitutional questions).
477 See TRIBE, INVISIBLE, supra note 186, at 5–6; TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note
181, at 73–80.
478 See TRIBE, INVISIBLE, supra note 186, at 2, 10 (introducing the “Invisible” Constitution).
479 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY ix–x (2012) [hereinafter AMAR, UNWRITTEN] (endorsing the con-
cept of an Unwritten Constitution that, among other things, permits the identification of the
authoritative written Constitution, as well as providing substantive constitutional content).
480 See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703, 717 (1975) (defending an early account of the authoritative force of the Unwritten
Constitution, derived from natural law: “[T]here was an original understanding, both implicit
and textually expressed, that unwritten higher law principles had constitutional status.”);
Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1127–28
(1987) (arguing that the democratic enactment of higher law in the Constitution was not
intended by the Founders to displace all other authoritative higher law).
481 See, e.g., AMAR, UNWRITTEN, supra note 479, at 6–16 (exploring whether the Con-
stitution would permit the Vice President to preside over her own impeachment trial); ELY,
DEMOCRACY, supra note 24, at 13 (inquiring whether an individual born by Caesarian
section would be eligible to be elected president under the Natural Born Person Clause).
482 NELSON GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION AND FORECAST 72–81 (4th ed. 1983) (describing
grue—which is defined as a color with a temporal dimension, varying over time—and exploring
how we can distinguish green from grue).
483 KRIPKE, supra note 461, at 7–15 (noting that quaddition is indistinguishable from
addition up to sums less than a certain number, at which point it is a completely different
binary operator).
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is implausible.484 The hypothesis of the Invisible or Unwritten Constitution suggests
a pervasive gap in the written Constitution that is unusual or anomalous as a matter
of the written text.485 It is a mistake in quantification: it is not the case that all of the
constitutional provisions require interpretation or an unwritten constitution to know
how they apply.486 There is no such pervasive gap or anomaly; richer and more com-
plete accounts of the nature of language and texts acknowledge the austerity of semantic
meaning—in particular, pragmatics; other sources of communicative content recog-
nize that language, generally, and texts, in particular, have more than only semantic
sources of linguistic and inferential content.487 That is not to assert that the constitu-
tional text anticipates or answers all of our contemporary constitutional questions;
there are some constitutional provisions that do require such extratextual exegesis.488
Moreover, the model of the Invisible or Unwritten Constitution is not the best ac-
count of the extratextual material we need. We do not need an Unwritten or Invisible
Constitution once we understand each of the provisions of the written Constitution
we have. This does not imply that the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text
answers all of the constitutional controversies we face, only that the limitations on
that linguistic meaning are not peculiar to the Constitution. The linguistic meaning
of the constitutional text is like that of other performative texts; once we recognize
that performative character, the task of applying the Constitution becomes easier,
because we can recognize that the meaning of propositions of constitutional law is
not determined by their correspondence with matters of constitutional fact.489
484 See generally BRANDOM, INFERENTIALISM, supra note 250; LeDuc, Anti-Foundational
Challenge, supra note 43.
485 See AMAR, UNWRITTEN, supra note 479, at ix–x; TRIBE, INVISIBLE, supra note 186, at 1–8.
486 This is a mistake of the type explored by, among others, Wittgenstein in considering
how we follow rules. See generally WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 339, at
§§ 198–240. Wittgenstein’s remarks on following a rule are far from straightforward (and
have been, as noted below, controversial). Wittgenstein appears to be challenging the paired
positions that (1) the application of a rule is premised upon the prior interpretation of that
rule and (2) when a rule is unclear in its application, that uncertainty can be removed by
articulating a fuller or more precise interpretation of that rule. See id. For my fuller discussion
of some of these issues, see LeDuc, Originalism’s Claims, supra note 217, at 13–14. For my
argument that this analysis reveals the originalist critics’ problem of generality as a confusion
about the nature of legal rules, see LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation,
supra note 43, at 113 n.92; LeDuc, Practical Reasoning, supra note 83, at Section II.B.
487 See SOAMES, Legal Texts, supra note 112, at 422 (arguing that semantic meaning is too
“austere” to carry all of the requisite force of legal texts). See generally BRANDOM, INFER-
ENTIALISM, supra note 250, at 89–90 (describing the inferential commitments carried with
the expressive dimension of normative language).
488 See AMAR, UNWRITTEN, supra note 479, at ix (offering examples of principles of the
Unwritten Constitution like that of “One Man, One Vote”). These are largely congruent with
what Bobbitt has styled structural arguments. See generally BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64,
at 74–92.
489 See supra notes 335–39 and accompanying text. See generally LeDuc, Anti-Founda-
tional Challenge, supra note 43.
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The accounts Tribe and Amar offer might be defended on the basis that their
notion of an Unwritten or Invisible Constitution is merely a metaphorical gambit to
highlight the complexity of meaning and use in our written Constitution for a philo-
sophically unsophisticated hoi polloi.490 While describing an Invisible or Unwritten
Constitution, on this defense, Tribe and Amar do not mean to make an ontological
claim for the existence of such constitutions.491 They are merely expositional or ex-
planatory devices. Such an account of the use of the notions of an Invisible or
Unwritten Constitution fails to recognize the doe-eyed ingénue in Amar and Tribe
as they announce that the force of the constitutional provisions is not captured by
the semantic meaning of the text.492 They believe that they have made an important
discovery. It is not entirely clear whether Tribe and Amar believe that they have
discovered something unusual or unique about the constitutional text, or about legal
texts generally. Certainly there appears to be no acknowledgment that the kinds of
methods that they introduce with the Invisible and Unwritten Constitutions are gen-
erally equally appropriate and necessary for other kinds of texts: the invisible parking
ticket, the unwritten shopping list, the unwritten and invisible recipe, etc.
Second, introducing an Invisible or Unwritten Constitution is a wrong turn
because it suggests that the nature of the constitutional communicative acts and tech-
niques are somehow different. We cannot be expected to read an Invisible or Un-
written Constitution in the same way that we read a visible or written Constitution.
For example, could the Ninth Amendment of the Invisible Constitution be disregarded
in the same manner as a provision of such Constitution that had been obscured by
a blot of invisible ink?493 While Tribe intends his book to be an introduction to the
methods of invisible constitutional interpretation and analysis, the strategy raises
more questions than it resolves.494 For example, Tribe’s Invisible Constitution pre-
sents novel and difficult questions about how such a constitution can be amended495
and how it can be reconciled with the benefits of a written constitution that had been
490 See AMAR, UNWRITTEN, supra note 479, at xiii (promising that non-lawyers should not
feel daunted by the book, despite its length and the sophistication of its arguments).
491 See TRIBE, INVISIBLE, supra note 186, at 211 (suggesting an analogy of Plato’s cave
metaphor for understanding the constitutional text).
492 See id. (concluding that “the quest for the [I]nvisible Constitution is surely central to
any study of the Constitution we are able to see and to read”).
493 See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 166 (arguing that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause should be disregarded as if obscured by an ink blot because we cannot fathom its
meaning); see also id. at 183–85 (arguing that there is no guidance as to what the Ninth
Amendment means).
494 See TRIBE, INVISIBLE, supra note 186, at 12–13.
495 This question might be put as to whether the Invisible Constitution has a provision
corresponding to Article V of the Constitution. This question becomes less pressing if one
adopts Bruce Ackerman’s account of constitutional amendment. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 49 (1991) (introducing the claim that the Constitution has
been transformed on occasion without formal constitutional amendment).
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sought in the founding.496 Most obviously, an Unwritten Constitution does not deliver
the confidence of having reached shared agreement and understanding that a writing
provides.497 As much difficulty as we have reaching agreement on what the written
Constitution provides, an unwritten constitution would present even more serious
challenges of interpretation and application.498
On Amar’s account, a judge facing a constitutional question must interpret both
the written and unwritten Constitutions.499 Moreover, there cannot be an unresolved
conflict between the two;500 in the event of conflict, the written Constitution trumps.501
Third, introducing the concept of an Invisible or Unwritten Constitution is a
wrong turn because it plays into the existing dialectic of the debate over originalism,
inviting originalists to reject such concepts on the basis that they do violence to the
text in the same way that the Living Constitution did before.502 The Invisible and
Unwritten Constitutions are needless provocations to originalism because they are
manifestly inconsistent with the originalist project of deciding constitutional cases
on the basis of the historical public linguistic understanding of the written constitu-
tional text. Moreover, the introduction of the Invisible and Unwritten Constitutions
fails to take into account and respect the choice of the Founders and other relevant
agents to adopt a written Constitution.503 If, by contrast, we plumb the sources of
meaning and use of the constitutional text as an example of written language
generally, with features common to other texts and features that are specific to per-
formative texts and to legal texts, the originalist alternative is not called up. While
our inquiry largely explores the meaning of the constitutional text, using tools that
496 AMAR, UNWRITTEN, supra note 479, at xii–xiii (introducing, without argument, the
claim that the adoption of a written Constitution did not reflect a complete break with the
British tradition of an unwritten constitution and that from its adoption the Constitution has
always encompassed unwritten law).
497 See id. at xii.
498 I am indebted to Jeff Greenblatt for highlighting this point.
499 AMAR, UNWRITTEN, supra note 479, at xiv–xv (describing the task as that of “faithful
interpret[ation]”).
500 Id. at xi (characterizing the Unwritten Constitution as supplementing the written
Constitution, not supplanting it). I have sketched how abandoning the debate would enable
us to enrich our constitutional decisional discourse. See LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note
31, at 197–220.
501 AMAR, UNWRITTEN, supra note 479, at xi (“America’s unwritten Constitution could
never properly ignore the written Constitution . . . .”).
502 See, e.g., BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 76, at 407–18; BORK,
TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 167–70; Rehnquist, Living, supra note 4, at 705 (arguing against
judicial decision pursuant to the doctrine of a Living Constitution, and arguing that demo-
cratic political action is the only process “compatible with political theory basic to democratic
society by which one’s own conscientious belief may be translated into positive law and
thereby obtain the only general moral imprimatur permissible in a pluralistic, democratic
society”); Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 38–47.
503 Compare AMAR, UNWRITTEN, supra note 479, at ix–x, with Scalia, INTERPRETATION,
supra note 6, at 38–47. See generally BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 376.
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we may not have recognized are available to us, in some instances our inquiry into
the performative element and use of the constitutional text may take us beyond the
meaning of the text. But none of the techniques defended here would appear to their
proponents to be unfaithful to the Constitution. Their proponents also seek and pro-
claim their fidelity to the Constitution.504 They do so, however, in such a different way
that the originalists would not agree that their critics maintain the requisite fidelity.
The introduction of the concepts of the Invisible and Unwritten Constitutions
would also create extraneous sources of authority for constitutional interpretation
and constitutional decision.505 While that strategy might appear attractive to some
of originalism’s critics, it is not likely to persuade originalists.506 It is not likely to
persuade originalists for a number of reasons. Most importantly, of course, they are
not written to persuade the originalists: Amar’s ideopolis is distinct from that of the
originalists and he appears to have no desire to visit. Indeed, Amar’s work is likely
to be rhetorically unsuccessful even with many critics of originalism.507 More funda-
mentally, our canonical constitutional argument does not incorporate appeals to the
Invisible or Unwritten Constitutions.508 The anti-foundational account of our con-
stitutional practice I have defended cannot endorse such foundational, theoretical
arguments for a departure from our constitutional decisional practice.
Those extraneous sources Tribe and Amar would look to are not part of the
written Constitution itself.509 Amar characterizes the written and unwritten constitu-
tions as the yin and yang of our constitutional law.510 My rejection of Amar’s strategy
turns on the relationship between the written and unwritten constitutions that he pro-
pounds. His strategy is implausible as a matter of constitutional language and para-
doxical as a matter of constitutional practice. We do not need an Unwritten Constitution
to understand the language of the Constitution, and we do not need the Unwritten
Constitution to decide constitutional cases. Amar pursues a subtle strategy to ground
our constitutional practice and decisions on a foundation of the synthesized written
and unwritten constitutions. As a foundationalist account, it must fail.511
504 See, e.g., AMAR, UNWRITTEN, supra note 479, at xi; Dworkin, Arduous, supra note 258
(asserting that his moral reading of the Constitution maintains fidelity, not the mechanical
reading defended by the originalists).
505 AMAR, UNWRITTEN, supra note 479, at xi.
506 See Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 38–47.
507 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY
320 (2016) (implicitly characterizing Amar’s Unwritten Constitution and Tribe’s Invisible
Constitution as works of provocation without practical utility to the judiciary).
508 See generally BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 7–8. Bobbitt’s structural argument
may incorporate much of Amar’s concept of the Unwritten Constitution, but I cannot explore
this potential line of harmonization further here.
509 See AMAR, UNWRITTEN, supra note 479, at xii–xiii; TRIBE, INVISIBLE, supra note 186,
at 6–8.
510 AMAR, UNWRITTEN, supra note 479, at xiii.
511 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 6–8; LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge,
supra note 43.
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The fourth element that should deter persistent protagonists from seeking to
continue the debate is that none of the differing accounts of constitutional reasoning
underlying the debate is satisfactory, and they share common flaws.512 The most
obviously unsatisfactory is the formalism of Robert Bork’s originalism.513 He at-
tempts to assimilate constitutional arguments to the syllogisms of formal logic.514
But constitutional argument cannot be reduced to such syllogistic form.515 Attempts
to reduce real life constitutional arguments to those simple structures may reveal
important elements in those arguments, but those attempts also lose critical elements
in the arguments. In particular, given the alternative modes of argument, no formal
syllogism is adequate to derive a decision, because it cannot explain the rejection of
alternative arguments made in other modes. The arguments made under any mode,
on Bobbitt’s account, are effectively incommensurable with the arguments under the
other modes.516 While other originalists do not go as far as Bork, they share his
strategy for formalization.517 Such formality is not incidental to originalism. The
formalism of originalism is an essential element in the originalist strategy to limit
judicial discretion and the kinds of prudential and, perhaps, ethical argument that
may provide sources of change in our constitutional law.
Originalism’s critics generally offer equally implausible accounts of constitu-
tional reasoning. While Dworkin claims that his account of law outperforms compet-
ing theories because of its account of legal argument and reasoning,518 Dworkin’s
account is fundamentally implausible.519 Nor do other critics of originalism offer
512 One of the starkest contrasts in these accounts is between Robert Bork’s formalistic
syllogistic reasoning and Ronald Dworkin’s comprehensive theory, posited in his law as
integrity theory; neither account captures our actual practice of constitutional reasoning and
argument very well. See infra notes 528–33 and accompanying text.
513 BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 162.
514 Id. at 162–63 (describing the constitutional text as providing a “major premise” in
constitutional argument).
515 For an alternative description, see PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 53, at 169–79 (de-
scribing a complex structure for legal argument that cannot be reduced to the classical models
of formal logic). See also LeDuc, Practical Reasoning, supra note 83, at 27–40 (endorsing
an informal description of constitutional reasoning and argument).
516 See, e.g., BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 5–8.
517 See, e.g., Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 45. See generally LeDuc, Practical
Reasoning, supra note 83, at 27–40.
518 See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 66, at 43–44.
519 First, I am unpersuaded by Dworkin’s realism and his claim that constitutional values
are found rather than made. See DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 93, at 36–41. Second, Dworkin’s
rejection of many of the established modes of constitutional argument (including the textual
and the historical), to the extent that he is committed to his claim of a complete ethico-legal
synthesis in his theory of law as integrity, appears implausible. While Sunstein appears
equally wrong in his opposite claim that constitutional decision should never be made on the
basis of general principles, Dworkin appears equally mistaken in his claim that decisions
must be grounded on a unique, complete principle ultimately grounded on moral and political
2017] STRIDING OUT OF BABEL 175
more satisfactory accounts. Sunstein offers perhaps the most radical strategy as he
rejects principled argument almost entirely.520 Principled reasoning and sweeping
opinions and decisions have their place in constitutional decision. They have a
place, notwithstanding Sunstein’s important and accurate reminders of the limits of
the place of the courts in our political, constitutional democratic republic and as
engines of social change.521 Just as Brown is the cliff over which the originalists may
be thrown by their critics,522 so, too, is it the cliff over which the Sunsteinian
minimalists may be thrown. While Brown could have been more principled than it
was, the rejection of the separate but equal doctrine was fundamental, principled,
and far-reaching. Once Brown was decided, it was unlikely that the Supreme Court
would reverse direction. As a result, the federal government became committed in
new and important ways to the goal of racial equality in America.523 That scope and
implication could not have been achieved with an unprincipled, minimalist decision.
These four failures inherent in the positions and arguments of both sides in the
debate do not conclusively rebut either position in the debate or preclude the con-
tinuation of the debate. But taken together, when coupled with the stalemate in the
debate and the other symptoms of pathology, these weaknesses strongly suggest that
the debate should be abandoned.
The rejection of the originalism debate argued for here cannot be more defini-
tive. To some extent, the characterization of the debate is as a matter of mistaken
modalities. The kinds of arguments from the constitutional text, and the original
philosophy. See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 66, at 225 (“According to law as integrity,
propositions of law are true if they figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness,
and procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the com-
munity’s legal practice.”); SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 159, at 49 (describing
Dworkin’s Hercules as an “oddball,” because his elaborate, comprehensive, and principled
theory of decision-making will make it very difficult, if not impossible, for him to find common
ground with other judges). For my criticisms, see generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational
Challenge, supra note 43.
520 See SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 159, at 38–41; SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE,
supra note 164, at 41.
521 See SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 159, at 176 (characterizing Brown as
ineffective in securing the desegregation of public schools and claiming that effective steps
toward such desegregation required political, legislative action); see also ROSENBERG, supra
note 310, at 70–71 (expressing substantial reservations about the role of the courts as agents
for change with respect to fundamental social practice and concluding, with respect to the
impact of the federal courts on racial discrimination, that “Brown and its progeny stand for
the proposition that courts are impotent to produce significant social reform”).
522 See BASSHAM, PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 106 (arguing that originalism
cannot give an account of the decision in Brown and that that failure discredits originalism
as a plausible constitutional theory).
523 Sometimes a hollow hope is better than no hope at all. Balkin, as noted before, captures
this aspirational ability of the Constitution to keep citizens’ hopes for justice alive. See
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 51, at 60–62.
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intentions and understandings, are good modes of argument. Similarly, the modes
emphasized in their place by the critics—precedential, doctrinal, prudential, and struc-
tural among them—are also established and permissible kinds of argument made in
our constitutional practice.524 The error—for the originalists and for their critics—
lies in privileging one or more modes of argument in derogation of the others.
C. Later Resistance: Can the Protagonists Rehabilitate the Debate?
It is valuable to consider the replies that the protagonists in the debate may offer
to support their positions and thereby, implicitly, the debate itself. None of what has
been advanced here can offer a definitive rebuttal of the claims that have been made
in the debate. The protagonists can continue the debate without standing convicted
of an error in logic, a category mistake, or otherwise of a mistake that could properly
be characterized as calling into question their rationality. I do not purport to have
offered a call to end the debate that all rational persons must hear and accept. I hope
some of what I have argued suggests why practical reasoning does not operate at the
level that could deliver conclusions of that force.
The arguments made here are directed, first, to persuade judges responsible for
deciding constitutional cases. They are also meant to persuade originalist judges to
support their originalist arguments and results on the merits of those arguments and
the weaknesses inherent in the countervailing arguments from other modes. My
arguments are meant to persuade originalist judges to eschew the strategy of sug-
gesting that alternative modes of argument are impermissible.525
The arguments here are also designed to persuade proponents of the Living
Constitution or the Unwritten Constitution, along with other critics of originalism,
to defend their proposed decisional outcomes on the strength of the established,
canonical modes of constitutional argument that support those outcomes, and on
basis of their assessment of the inherent weaknesses in the countervailing textual
and historical arguments. For such critics of originalism, the claim here is that the
systematic rejection of the modes of argument that the originalists make is not a
strategy that may fruitfully be pursued.
524 Certainly many originalists sometimes employ structural argument, too. But to the
extent that they do so, they are employing a mode of argument that is not entirely consistent
with their claim to look only to the historical semantic understanding of the constitutional
text in constitutional interpretation and decision. Because we naturally rely on pragmatic
import in determining meaning, context often supplies important linguistic content. It may
be that the originalists ought to be understood as looking to linguistic meaning, not only to
the austere semantic meaning of the text.
525 For a fuller statement of these arguments, see generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational
Challenge, supra note 43. I have sketched how abandoning the debate would enable us to
enrich our constitutional decisional discourse. See LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 31, at
197–220.
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Whom can these therapeutic strategies reasonably be expected to cure? In theory,
both camps. But the manner in which the theoretical commitments of judges are to
be changed by the therapeutic elements incorporated here is different. Part of the
therapeutic strategy is designed to make the protagonists want to abandon the de-
bate, convincing them that the costs of abandoning their respective claims of privilege
and giving up the debate is an acceptable cost to incur. In Kuhnian terms, the thera-
peutic strategy is to propose and defend a paradigm shift.526 That shift replaces the
representational, foundational account of constitutional law and acknowledges the
priority of our constitutional practice.
When my strategy is characterized in these terms, the failure of the prior efforts
along these lines by Bobbitt and Patterson may make more sense. Because of the
intensity with which they advocated their then-radical views, it is not surprising that
they encountered equally intense resistance.527
The second class intended as an audience for the arguments and as patients for
the therapy are American constitutional scholars. The challenge faced to persuade
or cure this class is perhaps even more daunting. That is because they are even more
conceptually invested in their claims. For them to be persuaded by my arguments
or persuaded to make a paradigm shift in their thinking about the nature of the
Constitution, the truth of propositions of constitutional law and the associated
implications for originalism and its critics requires an intellectual tectonic shift. It
is hard to be optimistic that this will happen.
The originalists may attempt to rehabilitate their claims and to restart the debate
by recharacterizing my arguments and my nonargumentative therapeutic strategies.
They may argue that I have conceded that historical and textual arguments are
recognized forms of constitutional argument.528 In order to reassert the core orig-
inalist claim and restart the debate, originalism need only privilege those modes of
argument vis à vis the other modes of constitutional argument.529
526 See generally KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 414, at 43–76 (arguing that the
results of scientific evidence are insufficient to determine the choice between radically different
scientific theories and that scientific revolutions require paradigm shifts in scientific thinking).
527 See, e.g., Patrick O. Gudridge, False Peace and Constitutional Tradition, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1969, 1969 (1983) (reviewing PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982)) (re-
jecting the temptation to judge Constitutional Fate simply as bad—“[i]t is easy, upon first
reading, to characterize Constitutional Fate as simply a ‘bad’ book”—instead characterizing
Constitutional Fate as a “provocation”).
528 See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43. But I deny that
such historical or textual arguments are privileged when they conflict with other modes of
argument, thus denying the core originalist claim. See LeDuc, Privileged How?, supra note
251 (asserting that the claim that such authorities generate privileged arguments, to a greater
or lesser degree, is the core tenet of originalism).
529 See LeDuc, Privileged How?, supra note 251, at 6–62 (cataloging the principal ways
that the force of the privilege accorded the original understandings, expectations, and in-
tentions varies with the particular form of originalism).
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Establishing that claim of privilege, once the force of these modes of argument
has been acknowledged, may appear a modest task. But originalism has been trying
unsuccessfully to move from the existence of such arguments as accepted forms of
constitutional argument to a claim of privilege for those modes for the past several
decades. To redirect a practically powerful argument made by Robert Bork against
originalism’s critics,530 if the originalists were going to establish the claim of priv-
ilege, they would have done so long ago. Conceptually, the originalists cannot es-
tablish the claim of privilege because the other modes of constitutional argument are
a constitutive part of our constitutional law.531 When I characterize those arguments
as constitutive, I mean those arguments are, as descriptive matter, how our constitu-
tional law is made, beginning with advocates, who endorse or criticize one or more
modes of argument to support a decision in cases of constitutional controversy.532
The arguments and decisions are what our constitutional law is; it is not a parchment
or printed copy of the Constitution in the National Archives.533 By characterizing the
canonical modes of constitutional decisional argument as constitutive, I mean that
they constitute the social practice that is our constitutional law.
Thus, even if the task of privileging the original understandings and intentions
appears relatively modest to originalists, that project is nevertheless fundamentally
inconsistent with the pluralist, modal account of constitutional argument and de-
cision defended here. The arguments made here are inconsistent with privileging
those kinds of arguments in a constitutional decisional discourse. Such a privilege
is at once inconsistent with our constitutional practice and its demand for the ex-
ercise of judgment in constitutional decision.
Charles Barzun has begun to sketch an inclusive, non-positivist approach that
offers one of the latest contributions to the debate.534 His focus has been on criticiz-
ing the arguments William Baude makes for providing a new, uncontroversial,
positivist foundation for originalism,535 but he does not reject the originalist position.
Barzun characterized the positivist strategy to rehabilitate the originalist arguments
as project to find a middle ground between the originalists and their critics.536 In
particular, it is a means to find a middle ground between opposing positions in the
debate over how to interpret the Constitution.537 Thus, there are similarities between
530 BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 255.
531 See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 53, at xi–xvii.
532 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 4–6.
533 AMAR, UNWRITTEN, supra note 479, at 64–69 (describing the discrepancy between the
parchment copy of the Constitution in the National Archives and the printed copies presented
to the ratifying conventions).
534 Charles L. Barzun, The Positive U-Turn, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1323 (2017) [hereinafter
Barzun, Positive U-Turn].
535 See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015).
536 Barzun, Positive U-Turn, supra note 534, at 1328.
537 Id. (characterizing the new positivist originalism as claiming to “help resolve, or at
least reorient, our scholarly debates about how to interpret our Constitution”).
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his project and mine. Barzun is critical of the claims that Baude and Sachs make,
because what Barzun characterizes as a fundamental tension between the legal
academy and legal practice cannot be bridged so easily.538 Barzun thinks that some-
thing like Baude’s and Sachs’s project can bridge the gap if the fundamental, positivist
distinction often drawn between the internal and external perspective is discarded.539
He briefly argues that without such a distinction our legal discourse can be broad-
ened to incorporate contributions from theoretical disciplines now thought to offer
an external perspective.540 If we end up making that choice in our constitutional law—
and I am skeptical that we will—it will not be on the basis of jurisprudential argument.
I want to distance myself from Barzun’s objections on at least three levels. More
importantly, I want to discount the prospect that his inclusive approach offers the
path forward in the debate. First, I do not think the internal/external distinction
should be rejected. That distinction, at least in constitutional law, is grounded in the
particular practices that constitute our constitutional law in general and the particular
canonical forms of constitutional argument.541 Arguments against characterizing our
constitutional discourse as a practice do not seem descriptively apt. Second, Barzun
argues that Baude and Sachs do not understand the philosophical and theoretical
complexity underlying the originalism debate.542 As a result, they gloss over the
fundamental questions that demand answers if we are to choose among theories of
constitutional law. My objections to Baude and Sachs come from the opposite
direction: they accord too much authority to theoretical argument in their approach
to the originalism debate.543 Third, at a meta-philosophical level, Barzun, like Baude
and Sachs, misunderstands what philosophy should aspire to do and, more impor-
tantly, what philosophy can do.544 He envisions a robust role for philosophy and thinks
that philosophy can and should be enlisted to tell us how constitutional argument
can be made.545 Barzun has not acknowledged or engaged my claims in The Rela-
tionship of Constitutional Law to Philosophy and he does not otherwise engage the
538 Id. at 1330.
539 Id.; see Charles L. Barzun, Inside-Out: Beyond the Internal/External Distinction in
Legal Scholarship, 101 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1212–24 (2015).
540 Barzun, Positive U-Turn, supra note 534, at 1386–87.
541 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 64, at 3–8 (describing the practice of argument that
constitutes our constitutional law); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Internal/External Distinction and
the Notion of a “Practice” in Legal Theory and Sociolegal Studies, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
163 (1996) (endorsing the internal/external distinction and exploring its relationship to con-
cepts of shared practices).
542 See Barzun, Positive U-Turn, supra note 534, at 1330.
543 See LeDuc, Paradoxes, supra note 100, at 635–45.
544 See Barzun, Positive U-Turn, supra note 534, at 1328 (“[The new legal positivism]
suggests that deep questions of legal theory or philosophy may shed light on what legal
practice requires.”); LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 43,
at 153–54.
545 Barzun, Positive U-Turn, supra note 534, at 1386–87.
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arguments that ascribe a therapeutic role to philosophy. Had he done so, he might
have been more cautious in tacitly defending a foundational role for such philosoph-
ical argument. He is not necessarily wrong, but he is not entitled to his claim as a
matter of argument—the same criticism he makes of Baude.546
Finally, it is for these reasons that Barzun does not offer us new hope that the
originalism debate may be resolved on its own terms. The therapeutic arguments I
have offered against earlier iterations in the debate are thus also applicable against
Barzun’s stance.
Originalism’s critics also have a variety of strategies by which they might seek
to salvage their claims from the criticisms here. To do so they might interpret or
restate my criticism of originalism’s account of constitutional language and the truth
of propositions of constitutional law as showing that textual and historical modes
of argument are confused or otherwise untenable. If that were so, my account would
also fail as a description of our constitutional practice and thus would be inconsis-
tent with my own account of what a constitutional theory must do. Nothing in my
account discredits the historical or textual modes of argument made by originalists;
those are good modes of argument, even if they are not privileged modes of argu-
ment.547 They are coequal with other modes of constitutional argument.548 All are
part of our constitutional practice and, as such, constitutive of our constitutional law.
While originalism’s critics rightly point out my claim that tacit philosophical
premises underlie originalism, I made a parallel claim with respect to originalism’s
critics.549 So a strategy to endorse my claims against originalism requires a defense
against the parallel claims against the Living Constitution and the related strands of
originalism’s critics.
The originalists and their critics might each begin to defend their respective
positions and the continuing need for the debate on the basis that my challenge to
the underlying philosophical premises of the debate is unpersuasive.550 The philo-
sophical arguments against the premises of the originalism debate, particularly in the
stronger form I have outlined, admittedly do not reflect a consensus in contemporary
analytic philosophy.551 In the weaker form, it appears a more plausible stance,
simply asserting the absence of an objective world to which statements of consti-
tutional law correspond.552 If the premises that there is an objective, ontologically
546 Id. at 1330.
547 See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43, at 197–202 (en-
dorsing a pluralist account that recognizes multiple modes of constitutional argument).
548 See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 53, at x–xiii.
549 See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 41, at 305–22.
550 For the more complete statement of these arguments, and possible replies, see LeDuc,
Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43, at 202–06.
551 See generally id.
552 See also PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 53, at 154–63 (arguing that the of propositions
of law is not a matter of correspondence but a matter of our legal practice); cf. HARMAN,
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independent Constitution and that the truth of propositions of constitutional law is
determined by their correspondence vel non with such independent Constitution can
be defended, then there would appear to be ground on which to carry forward the
debate over originalism without interruption.
One response to such a strategy should be to note the cost that such a strategy
would exact—most tellingly for the originalists, but for most of their critics, too.553
Once originalism acknowledges its philosophical premises, some of its claims to the
simplicity and transparency would appear compromised.554 Its sneers at highfalutin
philosophy would also appear unfair. The truth of originalism’s claims would appear
hostage to originalism’s own tacit philosophical premises.555
It might be argued that conceding that originalism relies on certain premises,
whether ontological, epistemological, or drawn from the philosophy of language, is
no more damaging than Bork’s acknowledgment that originalism relies on the moral
premises of the Founders.556 The Founders and the adopters of the Reconstruction
Amendments relied upon these foundational, representational premises.557 But there
are two important differences. First, it is unclear whether or how these premises are
embedded in the constitutional text. Second, it is unclear whether rejecting these
premises is more properly analogized to making value judgments or to changing our
views about the nature of things. To an extent, this shift in philosophical view is
characterized as an advance in our knowledge, rather than a change in our moral
stance. But to so characterize the original understanding is not unlike the way
Dworkin would approach the Constitution. Accordingly, if originalism concedes its
reliance on such philosophical premises, the cost of that concession would be high.
Not surprisingly, therefore, mainstream originalism does not interpret the relevant
original understanding that way.
MORALITY, supra note 350, at 3–10 (exploring the seemingly limited relationship between
normative ethical statements and evidence from the observed world).
553 To the extent that Dworkin has already made this claim expressly, such a strategy has al-
ready been deployed. See DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 93, at 40 (“Given how we go on, the
height of the mountain is not determined by how we go on but by masses of earth and stone.”).
For my defense of an anti-representational, anti-foundational constitutional theory, see LeDuc,
Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43; LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 75.
554 See generally LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 41.
555 Brandom’s account of the error of the originalists and their radical critics is not stated
expressly in terms of their ontological commitments with respect to the Constitution. Brandom
instead states the error as misunderstanding the paired elements of authority and responsi-
bility for judges in their decisional practice. Brandom, Legal Concept Determination, supra
note 5, at 37–38. According to Brandom, the duty to interpret and apply the law by reference
to its historical understanding is accompanied by an authority to interpret that law as a judge
determines proper. Id. But Brandom does not explore the source of the duty that binds judges
or the parameters within which judges’ authority operates. The originalists, and many of their
critics, attribute that constraint to the objective Constitution. Brandom’s account is not in-
consistent with my argument.
556 See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 177.
557 There were no alternatives to such accounts at those times.
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IV. BEYOND THE ORIGINALISM DEBATE
Thus, even if the task of privileging the original understandings and intentions
appears relatively modest to originalists, that project is nevertheless fundamentally
inconsistent with the pluralist, modal account of constitutional argument and de-
cision defended here. The arguments made here are inconsistent with privileging
those kinds of arguments in a constitutional decisional discourse. Such a privilege
is at once inconsistent with our constitutional practice and its demand for the exer-
cise of judgment in constitutional decision.
My therapeutic strategy has had four steps. First, I argued that the debate over
originalism long ago reached a stalemate—even with the celebrated introduction of
New Originalism.558 The debate fails to generate new ideas, arguments, or conclusions
of any practical or theoretical import to our constitutional practice. There is admit-
tedly the appearance of progress, most notably in the arguments of New Originalism,
through the introduction of increasingly sophisticated analytic philosophy of lan-
guage into the debate.559 But that appearance is illusory. Those new strategies have
not convinced the protagonists’ opponents and they do not yield a better description
of our constitutional practice. The debate is pathological.
Second, drawing heavily on the argument made in earlier articles,560 I defended
an account of the conceptual confusions that underlie both sides of the debate, mak-
ing the debate possible.561 I highlighted the shared ontological assumption that an
objective Constitution makes our constitutional statements true or false and that the
decision of constitutional cases begins with the interpretation of the constitutional
text. Those premises make the debate, as it has been carried out, possible.
Third, and finally, I parried potential rebuttal arguments against my therapeutic
strategy and defended the claim that the debate cannot be reconstructed or revived,
criticizing the principal advances claimed by the originalists and their critics as
without promise.562 Progress in this part of the space of reasons will come from
moving beyond the terms of the debate and beyond the foundational premises that
make the debate possible.
The ongoing debate over originalism should be forsaken because it is pointless.
Neither side can prevail because the implicit ontological premise of the debate—
the existence of an original understanding in the requisite sense that the original-
ists privilege and their critics reject—does not exist.563 It does not exist because our
558 See supra Section I.A.
559 See supra Section I.A.
560 See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43; LeDuc, Onto-
logical Foundations, supra note 41.
561 See LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 43; LeDuc, Ontological Founda-
tions, supra note 41; supra Section I.B.
562 See supra Part III.
563 For a statement of this claim and my defense of it, see LeDuc, Anti-Foundational
Challenge, supra note 43, at 142–51.
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constitutional law consists of a practice of resolving constitutional case controversies
on the basis of accepted modes of argument. Some of those modes look to the original
historical understanding of the text; some do not. It might appear that I am endorsing
the anti-originalist side of debate. The sense in which there is no original understanding
is as damaging to the traditional anti-originalist position as it is to the originalist
claims.564 If the account of constitutional law as a matter of social practice is correct,
then the originalist project of identifying the original understanding of the Constitu-
tion and employing that understanding to decide cases, without more, is impossible.
Similarly, the anti-originalists’ project to demonstrate that the originalists are
wrong about the facts of the matter with respect to constitutional law is misguided.
The anti-originalists argue that the original understanding of the original understand-
ing was inconsistent with the originalist project565 or, as Tribe, Brest, and Dworkin
have all argued,566 that the original understanding was necessarily incomplete or un-
certain. Tribe and Dworkin assume that there is a constitutional fact of the matter that
is relevant in some controlling way to the controversy presented in a constitutional
case.567 The critics also adopt two fundamental erroneous concepts: first, of language—
that propositions of constitutional law correspond to constitutional facts, if true, and sec-
ond, of rules—that we need an interpretation of a rule before we may apply that rule.
I have defended the thesis that there are no facts outside of our social practices
to which we may appeal in determining the truth of our propositions of constitu-
tional law. As a result, the disagreement over the original understanding, the original
expectations, or the original intentions with respect to constitutional provisions can-
not either be sustained or refuted in the manner assumed by the protagonists in the
564 See id.
565 See Powell, supra note 8, at 948 (“[The originalism debate] cannot be resolved,
however, and should not be affected, by the claim or assumption that modern intentionalism
was the original presupposition of American constitutional discourse. Such a claim is his-
torically mistaken.”).
566 See generally Tribe, INTERPRETATION, supra note 21, at 65–66 (arguing that Justice
Scalia’s originalism conflates a semantic or linguistic originalism with an approach that looks
to the original expectations with respect to constitutional provisions); Paul Brest, The Miscon-
ceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980) (arguing that the
constitutional text is underdetermined); Dworkin, Forum, supra note 152, at 476–79 (arguing
that the concept of collective original intentions is not well-defined).
567 See DWORKIN, No Right Answer?, supra note 456, at 119 (arguing that there is indeed
one right answer to legal questions, as a matter of fact); LeDuc, Ontological Foundations,
supra note 41, at 320–22 (arguing that Tribe is committed to the existence of an ontologically
independent Constitution despite his emphasis on practice and his skepticism about sys-
tematic theories of interpretation like those defended by Justice Scalia and Ronald Dworkin).
But see TRIBE, INVISIBLE, supra note 186 (raising doubts about whether there is a fact of the
matter with respect to constitutional propositions through the hypothesization of an Invisible
Constitution). Dworkin does not believe that the originalists are right about their claim that
there is a fact of the matter about the original intentions. See Dworkin, Forum, supra note
152, at 476–77. See generally LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 41.
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debate. Originalists and their critics each tacitly appeal in their arguments about the
content of our constitutional law to an ontologically independent constitution that
does not exist. That ontological deficit undermines the arguments each side makes.
In the case of the originalist critics, the appeal to other facts to prove the truth of anti-
originalist propositions of constitutional law is no more compelling. The originalists’
modes of historical and textual argument cannot be delegitimized by historical or
philosophical arguments. Further, to the extent that the Living Constitution derives
its force by contrast with the originalist account, the anti-realist Living Constitution
is no more plausible than the realist account of original understanding or intentions.
The debate over originalism should be abandoned because it is fruitless. Orig-
inalism offers the siren call of a decision process that reestablishes constitutional
consensus and eliminates the apparent judicial discretion run amok of the Warren
Court. Anti-originalism offers the promise of a competing methodology that delivers
justice and freedom through the Constitution and the Court, unfettered by historical
understandings or expectations and untainted by the racist and sexist beliefs and
assumptions of the Founders.568 Both assume that there is an objective Constitution
to which such appeals may be made. Both projects are thus similarly misguided; we
must abandon the chimera of a Constitution against which we can test the truth of
our propositions of constitutional law, creating a decision process that can give us
certainty and consensus. Instead, we must eke out our constitutional decisions, and
our progress, if any, in the hard, particularized field of constitutional argument. The
alternative of invoking global arguments to discredit the opposing stance, however
seductive they may be to the protagonists in the debate, is illusory. It is illusory be-
cause there is no Archimedean stance from which to delegitimize accepted, canoni-
cal forms of constitutional argument from outside our practice of constitutional
argument and decision.569
It may be that, like the prior approaches to win or otherwise resolve the debate,
a therapeutic approach to the debate is doomed to fail. None of the participants
themselves have given much indication that they are open to therapy or even recog-
nize the need for it. Therapy may cure, but only if the patients are open to help. If
the participants must experience deep frustration and despair over the debate before
568 The anti-originalists must acknowledge the constraints of precedent and stare decisis,
but as Brown demonstrated, the anti-originalists are prepared to limit or overturn such
precedent as may be necessary. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493–95 (1954)
(fundamentally limiting Plessy v. Ferguson as a controlling interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause).
569 Further support for this pluralist, anti-foundational account comes from Noah Feldman’s
recent account of the mid-twentieth-century Supreme Court. See NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS:
THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (2010). While that
work is largely insensitive to the constitutional-theoretic issues underlying some of the con-
flict, it richly captures the decisional practices that instantiate the modal, pluralist account
of constitutional argument and law.
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making the kinds of fundamental changes sketched by this Article, we must question
whether the participants have yet reached that stage. After all, scholastic philosophy
survived, increasingly arcane and academic, for centuries before it was replaced.
Despite all of the evidence, most of the debate’s protagonists appear to believe
that their triumph is at hand.570 My critical account of the debate from each side’s
perspective may lead even the hardened participants to step back and assess how
fruitless their project has proven.
Perhaps the originalists and their critics cannot imagine a world in which the
Constitution is a matter of practice, rather than an objective artifact that can provide
us with answers when we face constitutional controversies in cases. The therapeutic
strategy pursued here requires abandoning the notion that there is a Constitution that
can give currency to our constitutional claims independent of our hurly-burly prac-
tice of constitutional argument and decision. Without being able to imagine that
alternative, the therapeutic project pursued in this Article must fail, and the debate
must continue. Thus, the final therapeutic step remaining is to begin to imagine and
contemplate the world of constitutional decision and interpretation without the dual-
isms of the originalism debate.
We must first identify what we would give up in abandoning the originalism
debate; we must also recognize what we would gain. If we abandon the originalism
debate, we must abandon the strategy of delegitimizing other modes of argument.571
The originalists must concede that prudential, structural, doctrinal, and ethical ar-
guments are legitimate modes of argument. When those arguments are made in
constitutional decision, they legitimize the decisions made—even if contrary argu-
ments may also be made that such arguments are noncompelling or the decision
itself is erroneous.
The corresponding strategy by originalism’s critics to delegitimize the historical
and textual arguments of the originalists also fails. Originalism’s critics must
acknowledge the place of historical and textual arguments. No constitutional theory
can delegitimize those forms of argument. In the place of wholesale, methodological
challenges to various modes of argument, we must return to a retail method of con-
stitutional argument. Each constitutional question must be addressed on its own
even while attending to the overall constitutional fabric. That does not mean that we
must abandon stare decisis. We can both address each case and controversy on its
particular terms and recognize the importance of consistency and general rules by
continuing our constitutional decision practices. Beyond Babel sketches the public
570 See, e.g., Scalia, Response, supra note 76, at 149 (announcing the beginning of hard
times for originalism’s critics); Dworkin, Bork, supra note 1, at 674; Posner, Bork, supra
note 25, at 1369–70 (announcing the demise of originalism).
571 The anti-foundational arguments made here would foreclose other delegitimization
strategies, too, because if our constitutional arguments comprise our constitutional law, then
no mode of those arguments may be excised from our decisional process on the basis of
theoretical argument.
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space of reasons in an alternative constitutional world that we can now recognize as
possible, where arguments are made and cases decided without the pervasive metrics
and informing concepts of an ongoing debate over originalism.572
In conclusion, the pathology of the debate is apparent. Traditional arguments
made over many decades by each side have failed to persuade their intended audi-
ences. A novel, therapeutic stance toward the debate over originalism offers a prom-
ise for relief.
572 See generally LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 31.
